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This thesis bundles four studies on saving for retirement and the role of the pension
system. Saving for retirement has been and remains to be an important topic on the
policy agenda, and has produced a wide spectrum of research in economics. The
four studies aim to contribute to understanding the role of pension systems in the
decision how much to save for retirement. A key feature in the ﬁrst three essays
concerns the role of uncertainty in the decision to put money aside, investigated
using Dutch microeconomic data, whereas the last study takes a European view on
the same topic. Uncertainty in pension income is of particular policy interest in the
Netherlands at this moment. The current ﬁnancial crisis has shown the vulnerabil-
ity of the Dutch pension funds to bad stock market returns and low interest rates,
which puts pension beneﬁts of all participants at risk. This comes on top of the
problems due to aging of the population, which increases the social security pay-
check. In this introductory chapter, I will ﬁrst motivate the research and discuss its
policy relevance in section 1.2. Second, I present the research questions the thesis
aims to answer in section 1.3. Section 1.4 summarizes the main ﬁndings of the four
studies. The remaining chapters of this thesis present the four studies undertaken.
All chapters may be read independently.
1.2 Motivation and contents
The idea of saving for retirement is very old, and broadly ranges from raising chil-
dren to take care of the elderly parent to investing in a pension fund. In both cases,
the individual expects to enter a stage in life without ﬁnancial resources from labor.
Saving for retirement serves to prevent people from starvation after terminating
their working career. With the introduction of the Bismarckian welfare state, and
in particular the old-age social security system, the government has stepped in to
provide their citizens a level of income to ﬁnance consumption expenditures. The
pension system expanded by the introduction of employer-provided pension plans.
In the Netherlands, the social security system (the ﬁrst pillar of the pension system)
covers all citizens of the Netherlands, while around 90% of employees are covered
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by an occupational pension plan (the second pillar). Together, these two pillars
provide generous pension beneﬁts upon retirement from the labor market.
There are multiple economic consequences of the introduction of a pension sys-
tem, most importantly: 1) reduced fertility, as the elderly parent becomes ﬁnan-
cially independent of the children (Neher, 1971); 2) changes in labor supply, indi-
viduals end their working career (before or) upon reaching the statutory retirement
age to claim pension beneﬁts (Stock and Wise, 1990); and 3) reductions in private
wealth accumulation. This thesis focuses on the third consequence: how does the
provision of public and occupational pensions affect wealth accumulation? In a
simple economic setting, the answer to this question is straightforward: each euro
received after retirement implies a one euro decrease in savings before retirement.
This crowding out effect of private wealth by pension wealth has been predicted in
the theoretical literature, starting with Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Fried-
man (1957), and subsequently tested empirically using aggregate data (Feldstein,
1974) and microeconomic data (Dicks-Mireaux and King, 1984; Gale, 1998).*
In reality, the economic environment the typical household faces is more com-
plicated than the simple setting described above. The vast majority of the empirical
literature uses a version of the lifecycle model based on perfect foresight: individu-
als can perfectly predict the future. That is, an individual of, say, age 40 knows his
future earnings, pension beneﬁts, the rate of inﬂation, the timing of his death and
all other economic variables relevant to making the saving decision. This assump-
tion is convenient in theoretical work and empirical speciﬁcations, but is unlikely
to be justiﬁed in reality. Indeed, as already noted by Keynes (1936), one of the fac-
tors inﬂuencing the propensity to consume out of income is:
“Changes in expectations of the relation between the present and the future level of income.
– We must catalogue this factor for the sake of formal completeness. But, whilst it
may affect considerably a particular individual’s propensity to consume, it is likely
to average out for the community as a whole. Moreover, it is a matter about which
there is, as a rule, too much uncertainty for it to exert much inﬂuence.” (Keynes,
1936, Chapter 8)
* More extensive literature reviews are presented in the core chapters of the thesis.
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From a macroeconomic perspective, Keynes may be right in saying that expecta-
tions are not so important for consumption decisions. However, for an individual,
expectations of future income may well be very important for explaining behavior.
In the ﬁrst two essays, I allow individuals to be uncertain about the future, and in-
stead model future pension beneﬁts (as a fraction of earnings) as a random variable.
To estimate the lifecycle model with uncertainty over pension beneﬁts using micro-
economic data, we need to know how uncertain people are over their estimate of
future income. Dominitz and Manski (1997) developed a survey methodology to
elicit the subjective distribution of a random variable. Their methodological inno-
vation has been used in the Dutch Pension Barometer survey to elicit the subjective
distribution of pension beneﬁts for a sample of Dutch employees. In short, instead
of asking the respondent to indicate how much pension beneﬁts he expects to re-
ceive in the future, the survey asks him to state the probability that his pension
beneﬁts are less than 100% of his current income. Asking the same question for
different thresholds (for example, less than 70% of current income) then gives the
researcher an idea of the shape of the distribution of pension beneﬁts. From this
distribution, both the mean and standard deviation, as measures of the expected
level of beneﬁts as well as the uncertainty around this estimate, can be computed.
Chapter 2 discusses the usefulness of this methodology, and analyzes which fac-
tors inﬂuence the expected level of and uncertainty over pension beneﬁts. Chapter
3 subsequently uses the expected level pension beneﬁts and the degree of uncer-
tainty to explain household saving, and as such relaxes the assumption of perfect
foresight in an empirical lifecycle model.
Chapters 4 and 5 also contribute to the empirical literature on saving for retire-
ment, but, in contrast to chapters 2 and 3, do not focus on relaxing the assumption
of income certainty. Chapter 4 recognizes the fact that, although the pension system
in the Netherlands is generous, households may still wish to engage in other forms
of retirement saving. In particular, households may purchase insurance policies to
provide additional sources of income for ﬁnancing consumption expenditures after
retirement. I investigate the demand for both annuities and endowment policies us-
ing the DHS panel. Put simply, purchasing an annuity entitles the buyer to a stream
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of income, starting at a date in the future (for instance, at retirement) and lasting
until the buyer dies. An endowment policy instead entitles the buyer to a sum of
money, to be received upon a certain date in the future, such as the retirement date.
Both products have a tax-preferred nature. Buying an endowment policy has the
additional advantage of closing the gap between actions and intentions, by locking
money away for a longer period; if one really wishes to save for retirement, but still
spends labor earnings on food and drinks, this type of product is particularly suit-
able for achieving one’s goal. An annuity instead has the advantage of paying out
as long as one lives. As shown by Yaari (1965), annuities are an attractive product
to hedge against becoming very old and running out of wealth. Yet, the empirical
evidence suggests low ownership rates for annuities, a phenomenon referred to as
the annuity puzzle. The aim of chapter 4 is to investigate which factors inﬂuence
the demand for annuities and endowment policies, as an attempt to understand-
ing the causes of the annuity puzzle. Moreover, I offer an additional explanation
of the annuity puzzle: the low observed rate of ownership of annuities may be an
artifact of using survey data. Individuals may report not to own annuities, while in
reality they do own an annuity, and vice versa. Our econometric model takes this
measurement error problem into account, and estimates the probability of misre-
porting ownership of both annuities and endowment policies.
Measurement errors play an important role in chapter 5 as well. In this last
chapter, I return to the question on the crowding out of private savings by pension
savings, taking a European view. The Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in
Europe, SHARE, interviews households in 13 European countries, using the same
questionnaire translated in each country’s language. The third wave of this survey,
called SHARELIFE, is unique in asking these households to give information on
their life histories. Since the respondents are at least 50 years old when being inter-
viewed, asking them about their personal history closes a large informational gap.
For this study’s purposes, the labor market history and past earnings are especially
interesting, as they allow the researcher to construct a measure of lifetime earnings.
This measure is missing in previous studies estimating the extent of crowding out.
Next to using these unique data, the essay shows that measurement error plays an
important role in most of the literature. It is well known that measurement error
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in any of the explanatory factors leads to biases in the estimated model parame-
ters. I show that, in the type of model the literature has built upon, the bias may
be large enough to have the researcher draw the wrong, opposite conclusions. The
econometric model presented in this chapter, however, always leads the researcher
in the right direction. This is important, since the extent of crowding out has impor-
tant implications for policy makers contemplating a reform of the pension system,
as is currently taking place in the Netherlands. Due to population aging and the
economic crisis, the pension system has become more fragile, and measures are be-
ing discussed to improve the performance of the Dutch pension system. Once we
know the extent of crowding out of private wealth by pension wealth, we can more
accurately predict the welfare consequences of these reforms. Chapter 5 establishes
the methodology for doing just that.
1.3 Research questions
To summarize what this thesis aims to achieve, this section presents the research
questions to which the four studies try to provide answers.
Chapter 2 addresses the following questions:
Question 1.1. Which factors inﬂuence the expected level of pension beneﬁts and the un-
certainty over pension beneﬁts of Dutch individuals? Are the answers to the probabilistic
survey questions useful?
The research question handled in chapter 3 is
Question 1.2. How large is the extent of crowding out of private saving by pension sav-
ing in the Netherlands, and does uncertainty in pension beneﬁts lead to a precautionary
savings?
In chapter 4, I deal with the following questions:
Question 1.3. Which factors are important for explaining the ownership rates of annu-
ities and endowment policies for Dutch households? Can measurement errors in observed
ownership rates solve the annuity puzzle?
The last questions, answered in chapter 5, are
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Question 1.4. How large is the extent of crowding out of private wealth by pension wealth
in Europe? How useful is retrospective earnings information in answering this question?
1.4 Main ﬁndings
Below, I provide short answers to the research questions posed above.
1.4.1 Chapter 2
On the factors inﬂuencing the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of
the retirement income replacement rate, chapter 2 shows that, compared to less
educated individuals, higher educated individuals expect a statistically signiﬁcant
lower replacement rate and are more uncertain about it. Two (possibly reinforcing)
explanations for this ﬁnding are as follows. First, since higher educated individuals
typically earn higher wages, while the Dutch state pension system is redistributive
in nature, they should expect a lower replacement rate than less educated individu-
als. Furthermore, the career path of higher educated individuals is usually steeper
and surrounded by greater uncertainty, making it harder to predict pension bene-
ﬁts, resulting in more subjective uncertainty. Second, these ﬁndings may reﬂect the
fact that higher educated individuals are better informed about their future pen-
sion entitlements by, for instance, keeping closer track of news and developments
regarding their pension income. The recent turmoil on the ﬁnancial markets follow-
ing the credit crunch of 2008 affected both state and occupational pensions in the
Netherlands, lowering real pension beneﬁts and increasing the eligibility age. Fur-
thermore, recently implemented changes, including the change from ﬁnal-pay to
average-pay occupational pensions and the abolishment of tax-favorable early re-
tirement contributions, are mostly negative for the level of pension beneﬁts. Hence,
those who keep track of (possible) changes in the pension system (i.e., the higher
educated) may reasonably expect lower beneﬁts and a more uncertain future.
The expected replacement rate decreases with age until age 48, and uncertainty
increases with age until age 36. Indeed, the current proposed changes in retirement
income (increase in eligibility age, increasing premia) increases uncertainty for the
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young and decreases their income. Furthermore, uncertainty has been increasing
during the last few years, with pension income expected to decrease. Marital sta-
tus is not important, which is not surprising, since the differences between singles
and couples are small for state pension beneﬁts and nonexistent for occupational
pensions. The uncertainties in pension beneﬁts elaborated upon above (reforms,
ﬁnancial crisis) hold for both couples and singles, and hence there is no reason to
expect signiﬁcant differences between the two.
On the usefulness of the probabilistic survey questions, chapter 2 ﬁnds that re-
searchers should be careful in using the answer to these questions. To be precise,
the questions are difﬁcult to answer for respondents with less knowledge of proba-
bilities. As a result, around one third of the sample gives answers violating the laws
of probability. Not surprisingly, education plays an important role: less educated
individuals are more likely to violate the laws of probability. As these inconsistent
answers are not usable in empirical work, the ﬁnal sample consists of relatively
high educated respondents. Ignoring endogenous sample selection due to incor-
rect responses to probabilistic survey questions concerning pension entitlements
biases the results toward a more pessimistic expectation and excess uncertainty in
the replacement rate.
1.4.2 Chapter 3
Chapter 3 ﬁrst presents a theoretical lifecycle model with uncertainty in pension
beneﬁts, as well as uncertain lifespan. This model shows that uncertainty in pen-
sion beneﬁts leads to a precautionary saving motive: compared to a model with-
out uncertainty, savings are higher, in order to compensate for the possibility that
pension beneﬁts turn out to be lower than expected. Higher life expectancy also
leads to higher savings, as individuals wish not to outlive their wealth in case they
become very old. Next, I take the model to the data, and estimate the saving rate
equation implied by the theoretical model using weighted quantile regression tech-
niques. Quantile regressions are useful to allow the effects of, for instance, uncer-
tainty to depend on the level of saving: those with higher rates of saving may well
be different from those with low rates of saving. Moreover, based on a version
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of the lifecycle model with borrowing constraints, the theory predicts to observe
differences between these groups. The weighting tries to correct for the sample
selection effects found in chapter 2.
I ﬁnd that richer, wealthier households replace private savings by expected pen-
sion beneﬁts. That is, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant crowding out effect using subjective ex-
pectations data. Precautionary savings against uncertainty in pension income and
uncertainty in lifespan are conﬁrmed for the more afﬂuent households in the sam-
ple, that is, in the higher quantiles of the saving rate distribution. The results are in
line with the lifecycle model with borrowing constrains and uncertainty in pension
income.
1.4.3 Chapter 4
Regarding the factors explaining who owns annuity products and endowment poli-
cies, I ﬁnd a clear socio-economic gradient between owners and non-owners: the
results indicate that age, income and wealth are important determinants for own-
ership of annuities and endowments. Older, wealthier and richer households are
more likely to purchase these insurance products. The annuity puzzle therefore
mainly exists among the lower socio-economic classes of the Dutch population.
Borrowing constraints or lack of ﬁnancial literacy may keep this group from buy-
ing these insurance products.
Regarding measurement errors in observed ownership rates, I estimate the de-
gree of underreporting annuity ownership to be around 32%-points, which is a
considerable fraction of the population. Around 12% is estimated to report to own
an annuity while the household does not. On the contrary, I do not ﬁnd evidence of
over- or underreporting ownership of endowment policies. These results suggest
that the annuity puzzle is not as large as usually perceived; asymmetric measure-
ment errors can partly explain the annuity puzzle.
1.4.4 Chapter 5
Regarding the usefulness of retrospective earnings information, chapter 5 shows
that being able to calculate lifetime earnings is a major improvement if measure-
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ment errors are present in the data. Moreover, the study shows, by examining av-
erage earnings as well as the slope of the wage path by age, that the retrospective
data reﬂect cross-country differences in earnings rather well. For instance, Polish
and the Czech respondents are found to be considerably poorer on average com-
pared to Dutch or Swedish households.
Regarding the size of the crowding out effect, I ﬁnd that the estimated crowd-
out is equal to 47.1% using robust regression and 60.9% using median regression
techniques, and in both cases signiﬁcantly different from zero and 100%. When
using ﬁnancial wealth as the dependent variable instead of net worth, the crowd-
out is estimated to be between 77.8% and 87.0%. These results suggest that Euro-
pean households will react to reductions in pensions, for instance, due to pension
reforms, by increasing private savings, although the savings reaction is not strong
enough to fully compensate for the decline in pension beneﬁts. As such, a reduction
in pension beneﬁts may cause some households to run down their private savings
too soon after retiring, and to have to lower the standard of living subsequently.
Moreover, I show that this is most likely to happen to lower educated individuals,






* This chapter is based on Van Santen, Alessie and Kalwij (2012).
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2.1 Introduction
The standard life–cycle consumption model with uncertain (pension) income pre-
dicts that consumption during one’s working life is positively related to what indi-
viduals expect to receive as income, and negatively related to income uncertainty
(Caballero, 1990). In most empirical work in economics (see e.g., Feldstein, 1974;
Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003; Kapteyn et al., 2005), individual-speciﬁc expecta-
tions and uncertainty are not available, leading authors to assume static, rational
expectations. To avoid making such strict assumptions regarding the expectation
formation process, several studies suggest using individuals’ subjective expecta-
tions of future income (Dominitz and Manski, 2006; Guiso et al., ming). Of partic-
ular interest, and the ones used in this study, are probabilistic questions of the type
suggested by Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski (2004) which allow the re-
searcher to elicit the subjective cumulative distribution function of an individual’s
pension income. Manski (2004) provides an overview of the use of probabilistic
questions, which have become increasingly popular in recent years and have been
used to assess the likelihood of general events (such as inﬂation and social security
beneﬁts) as well as person–speciﬁc events (such as mortality and one’s economic
situation). Manski suggests two reasons why eliciting expectations in a probabilis-
tic way is better than eliciting expectations from vaguely deﬁned answer categories
(e.g., an event is “very likely” or “not too likely”). First, the numerical scale al-
lows comparisons among individuals. Second, the consistency of a respondent’s
answers can be checked using the laws of probability.
This article contributes to the empirical literature by investigating whether in-
correct (or inconsistent) answers to probabilistic survey questions, and their subse-
quent removal from the sample, lead to endogenous sample selection. For example,
less–educated and less ﬁnancially literate persons may be less likely to answer such
questions in a meaningful way—that is, their answers may not satisfy certain laws
of probability—and may also have a different retirement income replacement rate.
Simply excluding these observations when analyzing the determinants of the sub-
jective replacement rate or subjective uncertainty, as is commonly done in other
papers (e.g., Dominitz and Manski, 2006), can therefore result in endogenous sam-
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ple selection and bias the parameter estimates.
The quality of subjective expectations, elicited using probabilistic survey ques-
tions, is examined in other papers.1 Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) investigate the
validity of subjective survival probabilities and ﬁnd that individuals are well able
to predict their own mortality, underlining Manski (2004)’s conclusion that prob-
abilistic survey questions are informative. Dominitz (1998) shows that next–year
income expectations are able to predict subsequent realizations reasonably well. In
addition, data on expectations and subsequent realizations are used in Dominitz
(2001); Das and van Soest (1997); Das and Donkers (1999); Stephens (2004). The
overviews of Hurd (2009) and Pesaran and Weale (2006) also emphasize the predic-
tive power of subjective probabilities.
However, Dominitz and Manski (1996,9) signal some evidence that not all re-
spondents answer correctly. Dominitz and Manski (1996) use survey software that
automatically signals mistakes in the probabilities entered by the respondent, af-
ter which the respondent must correct the mistake, but still allows the researcher
to keep track of them. The authors ﬁnd that 7% of respondents violate the mono-
tonicity of answers, and 40% provide answers incompatible with the (previously
elicited) median of the subjective distribution of future income. Dominitz and
Manski (1997) report 21% item non–response, 8% providing constant probabilities
over the thresholds, and 5% violating monotonicity. Kleinjans and van Soest (2010)
show that two common fears associated with probabilistic questions, namely, non–
response and focal points (e.g., answering 0%, 50%, or 100%), do not affect the
determinants of retirement expectations, but that individuals round off probabili-
ties instead. Manski and Molinari (2010) investigate the extent of rounding in more
detail and ﬁnd heterogeneity in answering patterns, with a small fraction (11% of
the respondents) always rounding up to multiples of 50. We do not address the
issues of rounding or focal points. More closely related to our study are Dominitz
and Manski (2006), who compare the sample statistics of non–respondents to those
in their ﬁnal sample, using data from the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE).
Non–respondents, deﬁned as providing either missing values, incomplete, non–
1 See the April/May 2011 special issue in the Journal of Applied Econometrics for a collection of papers
using subjective expectations.
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valid, or unusable answers for estimating the subjective distribution, in the SEE are
more likely to be female, less likely to be non–Hispanic whites, less likely to be la-
bor force participants, less likely to be married, and less likely to be high school or
college graduates. Furthermore, the probability of non–response is non–monotonic
in age. The degree of non–response, Dominitz and Manski (2006) claim, compares
favorably to that from the Health and Retirement Study, and hence the authors
conclude that selection effects are not an issue. By contrast, our empirical ﬁndings
provide strong evidence of endogenous sample selection effects when omitting in-
correct answers from an analysis of expected retirement income replacement rates.
We use responses to the Dutch Pension Barometer survey, described in detail
in Section 2.2, which follows the Dominitz and Manski (1997, 2006) approach. By
eliciting points on the (subjective) distribution function of future pension income,
these questions allow the researcher to compute estimates of the expected replace-
ment rate, that is, the ratio of expected pension income to current income, as well
as its standard deviation, which can be interpreted as uncertainty regarding the
replacement rate. We ﬁnd that about one–third of the respondents are unable to an-
swer correctly, and that the incidence of violations correlates with observable back-
ground variables, such as education, income, and gender. De Bresser and van Soest
(2010) ﬁnd similar results using the same data source, but use only the sample with
correct responses, thus implicitly assuming exogenous sample selection. A new
ﬁnding is that excluding those individuals for whom it is not possible to compute
the expectation or standard deviation of future pension income results in endoge-
nous sample selection. The resulting biases are quantiﬁed by predicting both the
expected replacement rate and the standard deviation of the replacement rate us-
ing a linear model without correcting for selection effects and using a Heckman
model that does correct for possible endogenous selection effects. This quantiﬁca-
tion shows that ignoring endogenous sample selection yields a downward bias in
the predicted expected replacement rate and an upward bias in the predicted un-
certainty (standard deviation) of the replacement rate. These biases are largest for
less–educated individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the data and the exact
wording of the survey questions. Section 2.3 examines the incidence of violations
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of the laws of probability and how it relates to individual characteristics. Section
2.4 discusses the computation of the expected value and standard deviation of the
replacement rate and relates these to individual characteristics. It also quantiﬁes
the consequences for the parameter estimates of ignoring endogenous sample se-
lection. Finally, Section 2.5 presents our conclusions.
2.2 Data
Since the summer of 2006, CentERdata has been collecting data on the pension
beneﬁt expectations of Dutch households with the Pension Barometer survey. Cen-
tERdata, afﬁliated with Tilburg University, specializes in data collection via (Inter-
net) surveys and administers the Pension Barometer survey to members of their
CentERpanel, a representative sample of the Dutch population aged 16 and above.
Those without access to the Internet are provided with a set–top box for their tele-
vision. The CentERpanel households are interviewed regularly about various sub-
jects. In particular, the DNB Household Survey (DHS) is sent out to the same Cen-
tERpanel members. Hence, background information on household panel members
is available from previous interviews, since unique identiﬁers for household mem-
bers are available.
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The ﬁrst pillar is the ﬂat–
rate public pension, provided to all inhabitants aged 65 and above. In 2010, this
amounted to e1057 gross for singles and e735 gross for married individuals. The
second pillar, the occupational pensions, are mandatory for most employees, and
both employers and employees contribute to a pension fund. Finally, the third pil-
lar concerns private pension products, such as annuities bought from banks or in-
surers. This paper concerns pension beneﬁt expectations from the ﬁrst and second
pillars together.
There are two versions of the Pension Barometer: a monthly survey and a yearly
survey. The monthly survey has a rotating panel structure, such that each member
receives the survey once every three months. The main focus is on expectations
regarding the public pension (see Bissonnette and van Soest, 2010). The yearly sur-
vey is presented in two parts to the panel members, the ﬁrst part in March and
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the second in June. The June version of the annual survey is our main source of
information, for which the data for 2007, 2008, and 2009 are available. As only
employees receive the probabilistic survey questions concerning the retirement in-
come replacement rate, our analytical sample is restricted to employees.
We use the responses to the following sequence of questions to obtain a proba-
bility distribution of the replacement rate at two different retirement ages for each
individual.
Question 2.1. At what age do you think you can retire at the earliest, following your
employer’s pension scheme?
The answer to this question, say, age Y, is used in the subsequent question:
Question 2.2. If you would retire at age Y, please think about your total net pension in-
come, including social security, compared to your current total net wage or salary. What
do you think is the probability that the purchasing power of your total net pension income
in the year following your retirement will be
a) more than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
b) less than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
c) less than 90% of your current net wage? ... %
d) less than 80% of your current net wage? ... %
e) less than 70% of your current net wage? ... %
f) less than 60% of your current net wage? ... %
g) less than 50% of your current net wage? ... %
Question 2.3. Can your employer ﬁre you for reaching a certain (pension eligibility) age?
The answer can be either yes or no. If the respondent answers yes, a follow–up
question is posed:
Question 2.4. At what age is this?
The answer to this question, say, age Z, is used in the next question. If, however,
the respondent answered no to question 2.3, age Z is ﬁxed to be either 65 if the
answer to question 2.1, age Y, was lower than 55, or Y+5 years if Y was larger than
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54. Hence, in question 2.5 respondents are shown a particular age that is higher
than the age used in answering question 2.2. This age Z can be interpreted as their
latest retirement age.
Question 2.5. If you would retire at age Z, please think about your total net pension in-
come, including social security, compared to your current total net wage or salary. What
do you think is the probability that the purchasing power of your total net pension income
in the year following your retirement will be
a) more than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
b) less than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
...
g) less than 50% of your current net wage? ... %
These questions are intended to reveal the distribution of the net retirement income
replacement rate of Dutch employees. Traditionally, the replacement rate has been
deﬁned as the ratio between pension income and income just prior to retirement.
This question asks instead the net replacement rate compared to the current net
wage, which better suits the average pay system presently in place in the Nether-
lands.2 For the remainder of this paper, we will call this the replacement rate, or
RR. Throughout this paper, the notation for the probability that, say, RR > 100 is
P(RR > 100), as, for instance, asked in question 2.2a.
There is some evidence of item non–response for these questions, since some re-
spondents answer questions 2.1 and/or 2.3 but not the probability questions. These
are classiﬁed as "Don’t know" in the remainder of this paper and concern 27 obser-
vations for Q2.2 and 35 observations for Q2.5. Table 2.1 shows sample statistics
for each question in the three survey years. The number of observations varies
between years, as well as between the two questions.
The DHS, formerly known as the VSB–CentER Savings Study, is a yearly survey
that started in 1993 and covers about 2000 Dutch households, that also belong to
2 Dominitz and Manski (2006) and Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) both elicit expectations on the
level of retirement income, instead of the replacement rate. We believe that the replacement rate is a
better measure for retirement income in the Netherlands, as most people at least know rules of thumb
for computing the replacement rate (an increment of around 1.75% per year worked), but may be less
knowledgable about the level of pension beneﬁts.
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Table 2.1. Response patternsa
Year 2007 2008 2009
Variable Earliestb Latest Earliest Latest Earliest Latest
Number of employees 574 574 445 445 459 459
Don’t know 9 15 8 9 10 11
Retirement age 64 (63.3) 66 (66.6) 65 (63.3) 65 (66.7) 65 (63.8) 65 (66.9)
P(RR > 100) 0 (11.8) 0 (21.5) 0 ( 9.6) 0 (19.0) 0 (11.0) 0 (21.2)
P(RR < 100) 95 (69.1) 90 (64.5) 98 (68.6) 90 (66.2) 90 (67.9) 85 (65.1)
P(RR < 90) 75 (61.0) 70 (55.8) 80 (61.2) 70 (55.6) 75 (59.5) 60 (54.2)
P(RR < 80) 60 (53.8) 50 (44.6) 60 (53.7) 50 (46.5) 50 (51.6) 50 (45.0)
P(RR < 70) 40 (39.5) 20 (30.6) 40 (40.0) 25 (31.9) 30 (37.4) 25 (31.8)
P(RR < 60) 10 (25.1) 10 (19.5) 10 (24.8) 10 (20.5) 10 (22.7) 10 (19.4)
P(RR < 50) 2 (17.6) 1 (14.2) 5 (15.0) 1 (14.1) 5 (15.0) 1 (13.6)
Observations 565 559 437 436 449 448
aThis table shows the cross–sectional median (mean) of each variable. The initial sample is restricted to non–missing explanatory variables in Table 2.2.
bEarliest refers to earliest retirement age, in questions 2.1 and 2.2, and latest refers to latest retirement age, in questions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
the CentERpanel mentioned above. The survey is administered between February
and December of the speciﬁc year. Respondents answer questions on a broad range
of topics, including household income, assets and liabilities, health, and economic
and psychological concepts (see Alessie et al., 2002 for an extended description).
This study uses the three waves from 2007 to 2009 to obtain individual characteris-
tics. In addition, and as will be explained in detail in Section 2.4, our analysis uses
four variables that identify a Heckman selection model which takes into account
possible endogenous sample selection. These four variables relate to the so–called
exclusion restrictions that are imposed on the main equation of the Heckman se-
lection model, i.e. these four variables are only included in the selection equation.
We refer to these four variables as the excluding variables. To construct them, we
consider the following questions from the Pension Barometer survey and the DHS
that provide information on whether or not people are able to answer probabilistic
questions and which are not related to retirement.
Question 2.6. How likely is it that you will attain (at least) the age of 65 / 75 / 80 ?
Please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 through 10, where 0 means “no chance at all”
and 10 means “absolutely certain”.
Respondents answer at most three but mostly two questions, depending on their
actual age. The survival probability should be decreasing in age; surviving until
age 75 implies survival up to age 65. We construct the variable Survival probabil-
ity error, which is equal to one if the respondent violates monotonicity, and zero
otherwise.
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Question 2.7. What is the probability that the purchasing power of your total household
income, in one year from now, will be higher / lower than it is now?
Respondents provide two probabilities, one for the higher expected income and
one for the lower. We construct the variable Expected income adding–up error, which
is equal to one if these probabilities sum up to more than 100%, and zero otherwise.
The next question ﬁrst elicits the minimum and maximum expected household
incomes, after which a series of four follow–up questions are posed based on those
answers:
Question 2.8. What do you think is the probability that the total net yearly income of your
household will be less thane[LOWEST+(HIGHEST− LOWEST) ∗ {0.2/0.4/0.6/0.8}]
in the next 12 months?
In words, respondents are asked the probability that their net household yearly
income will be less than 20% above their lowest expected income, and similarly for
40%, 60%, and 80% above. These four probabilities should be increasing with the
threshold level (less than 20% above the lowest expected income implies less than
40% above the lowest expected income), and we construct the variable Expected
income probability error, which is equal to one if this is violated, and zero other-
wise. The ﬁnal question has a setup similar to that of question 2.8 but concerns ex-
pected inﬂation, for which we construct the variable Inﬂation probability error, which
is equal to one if monotonicity is violated, and zero otherwise.
Table 2.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of individual characteristics
used in this study: Female (=1 if female), age, education dummies, partner (=1 if
married or in a relationship), gross monthly income in euros, years worked (Ex-
perience), and the four excluding variables. For education, we divide respondents
into Elementary, Secondary, College, and University educational attainment.
The sample consists of mostly males and married or cohabiting persons. Gross
monthly income is arounde2700. More than 42% of respondents have higher voca-
tional or university education. As for the excluding variables, most errors are made
due to violating monotonicity for expected income and inﬂation.
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics explanatory variablesa
Variable 2007 2008 2009
Female 0.395 (0.489) 0.375 (0.485) 0.364 (0.482)
Single 0.258 (0.438) 0.243 (0.429 0.233 (0.423)
Income 2656.7 (1201.4) 2779.0 (1298.4) 2867.6 (1323.1)
Experience 20.373 (11.996) 21.251 (11.578) 22.480 (11.748)
Age 44.463 (10.028) 45.458 (10.061) 46.747 (9.998)
Elementary 0.240 (0.428) 0.236 (0.425) 0.235 (0.425)
Secondary 0.336 (0.473) 0.337 (0.473) 0.307 (0.462)
College 0.279 (0.449) 0.290 (0.454) 0.305 (0.461)
University 0.145 (0.352) 0.137 (0.344) 0.153 (0.360)
Survival probability error 0.007 (0.083) 0.002 (0.047) 0.007 (0.081)
Expected income adding–up error 0.057 (0.233) 0.054 (0.226) 0.037 (0.189)
Expected income probability error 0.171 (0.377) 0.155 (0.362) 0.198 (0.399)
Inﬂation probability error 0.145 (0.352) 0.294 (0.456) 0.338 (0.473)
Observations 574 445 459
aTable shows the mean (standard deviation) of each explanatory variable for the sample of employees for which all dependent and
explanatory variables are known.
2.3 Violations
Questions 2.2 and 2.5 ask respondents to ﬁll in seven probabilities. This section
checks the answers for consistency. Question 2.2a asks P(RR > 100); question
2.2b asks P(RR < 100). Since these events are mutually exclusive, the sum of the
answers to these questions should not exceed 100% so as not to violate adding up.
In order not to violate monotonicity, the answers to questions 2.2b to 2.2g should
be non–increasing; if the replacement rate is less than 90% of the current income, it
is, of course, also less than 100% of the current income. Table 2.1 shows that, for the
average respondent, the answers to 2.2a and 2.2b add up to less than 100% and that,
on average, there are no violations of monotonicity. Table 2.3 shows the number of
individuals (by year) for whom the sum of their answers to questions 2.2a and 2.2b
add up to more than 100% and/or who violate monotonicity in their answers to
questions 2.2b to 2.2g. The percentage of correct responses was about 65% in 2007
and about 70% in 2008 and 2009, which suggests a slight decrease in the incidence
of violations. Furthermore, there exists a clear pattern in the violations, in that for
each year and each type of violation (i.e., six tests), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive
association (p=0.000) between correctly answering questions 2.2 and 2.5.
The number of Pension Barometer respondents violating monotonicity and/or
adding up is considerably larger than for the SEE respondents, reported by Do-
minitz and Manski (1997): conditional upon answering preliminary questions con-
Probabilistic survey questions 29
Table 2.3. Violations of the laws of probabilitya
Panel A: 2007
Replacement rate Earliest retirement age (Q2.2) Latest retirement age (Q2.5)
Monotonicity Monotonicity
Adding up Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total
Correct 367 143 510 379 102 481
Incorrect 45 19 64 71 22 93
Total 412 162 574 450 124 574
Panel B: 2008
Replacement rate Earliest retirement age (Q2.2) Latest retirement age (Q2.5)
Monotonicity Monotonicity
Adding up Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total
Correct 310 93 403 314 74 388
Incorrect 29 13 42 45 12 57
Total 339 106 445 359 86 445
Panel C: 2009
Replacement rate Earliest retirement age (Q2.2) Latest retirement age (Q2.5)
Monotonicity Monotonicity
Adding up Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total
Correct 320 107 427 322 74 396
Incorrect 19 13 32 47 16 63
Total 339 120 459 369 90 459
a Table shows the number of respondents that violate adding up (P(RR > 100) +P(RR < 100) > 1),
violate monotonicity (P(RR < 100) > P(RR < 90)or similar for other thresholds), violate both or
answer correctly, in each year and for both questions 2.2 and 2.5
cerning lowest and highest expected incomes, and conditional on providing prob-
abilities that vary with the threshold, 5% of SEE respondents are unable to report
correct probabilities concerning next–year income. For pension beneﬁt expecta-
tions elicited from SEE respondents, studied in Dominitz and Manski (2006), no
information is given regarding the number of inconsistent responses. The main
difference between the survey data we use and the SEE survey data is the fact that
inconsistencies are ruled out in advance in the latter case. That is, the respondent is
requested to review the answer in case of a violation of monotonicity. Hence, in the
ﬁnal data, there are no inconsistencies in Dominitz and Manski (2006). Whether
or not these requests to review the answer ultimately lead to a larger sample, as
well as to more informative answers, remains an open question for future research.
To further explain the difference in the number of violations, we note that SEE re-
spondents are always asked to provide probabilities of income being less than the
thresholds, and therefore never violate adding–up, by deﬁnition. Second, proba-
bilities are asked about income being less than four thresholds, while our question
has seven thresholds. Hence, there are more possibilities to make mistakes in our
question. For the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Delavande and Rohwed-
der (2008) report a loss in sample size of around 20% due to inconsistencies, when
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eliciting expectations of social security beneﬁts from non–retirees under the age of
72.
2.3.1 Explaining the ability to answer correctly
This section examines the extent to which the ability to answer probabilistic ques-
tions correctly—that is, without violations of adding up or monotonicity—is related
to individual characteristics. We use gender, age, education, household income and
marital status as the explanatory individual characteristics. In addition, since the
incidence of violations is lower in 2008 and 2009 compared to 2007 (see Table 2.3),
we include a learning variable that equals one if the respondent is answering these
questions for the ﬁrst time, two if for the second time, and three if for the third
time. For both questions separately, we deﬁne the variable Able to indicate the abil-
ity to answer correctly, where Ablei = 0 if respondent i violates adding up and/or
monotonicity or is classiﬁed as "Don’t know".
Table 2.4 reports the effects of individual characteristics on the ability to answer
correctly (Able). We estimate (pooled) probit models with time–speciﬁc intercepts.
Table 2.4 reports parameter estimates, standard errors clustered at the individual
level, and marginal effects.
First, we observe that the parameter estimates and signiﬁcance levels are sta-
ble across the questions. We observe that older people are less likely to produce
inconsistent answers, but the effect is not signiﬁcant. Education is very important
in explaining ability: Persons with a secondary, college, or university background
are signiﬁcantly less likely to make mistakes than the benchmark group with the
lowest level of education. Jointly, the education dummies are highly signiﬁcant (p-
value = 0.000). A perhaps counterintuitive ﬁnding is that higher–income individu-
als are more likely to make mistakes, but the effect is not signiﬁcant; the education
dummies make the inclusion of income redundant, since more educated persons
have higher incomes.3 Women are more likely to violate, while marital status is
insigniﬁcant. We will use the incidences of incorrectly answering the probabilistic
3 Estimates without education dummies reveal that income has a signiﬁcantly positive effect on the
ability to answer correctly (not reported, but available upon request).
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Table 2.4. Explaining violationsa
Dependent variable: Ableb At the earliest retirement age (Q2.2) At the latest retirement age (Q2.5)
Parameter Standard Marginal Parameter Standard Marginal
Covariates estimate error effect estimate error effect
Age 0.050 (0.035) -0.001 0.026 (0.036) 0.001
Age2 -0.001 (0.0004) -0.0003 (0.0004)
Secondary 0.146 (0.105) 0.050 0.223** (0.107) 0.074**
College 0.441*** (0.113) 0.146 0.451*** (0.112) 0.145
University 0.705*** (0.154) 0.209 0.686*** (0.151) 0.198
log Income -0.040 (0.099) -0.014 -0.105 (0.101) -0.036
Female -0.117 (0.093) -0.041 -0.232** (0.094) -0.081
Single 0.044 (0.093) 0.015 0.047 (0.095) 0.016
Experience 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 0.0002 (0.005) 0.000
Survival probability error 0.222 (0.489) 0.073 0.571 (0.584) 0.160
Expected income adding-up error -0.197 (0.171) -0.072 -0.391** (0.158) -0.144
Expected income probability error -0.327*** (0.095) -0.120 -0.263*** (0.093) -0.094
Inﬂation probability error -0.229*** (0.080) -0.082 -0.125 (0.081) -0.043
Learning 0.051 (0.049) 0.018 0.038 (0.049) 0.013
Dummy 2008 0.191** (0.083) 0.066 0.127 (0.082) 0.043
Dummy 2009 0.210** (0.084) 0.072 0.121 (0.086) 0.041
Constant -0.609 (1.071) 0.466 (1.091)
Observations 1451 1443
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.037
log L -860.4 -844.9
p-value Wald test model 0.000 0.000
p-value Wald test Age 0.326 0.724
p-value Wald test Education 0.000 0.000
p-value Wald test Income 0.281 0.114
p-value Wald test Excluding variables 0.000 0.001
p-value Wald test Time dummies 0.017 0.224
p-value Chow test 0.672 0.959
a Table shows parameter estimates, standard errors clustered at the respondent level, and marginal effects after probit. Here ***, **, and * denote
p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1, respectively.
b The dependent variable Able equals one if the respondent answers correctly, and zero if the probabilities violate adding up and/or monotonicity or
the answer is classiﬁed as "Don’t know".
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questions corresponding to the survival probability, income expectation, and inﬂa-
tion expectation as excluding variables in the Heckman selection model in Section
2.4 to explain the expected replacement rate and the standard deviation of the re-
placement rate. The bottom of Table 2.4 shows that these excluding variables are
jointly signiﬁcant. Those individuals who make errors in these other probabilistic
questions are more prone to make mistakes in the probabilistic questions concern-
ing the replacement rate. Time effects show that signiﬁcantly fewer people made
mistakes in 2008 and 2009, yet this cannot be attributed to learning effects, which
have an insigniﬁcant impact. We have no ready explanation for this ﬁnding. A
Chow test for structural breaks shows that the coefﬁcients, other than the intercept,
are stable over time; the null hypothesis of time–invariant slope parameters cannot
be rejected (see the bottom of Table 2.4).
The results we obtain are in line with the results found in Gouret and Hol-
lard (2011), albeit on a different aspect of probabilistic survey questions. Gouret
and Hollard study expectations of risk and return of an investment of $ 1000 in
a stock mutual fund, using similar probabilistic survey questions to those used
in our study. Moreover, Gouret and Hollard (2011) derive a measure of coher-
ence, to study whether the elicited probabilities are similar in magnitude to those
obtained from a differently phrased question on the same subject (i.e. whether
there is a framing effect à la Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). Gouret and Hollard
(2011) ﬁnd that high–educated respondents are more coherent, as are men. A mi-
nor difference is the fact that Gouret and Hollard ﬁnd a stronger income effect, with
higher–income respondents (except for the most afﬂuent) providing more coherent
answers. Similarly, Dominitz and Manski (1997) have reported a higher effective
response rate for university graduates, being 36% more likely to be in the ﬁnal
sample compared to those with 12 years of schooling or less. Delavande and Ro-
hwedder (2008) report statistically signiﬁcant differences in education, an index of
probabilistic thinking, and wealth between the consistent and inconsistent groups
of respondents in the HRS.
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2.4 Replacement rates
This section ﬁrst computes the expected value and variance of the replacement rate.
Second, it analyzes the determinants of the expected replacement rate and uncer-
tainty (the standard deviation of the replacement rate) and relates these to individ-
ual characteristics using Heckman selection models that take into account possibly
endogenous sample selection (Heckman, 1979). Finally, we quantify the selection
bias by predicting the expected value and standard deviation of the replacement
rate with and without sample selection corrections for different types of individu-
als.
2.4.1 Computation
Dominitz and Manski (1997), Manski (2004), and De Bresser and van Soest (2010)
ﬁt a log–normal distribution to the probabilities. This parametric approach relaxes
the need to consider small violations in adding up or monotonicity. However, this
approach has disadvantages as well. First, it is not clear why the replacement rate
should be log–normally distributed. Second, the probabilities need to vary with the
threshold to make a non–linear least squares estimation feasible. Third, if the vio-
lation becomes "too large", the non–linear least squares estimates hardly converge,
leading to implausible estimates of location and spread of the replacement rates.
Yet, what exactly is too large is not at all clear. Therefore, we propose a nonpara-
metric distribution of the replacement rate.
The answers to questions 2.2 and 2.5 provide information on the subjective cu-
mulative distribution function for each respondent. There are seven thresholds
for which we know the probability that the replacement rate is lower or higher
than this threshold. We assume a nonparametric, piecewise–linear subjective dis-
tribution function for each respondent; that is, the distribution function is uniform
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if 0 ≤ RR < 50
P(RR < 50) +P(50 ≤ RR < 60) ( RR−5010 ) if 50 ≤ RR < 60
P(RR < 60) +P(60 ≤ RR < 70) ( RR−6010 ) if 60 ≤ RR < 70
P(RR < 70) +P(70 ≤ RR < 80) ( RR−7010 ) if 70 ≤ RR < 80
P(RR < 80) +P(80 ≤ RR < 90) ( RR−8010 ) if 80 ≤ RR < 90
P(RR < 90) +P(90 ≤ RR < 100) ( RR−9010 ) if 90 ≤ RR < 100
P(RR < 100) +P(RR = 100) if RR = 100
P(RR ≤ 100) +P(100 < RR < 120) ( RR−10020 ) if 100 < RR < 120
(2.1)
All the probabilities are known from the answers given by respondents. Writing
the CDF as above allows us to work with a continuous distribution function. There
is also one discrete element, since the answers to questions 2.2a and 2.2b can add
up to less than 100%, which indicates that there is a positive probability associated
with the event that the retirement income is exactly equal to the current income.
We ﬁx the upper bound of the distribution function (arbitrarily) at 120%, and the
lower bound at 0%. These choices inﬂuence the value of the computed replacement
rate but do not induce additional cross–sectional variation and, therefore, do not
inﬂuence the results of the empirical analysis.
To compute the expected replacement rate, we use the CDF to ﬁnd the proba-




RR f (RR) dRR (2.2)
The measure for pension income uncertainty is the standard deviation of the
replacement rate. Again, we use the CDF to ﬁnd E(RR2) =
∫ 120
0 RR




E (RR2)− (E(RR))2 (2.3)
The standard deviation is set to zero if the response jumps from 100% to 0% for two
consecutive thresholds, as this corresponds to the least uncertainty in the replace-
ment rate a respondent can express.
Table 2.5 shows summary statistics for the expected value and standard devia-
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tion of the replacement rate. Since these cannot be computed for respondents vio-
lating the laws of probability, the samples are smaller than those used for Table 2.4.
The differences between the years are small, although we observe a slightly lower
replacement rate in 2008. We see a large variation in the expected replacement rate,
between 25% (which is the minimum due to the lower bound assumption) and
110% (the maximum) of the current income, with an average of 75%. Furthermore,
uncertainty about pension entitlements varies greatly in the sample. On average,
respondents have a standard deviation of about 15%, but this varies between 0%
and 43.9% of the current income. The expected replacement rate is higher if the re-
spondent faces question 2.5 with a higher retirement age. A back–of–the–envelope
calculation shows that, on average, employees expect 1.67% more pension income
for each additional year of employment (5% for a retirement delayed, on average,
by three years; see Table 2.1). In addition, uncertainty is lower at this later retire-
ment age. Figure 2.1 shows the empirical distribution of the expected value and
standard deviation of the replacement rates, both as a histogram and as a kernel–
smoothed estimate of the density (with a bandwidth of 9). The expected replace-
ment rates (Figures 2.1a and 2.1c) are symmetrically distributed, with outliers in
both tails. The median is around 70% of the current income. Figures 2.1b and 2.1d
show a spike at a standard deviation of zero. These individuals have expressed to
be certain about the level of the replacement rate. Compared to the other (uncer-
tain) respondents4, they have, on average, a signiﬁcantly higher expected replace-
ment rate. Moreover, they are three years older, are slightly less educated, and have
similar monthly incomes; women and individuals with a partner express certainty
more often. None of these differences in background characteristics are signiﬁcant
at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
2.4.2 Explaining expected value and standard deviation
Next, we examine the determinants of the expected value and standard deviation
of the replacement rate for both questions by estimating Heckman selection mod-
4 For brevity, these results are not displayed numerically.
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Table 2.5. Replacement rate summary statisticsa
At the earliest retirement age (Q2.2) At the latest retirement age (Q2.5)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: 2007
E(RR) 75.2 16.8 25 110 367 80.6 17.4 25 110 379
SD(RR) 14.5 8.9 0 43.9 367 14.6 9.3 0 43.9 379
Panel B: 2008
E(RR) 73.3 17.7 25 110 310 78.9 18.7 25 110 314
SD(RR) 15.6 9.8 0 43.9 310 14.9 10.0 0 43.9 314
Panel C: 2009
E(RR) 75.0 17.0 25 110 320 80.1 17.7 25 110 322
SD(RR) 15.6 9.9 0 43.9 320 14.9 10.2 0 43.9 322
a Table shows the (cross–sectional) sample statistics for the expected replacement rate (E(RR)), computed according to equation 2.2,
and the standard deviation of the replacement rate (SD(RR)), using equation 2.3, in each year for both questions 2.2 and 2.5
Figure 2.1. Expected value and standard deviation replacement rates
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els (Heckman, 1979). The Heckman selection model consists of two equations. The
ﬁrst equation is a selection equation to determine who is able to answer proba-
bilistic questions correctly (see Section 2.3.1). The second equation is an outcome
equation in which the expected replacement rate or the standard deviation of the re-
placement rate is explained. The error terms of these two equations are assumed to
be bivariate normally distributed with correlation coefﬁcient ρ (see, e.g., Cameron
and Trivedi (2005) for more details). Both equations are estimated simultaneously
by the maximum likelihood (ML) method. For the Heckman (1979) two–step es-
timator, the results of the (probit) selection equation are exactly equal to those in
Table 2.4. For maximum likelihood, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar and are therefore omitted here. We opt for ML to be able to cluster standard
errors at the individual level.5
We use time effects, age, gender, marital status, education, income, and years
of work experience as explanatory variables. Other speciﬁcations, in particular
including the expected retirement age from questions 2.1 and 2.4, more ﬂexible
functions of income and several interaction effects, do not inﬂuence these results.
The estimation results of the selection equation are already reported in Table 2.4.
As discussed earlier, the exclusion restrictions are on the variables Survival prob-
ability error, Expected income adding–up error, Expected income probability error, and
Inﬂation probability error. We assume, after controlling for incorrectly answering the
replacement rate probabilistic questions, that these variables only affect the out-
come variables through the selection adjustment and have no independent impact
on the outcome variables. We believe this is a reasonable assumption, since these
variables are solely related to the ability to answer probabilistic questions, and not
to retirement income expectations. As discussed in Section 2.3.1 and again reported
in Table 2.6 for the sample selection model, the excluding variables are jointly sig-
niﬁcant in explaining the ability to answer probabilistic survey questions correctly.
The estimation results of the outcome equations for the expected value and stan-
dard deviation of the replacement rate are displayed in Table 2.6 (for both ques-
tions). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. For comparison, Table
5 We use the heckman command in Stata 10.
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2.6 also shows the results of estimating a linear model for the outcome equations
by OLS, that is, without the endogenous sample selection correction.
The validity of the estimation results of the outcome equations depends on the
assumptions underlying the sample selection model. The assumption of the bivari-
ate normality of the errors of the selection and outcome equation is testable using
the approach suggested by Lee (1984) and Pagan and Vella (1989).6 More impor-
tant than departures from bivariate normality is the validity of the exclusion restric-
tions, which is not testable. Obviously, if the exclusion restrictions are not valid, the
Heckman results presented below are biased. Note that our explanatory variables
in the outcome equation can be seen as a proxy for permanent income, in the style
of the canonical lifecycle model. The only way in which pension income could be
affected by the errors made in other probabilistic questions is when our excluding
variables are a proxy for ability, i.e. the classic ability bias. Due to not observing
ability, our proxy for permanent income (education, age, income, gender) may be
correlated with the error term. To overcome this omitted variable bias, we have
added a measure of ﬁnancial literacy to both the selection and outcome equations.
The measure of ﬁnancial literacy is the same as used in Alessie et al. (2011a).7 While
ﬁnancial literacy is marginally signiﬁcant for explaining the expected replacement
rate of question 2, it is generally insigniﬁcant in determining who answers correctly,
as well as explaining the expected replacement rate and the standard deviation of
the replacement rate. For brevity, these results are not reported but available upon
request; the results reported in Table 2.6 are virtually unchanged. We do not believe
6 The normality of the errors of the (probit) selection equation is tested by means of a Lagrange Mul-
tiplier test. We regress a vector of ones on the ﬁtted values multiplied by the generalized residual, as
well as the squared and cubed ﬁtted values multiplied by the generalized residuals, and compute n · R2;
the bottom of Table 2.6 shows that the null of normality is not rejected (p=0.655 and p=0.273 for the
two questions, respectively). The key to testing bivariate normality is that, under the null hypothesis of
bivariate normality, the error term of the outcome equation is a linear function of the error term of the
selection equation. Pagan and Vella (1989) suggest adding ﬁtted values of the selection equation multi-
plied by the inverse Mills ratio and the second and third powers of the ﬁtted values, again multiplied by
the inverse Mills ratio, to the outcome equation. Bivariate normality implies that the coefﬁcients of these
added variables equals zero. The p-value of a Wald test for this implication is presented at the bottom
of Table 2.6. The results show that the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level.
7 Speciﬁcally, the questions elicit knowledge of the concepts of interest compounding and money illu-
sion. In our sample, 85% answers both questions correctly. We have included an indicator for answering
both questions correctly, with the base group consisting of respondents answering one or both questions
incorrectly, refuses to answer or gives a “Don’t know” answer. Other measures of ﬁnancial literacy give
similar results.
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that unobserved ability biases our results.
Table 2.6. Estimation results of Heckman and linear modelsa
Expected replacement rates
E(RR) Q2.2 E(RR) Q2.5
Model Heckman Linear Heckman Linear
Age -2.103*** -1.544** -1.435* -1.100
(0.702) (0.623) (0.749) (0.670)
Age2 0.021*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.013*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Secondary -7.357*** -5.719*** -7.642*** -5.525***
(2.249) (1.972) (2.208) (1.873)
College -12.29*** -8.067*** -12.71*** -8.449***
(2.351) (1.965) (2.369) (1.950)
University -13.18*** -7.152*** -12.31*** -6.415**
(3.086) (2.742) (3.035) (2.653)
log Income -1.813 -1.870 -0.065 -0.720
(1.878) (1.638) (1.943) (1.680)
Female -2.839* -3.694** -1.227 -3.409**
(1.661) (1.491) (1.801) (1.598)
Single -0.985 -0.436 -2.141 -1.501
(1.736) (1.585) (1.726) (1.536)
Experience -0.008 0.020 0.006 0.010
(0.100) (0.095) (0.096) (0.087)
Year 2008 -3.055** -1.815 -2.802** -1.898
(1.281) (1.121) (1.382) (1.166)
Year 2009 -1.154 0.0523 -1.652 -0.916
(1.340) (1.161) (1.384) (1.162)
Constant 157.5*** 134.0*** 130.4*** 115.4***
(21.21) (18.58) (21.84) (19.75)
Observations 1451 997 1443 1015
log L -5072 -4220 -5174 -4340
p-value Equation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Age 0.004 0.010 0.143 0.187
p-value Education 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000
p-value Time dummies 0.054 0.175 0.120 0.265
ρ -0.823 -0.875
p-value ρ = 0 0.000 0.000
p-value Exclusion restr. 0.000 0.029
p-val. Normality selection b 0.655 0.273
p-val. Normality outcome c 0.279 0.061
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6 – continued from previous page
Standard deviation replacement rates
SD(RR) Q2.2 SD(RR) Q2.5
Model Heckman Linear Heckman Linear
Age 1.016*** 0.744** 0.515 0.323
(0.383) (0.326) (0.412) (0.359)
Age2 -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.008* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Secondary 4.021*** 2.920*** 4.147*** 2.554**
(1.249) (1.119) (1.218) (1.068)
College 4.834*** 2.178** 5.176*** 2.186**
(1.289) (1.099) (1.211) (1.051)
University 7.318*** 3.592*** 6.452*** 2.269*
(1.582) (1.372) (1.559) (1.351)
log Income -0.577 -0.697 -0.506 -0.250
(0.940) (0.818) (0.973) (0.777)
Female -1.086 -0.645 -1.205 0.201
(0.921) (0.813) (0.996) (0.835)
Single 0.051 -0.359 0.345 -0.035
(0.888) (0.795) (0.933) (0.808)
Experience -0.015 -0.021 -0.034 -0.029
(0.049) (0.044) (0.051) (0.045)
Year 2008 2.098*** 1.460** 1.042 0.564
(0.735) (0.611) (0.786) (0.627)
Year 2009 2.361*** 1.755*** 1.412* 1.091*
(0.754) (0.615) (0.808) (0.641)
Constant -5.304 9.142 3.562 14.90
(11.66) (9.726) (11.89) (10.09)
Observations 1451 997 1443 1015
log L -4433 -3582 -4503 -3687
p-value Equation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Education 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.107
p-value Time dummies 0.003 0.010 0.181 0.235
ρ 0.896 0.965
p-value ρ = 0 0.000 0.000
p-value Exclusion restr. 0.004 0.003
p-val. Normality selection b 0.655 0.273
p-val. Normality outcome c 0.056 0.058
aHeckman models are ﬁtted in one step by the maximum likelihood method. The results of the selection equation are
comparable to those of Table 2.4.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Here ***, **, and * denote p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1, respectively.
b The normality assumption of the probit error terms is tested by means of the Lagrange multiplier test for detecting
skewness and excess kurtosis (see the text for details).
c The normality of the outcome equation error term is tested by means of the procedure suggested in
Pagan and Vella (1989) (see the text for details).
The selection and outcome equations are not independent: The correlation be-
tween the error terms, ρ, is signiﬁcant for all four models. The negative sign of ρˆ
in the expected replacement rate equations implies that unobservable factors that
positively correlate with the probability of answering correctly, relate negatively
with the expected value of the replacement rate. Furthermore, these unobservable
factors are positively correlated with the uncertainty in the replacement rate (a pos-
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itive ρˆ in the SD(RR) models). These signiﬁcant correlation coefﬁcients imply that
biased parameter estimates are obtained from OLS models explaining the expected
value or standard deviation of the replacement rate. Ignoring these sample selec-
tion effects would underestimate the strength of the education gradient, that is, the
OLS estimates are overestimated in the model explaining the expected replacement
rate, and underestimated in the model explaining the standard deviation of the re-
placement rate. A similar bias occurs for the time effects. This is important if these
parameters are, for example, used to predict expected replacement rates and pen-
sion risk for explaining household consumption or savings behavior (Bottazzi et al.,
2006; Van der Wiel, 2008; Guiso et al., ming).
Table 2.6 shows that, compared to less–educated individuals, higher–educated
individuals expect a signiﬁcantly lower replacement rate and are more uncertain
about it. Two (possibly reinforcing) explanations for this ﬁnding are as follows.
First, since higher–educated individuals, on average, earn higher wages, while
the Dutch state pension system is redistributive in nature, they should expect a
lower replacement rate than less–educated individuals. Furthermore, supported
by the surprising fact that past work experience is not signiﬁcant, the career path
of higher–educated individuals is usually steeper and surrounded by greater un-
certainty, making it harder to predict pension beneﬁts, resulting in more subjec-
tive uncertainty. Second, these ﬁndings may reﬂect the fact that higher–educated
individuals are better informed about their future pension entitlements by, for in-
stance, keeping closer track of news and developments regarding their pension
income. The recent turmoil on the ﬁnancial markets following the credit crunch
of 2008 affected both state and occupational pensions in the Netherlands, lowering
pension beneﬁts and increasing the eligibility age. Furthermore, recently imple-
mented changes, including the change from ﬁnal–pay to average–pay occupational
pensions and the abolishment of tax–favorable early retirement contributions, are
mostly negative for the level of pension beneﬁts. Hence, those who keep track of
(possible) changes in the pension system (i.e., the higher educated) may reasonably
expect lower beneﬁts and a more uncertain future.
The expected replacement rate decreases with age until age 48 (45) for the early
(late) retirement age, and uncertainty increases with age until age 36 (31). Indeed,
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the current proposed changes in retirement income (increase in eligibility age, in-
creasing premia) increases uncertainty for the young and decreases their income.
Furthermore, uncertainty increases over time, with pension income expected to de-
crease. Income is not signiﬁcant, due to both the inclusion of education dummies
and the strong correlation between income and education, as well as the fact that
the respondents are asked to condition on current income in answering the prob-
abilistic questions. Marital status is not signiﬁcant, which is not surprising, since
the differences between singles and couples are small for state pension beneﬁts and
nonexistent for occupational pensions. The uncertainties in pension beneﬁts elabo-
rated upon above (reforms, ﬁnancial crisis) hold for both couples and singles, and
hence there is no reason to expect signiﬁcant differences between the two.
To gain more insight in the magnitude of the selection bias, we predict both
E(RR) and SD(RR) using the Heckman model and the linear model. We consider
a benchmark individual who is a married, 50 year old male with 25 years of expe-
rience and a university degree. His gross income is e3000 per month, which is in
between the median and mean incomes in our sample. Furthermore, we show the
effects of changing one of these characteristics, as well as plug in sample averages
for all the characteristics from Table 2.2. The survey year is 2008, and the results are
shown in Table 2.7 below.
We see that the bias is quite substantial for the benchmark individual: about
4 percentage points for the expected replacement rate and about 2.5 percentage
points for the standard deviation. The differences in the predictions are similar
whether we consider earliest retirement (Q2.2) or latest retirement (Q2.5). The bias
increases dramatically if we lower the education level: more than 10 percentage
points for E(RR) and more than six percentage points for SD(RR). For the sample
averages, the bias is larger than the benchmark as well: more than 7.5 percent-
age points for E(RR) and more than ﬁve points for SD(R). In all cases, the linear
model underestimates the predicted expected replacement rate and overestimates
the degree of uncertainty. To summarize, ignoring endogenous sample selection
due to incorrect responses to probabilistic survey questions concerning pension
entitlements biases the results toward a more pessimistic expectation and excess
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Table 2.7. Heckman model versus linear model predictionsa
Person E(RR) Q2 E(RR) Q5 SD(RR) Q2 SD(RR) Q5
Model Heckman Linear Heckman Linear Heckman Linear Heckman Linear
Benchmarkb 74.90 70.92 83.66 78.73 14.22 16.75 11.47 14.26
(2.36) (2.23) (2.64) (2.32) (1.27) (1.08) (1.34) (1.16)
Age 40 76.76 72.64 83.36 78.06 17.06 19.80 14.02 17.39
(2.31) (2.19) (2.64) (2.35) (1.28) (1.06) (1.34) (1.17)
Age 60 77.32 72.20 87.19 81.97 8.53 11.43 7.29 9.77
(2.71) (2.58) (2.95) (2.56) (1.42) (1.21) (1.46) (1.22)
Elementary education 88.07 78.07 95.97 85.14 6.91 13.16 5.02 11.99
(2.31) (1.81) (2.49) (1.73) (1.43) (1.05) (1.18) (0.99)
Secondary education 80.72 72.35 88.33 79.62 10.93 16.08 9.17 14.54
(1.90) (1.58) (2.15) (1.62) (1.17) (0.84) (1.05) (0.88)
College education 75.79 70.00 83.26 76.69 11.74 15.34 10.20 14.17
(1.68) (1.43) (2.01) (1.58) (1.00) (0.79) (1.00) (0.84)
Single 73.91 70.48 81.51 77.23 14.28 16.40 11.82 14.22
(2.70) (2.65) (2.86) (2.55) (1.39) (1.21) (1.45) (1.27)
Female 72.06 67.22 82.43 75.32 13.14 16.11 10.27 14.46
(2.45) (2.27) (2.80) (2.40) (1.44) (1.20) (1.47) (1.27)
Income e1800 75.80 71.85 83.69 79.09 14.51 17.10 11.72 14.38
(2.79) (2.58) (3.07) (2.70) (1.48) (1.28) (1.58) (1.34)
Sample averagec 79.12 71.69 86.54 77.68 11.83 16.49 9.66 15.35
(1.51) (1.20) (1.84) (1.23) (1.02) (0.66) (0.89) (0.69)
aThis table shows the predicted values of the expected replacement rate (E(RR)) and the standard deviation (SD(RR)) from the estimated Heckman
and linear models (see Table 2.6). Standard errors are in parentheses.
bThe benchmark individual is a 50 year old married male with a university degree and 25 years of work experience who earns e3000 gross per month.
The survey year is 2008. The other rows show the only deviation from this benchmark.
cThe sample averages correspond to the 2008 column in Table 2.2.
uncertainty in the replacement rate.
2.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper has been the ﬁrst to quantify the selection bias due to incorrectly answer-
ing probabilistic survey questions concerning pension entitlements in a sample of
Dutch employees. Given the mentioned selected samples reported in Dominitz and
Manski (1997, 2006) and Delavande and Rohwedder (2008), a similar bias is likely
to be found in other datasets, obtained from different respondents using different
methods of interview and on different topics.
Two related questions arise: Do respondents have a correct estimation of the
replacement rate, or should we keep assuming rational expectations in empirical
work? More interesting, once the selection bias is controlled for, is the gap between
subjective and objective replacement rates bigger or smaller? Knowing an individ-
ual’s true replacement rate is notoriously difﬁcult, and hence we resort to aggregate
statistics, taken from administrative data collected by the Central Bureau of Statis-
tics of The Netherlands. Table 2.8 reports replacement rates by gender and immi-
grant status, where the latter serves as a proxy for education. The ﬁrst observation
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from this table is the fact that women have higher replacement rates than men. In
table 2.6, we have seen a strong negative effect of being female on the expected re-
placement rate, if we do not control for endogenous sample selection. Controlling
for selection, the signiﬁcance of this negative effect disappears, suggesting that the
selection–correction pushes the replacement rates towards the objective replace-
ment rate. The second observation we make is that non–western immigrants (as
a proxy for the less educated) have a much higher replacement rate, on average
14% higher, compared to both non–immigrants and western immigrants. A similar
difference is obtained in Table 2.7, where the difference between predicted replace-
ment rates for the sample average and the elementary educated equals 8% for the
earliest retirement age, and 10% for the latest retirement age. Using a linear model,
the differences are 6% and 8%, respectively. This supports the hypothesis that the
selection correction yields more plausible results compared to using a linear model
without selection correction. Moreover, this comparison shows that the elicited ex-
pectations are, on average, plausible, and should provide better results in empirical
analysis than using strong rationality assumptions.
Table 2.8. Aggregate replacement rates (%)a
Non–Immigrants Immigrants Western Non–Western
Immigrants Immigrants
Total 75 79 73 88
Male 66 71 64 79
Female 94 93 87 101
aThis table shows the aggregate replacement rate by gender and immigrant status, as reported by Statistics Netherlands.
Future research should be devoted to prevent a reduction in sample size and a
selected sample by using alternative ways of eliciting expectations. A ﬁrst step has
been taken by Delavande and Rohwedder (2008), using a visual format for elicit-
ing the distribution of social security beneﬁts. Delavande and Rohwedder obtain
prima facie evidence of an increase in sample size, as well as a smaller standard
deviation of the distribution of social security beneﬁts. However, the fact that we
use replacement rates, not the level of pension beneﬁts, makes it difﬁcult to com-
pare their ﬁndings to ours. The ultimate test would be to use both the probabilistic
format and an alternative way of eliciting expectations (such as the visual format
of Delavande and Rohwedder (2008)). For the probabilistic format, respondents
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should be forced to provide consistent answers, but the information on inconsis-
tent responses should be stored. Only then can we make a comparison between
the various formats, as well as give a judgement on the informative value of the
subjective expectations.
As an application, one can use the expected pension income and pension risk
based on the (computed) replacement rates and, for instance, estimate a life–cycle
model of consumption without the need to arbitrarily assume how expectations are
formed. An important implication of our ﬁndings for such research is that one must
account for the endogenous selection effects due to incorrect responses. An inter-
esting extension of our study is to examine how persistent expectations are. That
is, we have shown some dispersion in the expected replacement rate in a (pooled)
cross–section, but to obtain further insights in expectation formation, it would be
of interest to analyze at the individual level how expectations are updated when
new information becomes available. Hence, the persistency of these expectations
can tell us something about how expectations are formed. Such an extension may
require a longer panel than we currently have and is left for future research.

Chapter 3
Uncertain pension income and
household saving∗
* This chapter is based on Van Santen (2012).
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3.1 Introduction
The standard lifecycle model emphasizes the importance of saving during working
life for consumption during retirement. A simple version of this model predicts
that private savings decreases one-for-one with increases in pension wealth, that is,
perfect displacement (or crowding out) of private savings by pension savings. The
displacement effect is an important policy parameter to assess the welfare effects of
changes in the pension system. In particular, less than perfect displacement would
suggest that households save too little to smooth consumption over the lifecycle.
This notion ignores precautionary saving motives to compensate possible adverse
labor market outcomes or lower than expected retirement income. The aim of this
paper is to allow for a precautionary saving motive stemming from uncertainty in
pension beneﬁts, and to estimate both the displacement effect as well as the pre-
cautionary effect using micro data.
I use data from the DNB Household Survey (DHS), an annual survey collecting
panel data from the Netherlands on household income, wealth and demographics,
and the Pension Barometer, an annual survey presented to a subset of respondents
from the DHS, which elicits expectations of pension beneﬁts. To be precise, the ex-
pectations of pension beneﬁts are elicited from probabilistic survey questions of the
type suggested by Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski (2004). These questions
allow for the calculation of the expected level of the retirement income replacement
rate, as well as the standard deviation of the replacement rate. I have subjective
expectations data at my disposal for the period 2006-2011, and both the expected
level of the replacement rate and its variance vary over time and over individuals.
Using quantile regressions, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant displacement effect or precau-
tionary saving effect for the lowest quantiles up to the median. In contrast, for the
75th quantile of the saving rate distribution, I ﬁnd that the saving rate increases
by 0.69 percentage points for every decrease in the individual-speciﬁc expected re-
tirement income replacement rate by 1 percentage point. An increase of 1%-point
in the individual-speciﬁc standard deviation of the replacement rate, as a measure
of uncertainty, increases the saving rate by 0.37 %-point. For the 90th quantile,
the saving rate increases by 1.27%-point and 0.96%-point for the same decrease
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in the expected replacement rate and increase in its standard deviation. In level
terms, a back-of-the-envelope calculation implies that for every extra Euro in ex-
pected pension wealth, private wealth decreases by 11.5 cents, or a displacement
effect of 11.5%, for the 75th quantile, and 21.2% for the 90th quantile. The results
match up with the estimate of Kapteyn et al. (2005), who exploit productivity dif-
ferences across cohorts and the introduction of social security in the Netherlands
to ﬁnd a small but statistically signiﬁcant displacement effect of 11.5%. Moreover,
the ﬁnding of insigniﬁcant displacement in the lowest part of the saving rate distri-
bution is consistent with a lifecycle consumption model with a liquidity constraint,
presented in Section 3.3, as well as the empirical evidence in Jappelli (1995) and
Engelhardt and Kumar (2011).
The main contribution is in allowing for the precautionary saving motive.1 The
results show that, in the highest quantiles, saving increases with uncertainty. For
the lower quantiles, I ﬁnd no evidence of precautionary saving, which is again
consistent with the lifecycle model with liquidity constraints. Previous empirical
literature has not accounted for the precautionary motive. The resulting omitted
variable bias is likely to produce a too large estimate of (the absolute value of) the
crowding out of private saving by pension wealth, as long as the true precautionary
saving parameter is positive. Indeed, for the 75th quantile, I ﬁnd that ignoring the
uncertainty in pension beneﬁts yields a increase in the saving rate of .8%-point for
a 1%-point decrease in the expected replacement rate. For the 90th quantile, the
saving rate increases by 1.5%-point. For the median respondent, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
displacement effect (0.5%-point) when ignoring uncertainty, but an insigniﬁcant
effect when accounting for uncertainty. Obviously, this casts doubt on the estimates
obtained in previous studies. In the lowest part of the distribution, the bias in
previous studies may not be too large.
Since the seminal article of Feldstein (1974), many studies have made attempts
to estimate the displacement effect. Gale (1998) estimates the displacement effect
of pensions on non-pension wealth to be 82.3% (39.3%) using median (robust) re-
gressions. Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) and Alessie et al. (2011a) use data on the
1 The theoretical work of Skinner (1988), Zeldes (1989) and Caballero (1990,9) emphasize the importance of precau-
tionary savings in aggregate savings. Empirical evidence of precautionary saving behavior is also found in, among
others, Lusardi (1998), Guariglia (2001) and Brown and Taylor (2006).
50 Chapter 3
earnings history of older respondents from, respectively, the Health and Retirement
Study in the US and the SHARE household survey in Europe. Both studies estimate
a model for discretionary household wealth as a function of pension wealth, and
ﬁnd evidence of limited displacement, between 47% and 67%. Attanasio and Ro-
hwedder (2003) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) estimate a model for annual
household saving, using pension reforms in the United Kingdom and Italy respec-
tively to offset endogeneity and attenuation biases affecting the displacement effect.
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) ﬁnd that the displacement effect differs per age
group, ranging from close to zero for young adults and nearly retired individuals
to 200% for middle-aged individuals, although the coefﬁcients differ per speciﬁca-
tion. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) ﬁnd that the displacement effect is close to
zero for the basic state pension, and ranges from 55% for middle aged to 75% for
nearly retired individuals regarding occupational pensions.
The regression equations in the papers above are based on either certainty or
certainty equivalence. Moreover, expectations are taken to be rational and static,
meaning that the introduction of the social security system in Kapteyn et al. (2005)
or the reform of the pension system in Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) or Attana-
sio and Brugiavini (2003) comes as a surprise, that households perfectly understand
the consequences of the change in the pension system and that the change is con-
sidered to be permanent and, therefore, immediately incorporated into household
consumption and saving programs over the lifecycle. Instead, I have available ex-
pectations of the pension income replacement rate for several time periods in a
panel of households. I do not have to make restrictive assumptions on the expec-
tation formation process, nor assume static expectations. A few other studies have
also relaxed the assumption on static expectations by using subjective expectations
data. Guiso et al. (1992) analyze precautionary saving against uncertain labor earn-
ings, while Guiso et al. (1996) analyze portfolio choice in the presence of income
risk. Bottazzi et al. (2006) use a subjective measure of expected pension beneﬁts to
study displacement of private wealth by social security wealth; their IV estimate of
the displacement effect equals 64.5% using Italian pension reforms to identify this
effect. Guiso et al. (ming) use similar probabilistic survey questions as used in this
paper to calculate individual-level expected replacement rates of pension income,
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as well as the standard deviation as measure of uncertainty. Using probit regres-
sions on a cross-section of Italian investors, the authors ﬁnd that the probability
of investing in a pension fund decreases with the expected replacement rate, and
increases with its standard deviation, in line with the lifecycle model. The same
sign and signiﬁcance are obtained for the probability of having health insurance.
This paper extends the analysis of Guiso et al. (ming) by using a saving equation
derived from a lifecycle model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 brieﬂy discusses the Dutch pen-
sion system. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical model, with derivations delegated
to the appendix. Section 3.4 discusses the data and Section 3.5 presents the results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Uncertainties in the Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars.2 The ﬁrst pillar is the ﬂat-rate
state pension beneﬁt, provided to all inhabitants aged 65 and above. In 2010, the
gross monthly beneﬁt amounted to e1057 for singles and e1470 for couples. The
second pillar, the occupational pensions, are mandatory for most employees, and
both employers and employees contribute to a (usually deﬁned beneﬁt) pension
fund. Traditionally, the Dutch occupational pension system is one of the most de-
veloped in the world, with pension funds holding around 125% of Dutch GDP in
investments in 2008. Finally, the third pillar concerns private pension savings, such
as annuities bought from banks or insurance companies or private retirement sav-
ing accounts. The third pillar is less popular in the Netherlands, as documented by
Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2011). This paper concerns pension beneﬁt expecta-
tions from the ﬁrst and second pillars together.
Bodie (1990) argues that employer pensions can serve as insurance against re-
placement rate inadequacy, deterioration of social security beneﬁts, longevity risk,
investment risk and inﬂation risk. However, this "insurance contract" is far from
complete. The recent turmoil on ﬁnancial markets after the subprime mortgage cri-
sis in the US, followed by a global ﬁnancial, economic and debt crisis, and the ag-
2 See Bovenberg and Gradus (2008) for an overview of the Dutch pension system and its reforms.
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ing of the population in many developed economies has led to revisions in pension
systems worldwide. In the Netherlands, these include an increase in the statutory
retirement age, from currently 65 to 67 in 2023. Furthermore, the occupational pen-
sion system will shift from a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) to a deﬁned contribution (DC)
system, making explicit the dependence of pension beneﬁts on asset returns. Since
2009, Dutch pension funds have taken different measures during the crisis due to
underfunding resulting from sharp negative investment returns, including a reduc-
tion of nominal accrued pension rights, increasing the pension premium and/or
not adjusting pension wealth to inﬂation. Hence, already under the implicitly risky
DB contracts and after the transition to the DC system, income after retirement is
not as certain as usually perceived.
Since the sample period (2006-2011) includes this period of turbulence, it is im-
portant that the expectations from the survey questions I use in this paper do re-
ﬂect this. I have reason to believe that this is indeed the case. First, Van Santen
et al. (2012) reports that the (average) expected replacement rate, calculated from
the same data as used in this study, has been decreasing over time (see also Section
3.4). Likewise, the (average) variance of the replacement rate has increased over
time. Second, Van der Wiel (2009) studies the effect of public debate on the ex-
pectations of the statutory retirement age in the Netherlands, using data from the
monthly version of the Pension Barometer. The author ﬁnds a large effect of pub-
licity on expectations for less-educated individuals and for those that stated not to
read the newspapers.
3.3 Model
The theory on income uncertainty presented here is not new in any respect. The
model is in the spirit of the two-period consumption model of Leland (1968), who
analyzes precautionary saving if second-period (pension) income is unknown, but
the individual does have a subjective distribution of future (retirement) income in
mind when taking decisions; Leland (1968) shows saving is increasing in uncer-
tainty. I consider a ﬁnite horizon discrete-time lifecycle model with uncertainty
over both pension income and length of life. I assume a certain level of labour
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income, a certain interest rate and an exogenous date of retirement. The current
period is denoted by period t. The individual’s3 remaining lifetime is divided into
two parts, the working stage and the retirement stage. I make the following as-
sumptions:
• The per-period utility function is of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) type4 , U(c) = − (1/α) exp (−αc) with coefﬁcient of absolute risk
aversion α.
• Retirement is exogenous, and occurs at age K.
• Income during working life, yτ is certain and exogenous but varies with age
τ.
• Retirement income, yK, is a normally distributed5 random variable with mean
μyK and variance σ
2
yK . Income after retirement is constant.
• Survival is guaranteed until retirement; after retirement the survival probabil-
ity up to period τ > K is denoted aτ . The maximum attainable age is denoted
by L.
• The interest rate, r is constant and equal to the rate of time preference, ρ. For
notational convenience, I deﬁne R = 1+ r and β = (1+ ρ)−1 as interest factor
and discount factor, respectively.
The problem the currently young individual faces is to maximize lifecycle utility
































3 I abstract from intra-household decision making, and hence write "the individual" to mean the collective household.
In the empirical application, I use data from the head of the household for estimating the model.
4 The choice of a CARA utility function is motivated by the possibility to obtain closed-form solutions, which is not
possible with the class of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions. This choice prevents buffer-stock
saving behavior (Carroll, 1992), which needs decreasing absolute risk aversion. See also Blau (2011), who studies
displacement in a rich, uncertain environment with CRRA utility.
5 Lam (1987) discusses more general distributions for income under CARA utility. Normality is not imposed in the
empirical application.
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where cτ is consumption in period τ, At−1 is predetermined wealth and Et is the
expectation operator conditional on information available in period t. I solve for
today’s consumption, ct, in three steps. First, I solve the retirement stage and cal-
culate the value of future utility streams, conditional on wealth available at the
beginning of retirement, AK−1. Second, I solve the problem for the working stage,
and compute the value of utility conditional on leaving AK−1 available for future
consumption. Finally, I choose AK−1 to maximize lifecycle utility. Appendix 3.A
shows the complete derivation of the model. Current consumption is given by
ct =



















This is the closed-form expression for today’s consumption when future pen-
sion income is uncertain. The ﬁrst term is the familiar expected present value of
future income streams (or permanent income). Without uncertainty, consumption
would be equal to permanent income. With uncertainty, consumption equals per-
manent income minus precautionary saving due to lifetime and pension income
uncertainty. If the probability of survival increases (aτ ↑), consumption decreases,
a result that is also found under the well-documented ’certainty equivalence’ case.6
The most interesting feature of the solution is the explicit relationship between
consumption and the variance in pension beneﬁts, which is absent in the certainty
equivalence case. Uncertainty in pension income induces consumers to spend less,
and hence to save more. The consumption function I obtain is similar to the con-
sumption function found in Caballero(1990,1991). Cantor (1985) has shown the
same solution for current consumption when income is normally distributed but
neglecting lifespan uncertainty.
The DHS dataset does not obtain information on consumption or expenditures,
but I do have data on annual saving. The closed-form solution for current saving,
6 For the certainty equivalence case, where U(cτ) = − 12 (c¯− cτ)2, current consumption would be equal to ct =






, with ∂ct∂aτ < 0.
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st = (R− 1) At−1 + yt − ct can be written as































where Δ is the backward difference operator. Previously accumulated assets have
a negative impact on saving, and if labor income increases with age (Δyτ > 0), to-
day’s saving will also be lower. Higher expected pension beneﬁts should decrease
saving, i.e. the displacement effect referred to in Section 3.1 is present here as well.
Uncertainty in pension income increases saving, i.e. a precautionary saving motive,
as does longer expected survival.
3.3.1 Model extensions
Although equation 3.3 is the equation to be estimated in Section 3.5, I consider de-
viations from the assumptions implicitly or explicitly made so far. There are many
deviations possible, such as7 stochastic labor income (Caballero, 1990) or interest
rates (Merton, 1973), endogenous labor supply and retirement (Feldstein, 1974), hy-
perbolic discounting (Laibson, 1998), habit formation (Angelini, 2009; Alessie and
Teppa, 2010), home production (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005, 2007), bequest motives
(Hurd, 1989) or liquidity constraints (Mariger, 1987; Deaton, 1991), all of which will
have an impact on current consumption. Here I consider liquidity constraints ex-
plicitly in the model presented above to guide the empirical approach. This choice
is partly based on the notion that negative consumption, which is not punished
much under CARA utility as opposed to CRRA utility, is ruled out explicitly, and
partly based on the ﬁnding in Gross and Souleles (2002) that precautionary mo-
tives, liquidity constraints and a combination of these are empirically important
for consumption behavior.
I use the approach of Mariger (1987) to incorporate a liquidity constraint, which
consists of the following steps:
1. Let today be denoted by time t, and assume At−1 > 0. Assume that there
7 This list of possible deviations is certainly not exhaustive, as is the list of references given here. See Attanasio and
Weber (2010) for a recent review.
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exists a date v in the future, such that the liquidity constraint binds at this
date for the ﬁrst time, Av=0. Afterwards, the constraint always binds.
2. Solve the unconstrained problem for periods t until v
3. The (endogenous) date v can be found by choosing the maximum date that
minimizes period t consumption.
See Mariger (1987) for details and a proof. The derivations are delegated to Ap-
pendix 3.B; here I focus on the intuition. There are four scenarios possible. First,
the liquidity constrained may be currently binding (v = t). Under the maintained
assumption that the liquidity constraint always binds after reaching the zero-assets
bound for the ﬁrst time, today’s consumption will be equal to today’s income, and
saving is zero, independent of retirement income. Second, the constraint may never
bind (v = L), and we are back with the unconstrained solution presented above.
Third, the constraint may become binding before retirement (t < v < K− 1). In this
scenario, today’s consumption equals the present value of income until the bind-
ing date. The individual’s horizon is shortened to a period before retirement, and
hence his consumption decision is independent of income after retirement. In this
case, there should be no displacement effect nor a precautionary saving effect; sav-
ing is independent of the expected level of pension income, μyK and independent of
the variance of pension income, σ2yK . In the ﬁnal scenario, the liquidity constraints
binds after retirement (K < v < L). In this case, there exists an interplay between
the survival curve and the binding date. Consumption and saving are functions of
μyK and σ
2
yK , but the marginal effects depend on the exact binding date.
In general, the level of pension income as well as the uncertainty in pension
income will exhibit a larger inﬂuence on current consumption, the later in life the
liquidity constraint binds. Moreover, the higher are predetermined assets and labor
income, the later in life the liquidity constraint will bind.8 In the empirical section,
these observations are explicitly taken into account, by making the marginal effect
of pensions on saving dependent on predetermined assets and labor income, using
quantile regressions; more details follow in Section 3.4.1.
8 This prediction of the model is consistent with the notion that liquidity constraints are likely to impact especially
young households (Meghir and Weber, 1996), who have low levels of wealth and a steep age-earnings proﬁle.
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3.4 Data and methodology
For the empirical analysis, I use two sources of survey data: the DNB Household
Survey (DHS) and the Pension Barometer (PB). Both surveys are administered by
CentERData, Tilburg, The Netherlands, and have unique identiﬁers allowing us
to merge the two data sets at the individual level. The respondents represent the
Dutch population aged 16 and above. Both surveys are administered via the in-
ternet, and internet access is provided to those that do not have access themselves.
The DHS has been running since 1993, and the data from 2011 are the most recent
available. The DHS collects information on many socio-economic characteristics of
the household, including a detailed breakdown of household income and wealth
holdings, which can be used to construct measures of total assets, ﬁnancial assets
and housing assets; see Alessie et al. (2002) for an extended description.
The Pension Barometer survey is administered to a subset of respondents from
the DHS. The survey started in 2006, and 2011 is the most recent survey year at my
disposal. Among other questions, the PB elicits expectations of pension beneﬁts
from employees aged below the statutory retirement age of 65. More speciﬁcally,
the PB contains probabilistic survey questions of the type suggested by Dominitz
and Manski (1997) and Manski (2004) that elicit the subjective distribution of the
pension income replacement rate. Using the responses to these questions allows us
to construct individual-speciﬁc measures of expected pension beneﬁts and subjec-
tive uncertainty of pension income, by calculating the ﬁrst and second moment of
the distribution.
The exact wording of these questions is as follows.
Question 3.1. At which age do you think you can retire at the earliest, following your
employer’s pension scheme?
The answer to this question, say age K, is used in the subsequent question:
Question 3.2. If you would retire at age K, please think about your total net pension in-
come including social security, compared to your current total net wage or salary. What do
you think is the probability that the purchasing power of your total net pension income in
the year following your retirement will be:
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a) more than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
b) less than 100% of your current net wage? ... %
c) less than 90% of your current net wage? ... %
d) less than 80% of your current net wage? ... %
e) less than 70% of your current net wage? ... %
f) less than 60% of your current net wage? ... %
g) less than 50% of your current net wage? ... %
The probabilities answered by the respondent deﬁne 7 points on the subjective cu-
mulative distribution function of pension income. I assume a maximum replace-
ment rate of 120%, and use linear interpolation between the thresholds to derive
the complete distribution for each respondent in each survey year. The expected
replacement rate, i.e. the ﬁrst moment, is then used as a measure of the expected
level of pension beneﬁts divided by current income, μyK/yt. The standard devia-
tion, that is, the square root of the second central moment, is used as the measure of
replacement rate uncertainty, σyK/yt.
9 The determinants of the expected value and
standard deviation of the replacement rate have been investigated in Van Santen
et al. (2012), who show that the expected beneﬁt is U-shaped in age with a mini-
mum at 48, while uncertainty is inverted U-shaped with age with maximum at age
36. Educational attainment depresses the expectation, and increases uncertainty.
The uncertainty was higher in 2008 and 2009, compared to 2006 and 2007, possibly
due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Similarly, the expected replacement rate was lower in
these years.
Moreover, Van Santen et al. (2012) show that the sample from which consistent
answers are obtained, i.e. probabilities in line with the law of total probability and
monotonicity of the cumulative distribution function, is a selected sample. For this
reason, I construct sampling weights to correct for selection bias, detailed in Section
3.4.2 below.
Lifespan is the second source of uncertainty in the model. For the empirical
speciﬁcation, I rely on questions from the DHS which ask respondents to provide
subjective survival probabilities for certain target ages:
Question 3.3. How likely is it that you will attain (at least) the age of 65 / 75 / 80 ?10
9 Results using the inter-quartile range are very similar; the correlation between the IQR and the standard deviation
is 0.90.
10 Respondents answer at most three, but mostly two questions, depending on their actual age. Respondents younger
than 55 provide survival probabilities up to age 65 and 75, while people aged 55-65 provide survival probabilities for
age 75 and 80. This ensures that respondents do not have to answer survival probabilities up to ages lower than their
actual age nor ages in the near (5 years) future.
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Please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 thru 10, where 0 means ’no chance at all’ and 10
means ’absolutely certain’.
I ﬁt a two-parameter Gompertz distribution to the answers to estimate the subjec-
tive survival curve for each respondent in each year, in line with the theoretical
model. The cumulative Gompertz distribution function reads (Willemse and Kop-
pelaar, 2000)













where T is the time of death and q is the target age. I estimate the parameters b and
λ using a nonlinear least squares procedure, separately for each respondent in each
year. Furthermore, I use a discrete approximation to the continuous distribution to
compute remaining life expectancy as








P(T ≥ τ|T ≥ t) = ∞∑
τ=t
exp[− exp[ τ−λb ]]
exp[− exp[ t−λb ]]
.
(3.5)
The expected age of death then equals L˜ = E (T|T ≥ t) + t. This measure is used
in the descriptive analysis only,11 as the maximum attainable age of the model, L,
is ﬁxed at 110 in the empirical work.
The dependent variable, annual saving, is computed as the change of ﬁnancial
wealth, st = At − At−1, and ﬁnancial wealth equals the sum of the most liquid
assets (checking accounts, saving arrangements, deposit books, saving or deposit
accounts, saving certiﬁcates) net of the most liquid categories of liabilities (private
loans and extended lines of credit). Note that this saving measure is backward
looking: saving in year t is the change of ﬁnancial wealth between years t− 1 and
t. On the contrary, the subjective expectations are forward looking: the expected
replacement rate obtained in survey year t measures Et(yK/yt), and similarly for
the standard deviation of the replacement rate and subjective survival probabilities.
In order to relate these expectations to the period in which the saving decision is
taken, I use the lagged value of all expectations. Now, there are six observation for
ﬁnancial wealth (2006-2011), and hence ﬁve years of saving, related to ﬁve years of




b−1(λ − t)]+ 1), could have been used
in the descriptive analysis, which does not require the approximation, but the two are very similar in the data.
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expectations data.
The DHS gives additional information on household characteristics, most no-
tably the age of the household members, the size of the household and household
income. Table 3.1 below shows the sample statistics of the variables used in this
study. All variables refer to the head of household.
Table 3.1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation
10th Quantile -9874
25th Quantile -1705
Saving (s) 50th Quantile 354
75th Quantile 6020
90th Quantile 22624
Expected retirement age (K) 63.4 (1.9)
Expected replacement rate (μyK/yt) (%) 75.2 (16.8)
Standard deviation replacement rate (σyK/yt) (%) 15.5 (9.7)
Life expectancy (L˜) 82.0 8.2
Age (t) 47.3 (9.2)
Real income (y) 35325 (18302)
Financial wealth (A) 44455 (70215)
Low educated (%) 21.4 (41.1)
High educated (%) 50.8 (50.0)
Female (%) 18.4 (38.7)
Partner (%) 69.9 (45.9)
Number of children (%) 1.04 (1.07)
Urban (%) 46.0 (49.9)
Home owner (%) 78.3 (41.2)
Saver (%) 33.6 (47.3)
Bad health (%) 1.7 (13.0)
N = 1010. Symbol in parentheses refers to the model of Section 3.3.
Pooled sample statistics for years 2006-2011.
Figure 3.1 plots (bivariate) kernel regression estimates of the relationship hy-
pothesized in the lifecycle model of Section 3.3. As predicted by this model, I
observe positive relationships between saving and the uncertainty in pension in-
come (Figure 3.1b) as well as between life expectancy and saving (Figure 3.1c). The
relation between saving and the expectation of the replacement rate (Figure 3.1a)
appears hump-shaped, although the upward sloping part has few observations;
the negative relationship for higher values of the replacement rate is in line with
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the lifecycle model. Of course, this is just descriptive evidence, and the validity of
the model is formally tested in Section 3.5.
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Since I have panel data I use t to index the age of the head of the household; obvi-
ously, t can also be read as the index for year. Households are indexed by i. Annual
saving of household i at age ti, as given by equation 3.3, writing out the summa-
tions where possible, equal
sit = − (R− 1) R
ti−L
R− Rti−L Ait−1 +
Rti−Kit−1+1 − Rti−L










R− Rti−L μit−1 +
Rti−Kit−1+1 − Rti−L





(R− 1)∑Lτ=Kit−1 Rti−τ 1α log (ait−1τ)
R− Rti−L + uit . (3.6)
Note that all variables (except for future income terms in Δyiτ) in equation 3.6 are
known from the survey questions described above or background characteristics.
In particular, ti is the age of the head of the household, Kit−1 is the (possibly time-
varying) lagged retirement age from question 3.1, Ait−1 is previous-period liquid
wealth, μit−1 is the lagged elicited expected replacement rate multiplied by cur-
rent income yit and σ2it−1 the variance of the replacement rate multiplied by income
squared. ait−1τ is the lagged subjective survival probability up to age τ, and L the
maximum age, which is ﬁxed at 110. All amounts are measured in 2006 Euro’s,
deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index from the Statistics Netherlands. The co-
efﬁcient of risk aversion, α, is not available at the household level; I use α = 5 for
computing the terms, although the value is not important in the regression analysis
as these constants enter linearly. For R, I use R = 1.03 as the baseline value, in line
with earlier studies (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003; Hurd et al., 2012). Robustness
checks are performed by varying R between 1.01 and 1.05, and for α between 3 and
7. As for the third term on the right hand side, I use a ﬁxed effects model to predict
future labor income, detailed in Appendix 3.C.
One problem with the current speciﬁcation of the saving equation is that the
present value of expected pension beneﬁt receipts and the present value of un-
certainty in pension beneﬁts are highly correlated with current income, by con-
struction. Therefore, I divide all terms by R
ti−Kit−1+1−Rti−L
R−Rti−L yit. This transformation
implies I can use the expected replacement rate and the standard deviation of the
replacement rate as explanatory variables. Note that if I would take the variance of
the replacement rate, I would have the saving rate, s/y on the left hand side, and
σ2 × y on the right hand side. If income y is measured with error, which is typically
the case in a household survey, the impact of this error is unclear a priori and could
bias the results substantially.12
In line with the results from the lifecycle model with a liquidity constraint, I
let the marginal effect of pension income depend on wealth and labor income. I
12 Measurement error in the expectation variables, for instance due to the piece-wise linearity assump-
tion made to compute these from the underlying survey questions, is likely to attenuate the coefﬁcients
towards zero, and therefore (the absolute value of) these parameters may be underestimated.
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impose restrictions on the coefﬁcients for two variables, namely the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand-side, featuring predetermined assets Ait−1, and the third term, featuring
Δyiτ . Both these coefﬁcients are restricted to equal −1, and I subsequently take
these variables to the left-hand-side. Of course this also takes care of potential
biases from measurement error in household ﬁnancial wealth and the estimate of
future labor income; see Alessie et al. (2011a), for a formal justiﬁcation of these
parameter restrictions.
In the empirical application, I additionally control for observable household
characteristics, xit, such as education and home ownership, and time ﬁxed effects.
The ﬁnal equation to be estimated reads
(
R− Rti−L) sityit





















(R− 1)∑Lτ=Kit−1 Rti−τ 1α log (ait−1τ)(












(R− 1)∑Lτ=Kit−1 Rti−τ 1α log (ait−1τ)(
Rti−Kit−1+1 − Rti−L) + x′itγ+ uit ,
(3.7b)
where sityit
∗ is the implicitly deﬁned composite dependent variable. I estimate equa-
tion 3.7b using quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett Jr., 1978). The coefﬁcients
are now varying over the quantiles of the dependent variable. Of course, quan-
tile regressions have the additional robustness advantage to outliers, compared to
linear regression as well. Since I use a composite dependent variable, the interpre-
tation of the coefﬁcients depends on the contribution of each term on the left-hand-
side of (3.7a) to the composite variable. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the
saving rate, the wealth-to-income ratio and the growth rate of labor income, plot-
ted against the distribution of the composite dependent variable. The main source
of variation in the composite dependent variable comes from the saving rate. In-
stead, the wealth-to-income ratio is rather ﬂat. The results are mainly driven by the
saving rate. As a check, I have also estimated linear (panel data) models without
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imposing the restrictions, the results of which are shown in Section 3.5.3.








Min Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Max
Composite dependent variable
Saving rate Future income Predetermined wealth
3.4.2 Sample selection
The estimation sample is small (N = 1010), both in absolute terms and relative
to the full dataset if the panel were completely balanced (N = 2148). One of the
reasons for the small sample size is the fact that, to estimate equation 3.7, one needs
at least two time periods to compute the change in ﬁnancial wealth. Moreover, as
the Pension Barometer is a separate questionnaire, that is, not integrated into the
DHS, the household head has to answer three questionnaires to be included in the
estimation sample: the DHS in years t− 1 and t, and the PB in t− 1. The DHS has
quite substantial attrition, which is dealt with by biannual refreshment samples
that are drawn in view of keeping the panel representative of the Dutch population
of 16 years and older. Still, for this analysis, a considerable fraction of the potential
sample is lost.
A second major reason for the loss of observations is the fact that many re-
spondents do not answer the probabilistic survey questions in a meaningful way,
that is, either no answer or answers violating the law of total probability or vio-
lating monotonicity of the distribution function. For these observations, the ex-
pected level and standard deviation of the pension income replacement rate can-
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not be computed. Not surprisingly, education is related to being able to answer
the probabilistic questions or not. Van Santen et al. (2012) provide a more thor-
ough discussion of these selection effects. Combining the missing answers due
to attrition, item non-response and violations, we lose 1137 out of 2148 observa-
tions which have answered at least one DHS questionnaire. To correct for possi-
ble attrition and selection biases, I opt for Inverse Probability Weighted estimation
(Wooldridge, 2002, 2007) of the quantile regressions, following Maitra and Vahid
(2006). As a brief summary, all variables, both dependent and independent, are
weighted by the inverse of the probability of being in the estimation sample, in or-
der to obtain a consistent estimator13 of the population moment condition to which
the quantile regression estimator converges14. In practice, these probabilities need
to be estimated. I use a logit model to estimate the probabilities, in which the de-
pendent variable Dit = 1 in case the observation is in the estimation sample, and
Dit = 0 otherwise. As explanatory variables, I use a lagged dependent variable
(Dit−1) to account for attrition, following Abowd et al. (2001), age and its square,
the logarithm of real annual household income and the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation of ﬁnancial wealth. Furthermore, I use a set of indicators for ed-
ucation (reference group: least educated), working as a civil servant, not having
a permanent work contract, owning a house, being female, having a partner or
spouse, living in an urban area and being in bad health, as reported subjectively
by the respondent in the previous survey year. To account for selection effects from
not answering the probabilistic pension income questions, I use three variables sug-
gested in Van Santen et al. (2012). These ’excluding variables’ are derived from not
answering or violating other probabilistic survey questions regarding (1) next-year
inﬂation expectations, (2) next-year household income expectations and (3) next-
year household income growth expectations. All three variables are coded 1 in case
of not answering or violating probability laws. Finally, I include a household ran-
dom effect, and solve the initial conditions problem arising from the inclusion of
both the lagged dependent variable and the household random effect, following
the approach in Wooldridge (2005), by including an indicator (Di2005) for whether
13 The assumptions needed to ensure that the weighting works are essentially that the selection process is captured by
the weights, and that the weights are exogenous to saving.
14 Buchinsky (1998) corrects for attrition bias using a Heckman-type correction for quantile regression models.
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Inﬂation error -0.387*** (0.150)
Income error -0.558*** (0.177)
Income growth error -0.404 (0.359)
Age 0.758*** (0.0982)
Age2/100 -0.864*** (0.105)
Log real income 0.593*** (0.215)
IH(ﬁnancial wealth) -0.0211 (0.0243)
Secondary educated -0.463* (0.269)
Higher educated 0.185 (0.276)
University educated 0.560* (0.339)
Female -0.0151 (0.268)
Partner 0.214 (0.263)
Log (Nr children+1) -0.227 (0.220)
Civil Servant -0.332 (0.256)
No permanent contract -0.689* (0.377)
Home owner 0.668*** (0.247)
Urban area 0.206 (0.206)





p-value Excluding variables 0.000
p-value Age effects 0.000
p-value Income effects 0.000
S.D. Random effect 1.099
Dependent variable Dit = 1 if in estimation sample
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
or not the respondent answered the DHS questionnaire in 2005 (period 0).15 The
results are shown in table 3.2 below.
Being a respondent to both the DHS and PB questionnaires in period t − 1
increases the probability of being in the sample, but at a diminishing rate, con-
ﬁrming the attrition taking place in the sample. As in Van Santen et al. (2012),
education and whether the respondent does not answer the other probabilistic
questions on next-year inﬂation and household income (growth) correctly or does
not answer at all are good predictors of the selection effects from the probabilis-
tic survey questions on retirement income used in this paper. Older individuals
15 The results of the quantile regressions discussed in Section 3.5 are marginally affected by the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variables Dit−1 and Di2006, i.e. not considering panel attrition, in the sense that the qualitative conclusions
are the same, but the estimated coefﬁcients (and their signiﬁcance levels) are somewhat smaller in absolute values.
The biggest effect is noticeable for the variable σ, which, compared to Table 3.3 is now signiﬁcant at the 10% level (as
opposed to the 5% level) for the highest two quantiles. These results are available upon request.
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are less likely to be in the sample, probably due to the fact that the retirees are
of course excluded from the analysis. Finally, being in bad health in the previous
year decreases the probability of being in the estimation sample. In the quantile
regressions below, I use the variables used are y˜it = yit/P̂(Dit = 1) and z˜it =
zit/P̂(Dit = 1) as dependent and independent variables, respectively, where zit =(
μit−1/yit, ασit−1/2yit, (R− 1)∑Lτ=Kit−1 Rti−τ(1/α) log (ait−1τ) /
(
Rti−Kit−1+1 − Rti−L) , x′it).
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 shows the results of estimating equation 3.7b for the 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%
and 90% quantiles. I use the abbreviations μ, σ and Survival to refer to the expected
replacement rate, standard deviation of the replacement rate distribution and the
subjective survival probabilities, respectively. The standard errors are based on a
bootstrap procedure. I draw bootstrap samples of households (sampling all years
the household is in the data) from the entire dataset (i.e. 2148 observations) to calcu-
late a set of probability weights, and subsequently estimate the weighted quantile
regression coefﬁcients. This procedure is repeated 1000 times to obtain cluster-
bootstrapped standard errors, taking into account the uncertainty from estimating
the inverse probability weights. The control variables consist of the same set as
used in Table 3.2, and include the logarithm of the number of children and indi-
cators for education (secondary, more than secondary or university education with
benchmark least educated), being female, having a partner or spouse, being a civil
servant, not having a permanent contract (benchmark ﬂexible or short-term con-
tracts), owning a house, living in an urban area (benchmark living in villages with
population less than 10,000 persons) and being in bad health as reported by the
person, as well as time ﬁxed effects. The main results are presented in Table 3.3.
The coefﬁcients measuring the displacement effect (μ) and the precautionary
saving effect (σ) are insigniﬁcant for the lower part of the saving distribution. For
the 75th and 90th quantiles, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of displacement, and ev-
idence for precautionary saving behavior. The coefﬁcient estimates for the higher
quantiles are in line with the theoretical model. Across the entire distribution, the
results are consistent with the liquidity-constrained version of the model, as the
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Table 3.3. Results saving equation, weighted quantile regressions
Quantile
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
μ 0.452* -0.0163 -0.0424 -0.693*** -1.273**
(0.272) (0.125) (0.0806) (0.284) (0.550)
σ -0.178 -0.122 -0.00693 0.365** 0.964**
(0.226) (0.0977) (0.0668) (0.163) (0.348)
Survival -2.318*** -0.863*** 0.320 1.294*** 2.435***
(0.562) (0.281) (0.267) (0.476) (0.973)
Secondary educated -0.309** -0.252*** -0.0574 -0.206** -1.052***
(0.137) (0.0533) (0.0366) (0.0808) (0.322)
Higher educated 0.527*** 0.158*** 0.0978*** 0.143* -0.0767
(0.117) (0.0525) (0.0361) (0.0800) (0.338)
University educated 0.192 0.242*** 0.141*** 0.0743 -0.0595
(0.200) (0.0712) (0.0438) (0.0982) (0.338)
Female -1.806*** -0.521*** -0.0762* -0.200*** 0.214
(0.135) (0.0573) (0.0412) (0.0578) (0.133)
Partner -0.532*** -0.510*** 0.0390 0.104 1.444***
(0.121) (0.0535) (0.0406) (0.0792) (0.167)
Log(Nr children+1) 0.287*** 0.147*** -0.128*** -0.244*** -0.800***
(0.111) (0.0456) (0.0287) (0.0473) (0.143)
Civil servant -0.392*** -0.324*** -0.0466 -0.0931* 0.292**
(0.134) (0.0558) (0.0329) (0.0527) (0.143)
No permanent contract 0.560 -0.0307 0.201* 0.0991 0.127
(0.383) (0.254) (0.111) (0.0955) (0.184)
Home owner -0.0813 0.0929** 0.0318 0.0526 0.238
(0.107) (0.0461) (0.0368) (0.0658) (0.170)
Urban area 0.302*** 0.0353 0.0489 0.0223 0.283**
(0.0936) (0.0442) (0.0328) (0.0516) (0.138)
Bad health -0.550 -0.0567 -0.182 -0.206 -2.079***
(0.406) (0.453) (0.228) (0.151) (0.301)
Year 2007 0.0699 -0.176*** -0.174*** -0.0273 -0.0243
(0.154) (0.0488) (0.0404) (0.0564) (0.137)
Year 2008 -0.549*** -0.355*** -0.151*** -0.0738 -0.184
(0.131) (0.0571) (0.0401) (0.0644) (0.158)
Year 2009 -0.439*** -0.293*** 0.00831 0.245*** 0.0162
(0.0951) (0.0503) (0.0422) (0.0619) (0.206)
Year 2010 -0.415* -0.348** -0.0535 0.351 1.691
(0.250) (0.136) (0.0646) (0.302) (1.794)
Year 2011 -1.583*** -0.334*** -0.150*** -0.0453 -0.0963
(0.187) (0.0615) (0.0413) (0.105) (0.403)
Constant -1.743*** 0.149 0.370*** 1.098*** 3.997***
(0.354) (0.166) (0.109) (0.190) (0.536)
Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Households 491 491 491 491 491
Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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lower quantiles represent those with less assets and less income. I ﬁnd that the sav-
ing rate increases by 0.69 percentage points for every 1 percentage point decrease in
the expected replacement rate. An increase of 1%-point in the standard deviation
of the replacement rate increases the saving rate by 0.37 %-point. For the 90th quan-
tile, the saving rate increases by 1.27%-point and 0.96%-point for the same decrease
in the expected replacement rate and increase in its standard deviation.
For Survival, I obtain strong negative effects in the lower quantiles, no effect at
the median and positive effects at the high quantiles. The theory predicts a posi-
tive effect, hence saving to hedge against becoming very old is therefore only true
for the wealthiest households in the sample. Female-headed households and civil
servants save less, except at the highest quantile.
The results show evidence in favor of the lifecycle model with uncertainty. An
interesting test is to see what the impact is of ignoring uncertainty, and hence esti-
mating a certainty-equivalence version of the lifecycle model. To do so, I estimate
the same model as in Table 3.3, without σ and Survival as explanatory variables.
The result of the parameter governing the displacement effect is shown in Table 3.4
below.
Table 3.4. Results saving equation without uncertainty, weighted quantile regres-
sions
Quantile
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
μ 1.044 -0.281 -0.489** -0.795** -1.498**
(0.846) (0.353) (0.224) (0.366) (0.595)
Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Households 491 491 491 491 491
Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Same controls as in Table 3.3
The displacement effect is negative from the 25th quantile, and signiﬁcantly be-
low zero from the median upwards. This result is interesting, as it shows that ig-
noring precautionary saving motives leads to underestimation of the displacement
effect parameter, and therefore gives too high estimates of crowding out. In a sim-
ple omitted variable bias setting, this result can be easily explained as long as the
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true precautionary saving parameter is positive.16 Previous studies may therefore
have overestimated the crowding out effect even when using linear or median re-
gressions.
The remainder of this section shows the results of two robustness checks, namely
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. More checks have been done however, in
particular, 1) varying the ﬁxed parameters r (between 1-5%) and α (between 3 and
7), 2) a broader measure of saving (wealth) based on changes in (the level of) net
wealth (which includes housing wealth, mortgage debt and durable goods) as well
as 3) an interaction between the civil servant dummy and both μ and σ, to capture
labor income uncertainty or differences in risk aversion. For brevity, these are not
reported, but available upon request. The results of these checks show that 1) vary-
ing r and α gives quantitatively different results (in particular, higher interest rates
give larger coefﬁcients in absolute value terms), but leaves the qualitative results
unchanged, 2) broader saving and wealth measures give evidence of displacement
and precautionary saving only in the highest quantile17 and 3) income uncertainty
seems to play a less prominent role, as the interaction terms are marginally signiﬁ-
cant only in the highest quantile.
3.5.1 Unobservable taste for saving
It is often argued that “taste for saving” (Cagan, 1965) is distributed heteroge-
neously in the population: some individuals derive utility from saving, even with-
out a clear economic motive, whereas others simply do not save at all. Although
these ad-hoc statements are at odds with the model presented above, in the empir-
ical analysis we can try to separate those which like to save from those that dislike
saving. For this, I include a variable whether or not the head of household declares
to be a “saver”, which is based on the following stated preferences question from
the DHS:
Question 3.4. Please indicate what you do with money that is left over after having paid
for food, rent, and other necessities, on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “I like to spend
all my money immediately” and 7 means “I want to save as much as possible”
16 A second condition is that the mean and standard deviation of the replacement rate should be negatively correlated,
but this is true by construction, as we subtract the (squared) mean from the second moment to compute the variance
of the replacement rate.
17 The coefﬁcient estimates for the 75th quantile of μ and σ are signiﬁcant at the 11% level, and for the 80th quantile at
the conventional 5% level.
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The indicator Saver is coded 1 if the respondent answers 6 or 7. The variable Saver
is additionally interacted with μ and σ to allow for different effects between stated
savers and non-savers18, and hopefully capture the unobservable “taste for sav-
ing”. Table 3.5 below shows the results.19
The coefﬁcient on the interaction term between μ and Saver is negative across
the entire distribution, and signiﬁcantly so from the median upwards, indicating
that the stated savers more strongly displace private saving by pension saving.
In the higher quantiles, the difference between the estimated displacement effect
for savers and non-savers is the largest; focusing only on non-savers, one would
conclude that pensions do not affect private saving; for savers, I ﬁnd either no
effect or a signiﬁcantly negative effect. The magnitude of the estimate suggests that
for the highest (90th) quantile, an increase in the replacement rate by 1 percentage
point leads to a decrease in the private saving rate by 1.9 percentage point.
The precautionary pension saving effect shows a similar pattern; only for the
highest quantiles there is evidence of precautionary saving due to pension income
uncertainty, and the effect is stronger for the savers than for the non-savers. For the
lower quantiles, the effect on saving is not signiﬁcant. Of course, these households
save little (or negative) compared to the higher quantiles, and hence there saving
behavior may be related to other factors, such as the credit constraints mentioned
in Section 3.3.1. Similarly, lifespan uncertainty is found to decrease saving signiﬁ-
cantly for the lowest quantiles, contrary to the lifecycle model.
The dummy Saver has a (weakly) signiﬁcant positive effect on the saving rate, as
expected. The remaining parameter estimates are very similar to those in Table 3.3.
All in all, I conclude that those in the highest conditional quantiles are more likely
to behave according to the lifecycle model, as these households displace private
saving with retirement income and increase saving with uncertainty over pension
income and lifespan.
18 Note that the question elicits saving preferences or saving intentions, which is correlated with but remains different
from actual saving behavior (see, for instance, Laibson et al. (1998)).
19 Results using a different saving preference indicator, based on the question “Will you adjust your conduct if pensions
are cut down, for example through an adjustment on the indexation, postponement of the retirement age or a different
pension system?”, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar and are available upon request.
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Table 3.5. Results saving equation with interaction terms, weighted quantile regres-
sions
Quantile
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
μ 0.473* -0.108 -0.0854 -0.156 -0.773*
(0.261) (0.134) (0.109) (0.181) (0.432)
μ × Saver -0.068 -0.152 -0.312** -0.662*** -1.121***
(0.230) (0.0963) (0.149) (0.238) (0.433)
σ -0.273 0.132 0.187** 0.278** 0.520*
(0.250) (0.0981) (0.0820) (0.163) (0.293)
σ × Saver -0.087 0.142 0.430*** 0.676*** 0.781*
(0.281) (0.208) (0.163) (0.212) (0.441)
Survival -2.541*** -1.194*** 0.135 1.010** 2.568***
(0.523) (0.270) (0.276) (0.466) (1.024)
Secondary educated -0.322*** -0.198*** -0.0465 -0.225*** -1.006***
(0.121) (0.0520) (0.0368) (0.0784) (0.272)
Higher educated 0.528*** 0.147*** 0.169*** 0.112 -0.0806
(0.110) (0.0534) (0.0354) (0.0793) (0.301)
University educated 0.113 0.218*** 0.199*** 0.0402 -0.0512
(0.196) (0.0732) (0.0477) (0.0962) (0.314)
Female -1.823*** -0.535*** -0.0761* -0.174*** 0.0817
(0.141) (0.0613) (0.0445) (0.0618) (0.143)
Partner -0.579*** -0.452*** -0.0116 0.171** 1.273***
(0.118) (0.0545) (0.0386) (0.0830) (0.180)
Log(Nr children+1) 0.278*** 0.105** -0.0886*** -0.245*** -0.719***
(0.107) (0.0460) (0.0290) (0.0511) (0.148)
Civil servant -0.467*** -0.285*** -0.109*** -0.159*** 0.0909
(0.131) (0.0570) (0.0315) (0.0585) (0.165)
No permanent contract 0.432 -0.0385 0.173* 0.0800 0.388**
(0.411) (0.266) (0.0923) (0.0971) (0.186)
Home owner 0.0356 0.0764* 0.0888** -0.00233 0.171
(0.102) (0.0453) (0.0369) (0.0768) (0.191)
Saver -0.183 0.0952** 0.208* 0.216* 0.336
(0.197) (0.0398) (0.112) (0.129) (0.246)
Urban area 0.339*** 0.0275 0.0653** 0.0375 0.253*
(0.0969) (0.0447) (0.0306) (0.0553) (0.147)
Bad health -0.736* -0.192 -0.249 -0.235 -2.142***
(0.413) (0.457) (0.237) (0.148) (0.301)
Constant -1.707*** 0.0866 0.378*** 1.199*** 3.525***
(0.377) (0.170) (0.105) (0.193) (0.488)
Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Households 491 491 491 491 491
Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Time effects included, not reported
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3.5.2 A panel data quantile regression model
Finally, I estimate a panel data model for quantile regressions, where the (random)
household effect αi is parameterized as the mean of the time-varying indepen-
dent variables, following Mundlak (1978); see also Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) and
Wooldridge (2010).20 To obtain a pure location-shift approach (i.e. the household
effect does not vary over the quantiles), I impose cross-quantile equality restrictions
on the estimates of the household effects. Table 3.6 shows the parameter estimates
of the weighted quantile regression estimates of equation 3.7b.
The parameter estimates and signiﬁcance levels are similar to the results ob-
tained without the correlated random effects (Table 3.3), even while the household
effects are jointly signiﬁcant (p = 0.000), suggesting that the estimates of the dis-
placement effect and precautionary saving effects are not biased due to unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity. The differences are a somewhat smaller (in absolute
value) estimated displacement effect, and a slightly larger precautionary saving ef-
fect, which is signiﬁcant for the non-savers only at the median, and for the savers
in the highest quantiles. The remaining coefﬁcients for the explanatory variables
are similar to Tables 3.3 and 3.5 as well.
20 Alternative approaches for ﬁxed-effects quantile regression include penalized quantile regression approaches, as
in Koenker (2004) and Lamarche (2010), in which a full set of individual dummies is included, which are subject to
shrinkage towards a common value to prevent the well-known incidental parameters problem. However, the degree
of shrinkage inﬂuences the parameter estimates of all explanatory variables, and is subject to ongoing research. Hence,
I prefer to use the conceptually straightforward Mundlak (1978) approach.
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Table 3.6. Results saving equation with correlated random effects, weighted quantile re-
gressions
Quantile
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
μ 0.867 0.329 0.069 -0.465* -0.789**
(0.585) (0.281) (0.164) (0.245) (0.391)
μ × Saver -0.224 -0.182 -0.413*** -0.628*** -0.702**
(0.291) (0.155) (0.156) (0.203) (0.341)
σ 0.246 -0.276* 0.425*** 0.121 0.430
(0.470) (0.157) (0.162) (0.251) (0.528)
σ × Saver 0.657 0.088 0.235 0.872** 1.386**
(0.515) (0.185) (0.196) (0.414) (0.673)
Survival -2.352*** -0.659* -0.550 1.074** 1.963***
(1.000) (0.364) (0.446) (0.487) (0.668)
Secondary educated -0.364*** -0.267*** -0.170*** -0.187** -0.985***
(0.139) (0.0616) (0.0457) (0.0883) (0.340)
Higher educated 0.295*** 0.195*** 0.0944** 0.0487 -0.158
(0.114) (0.0579) (0.0417) (0.0922) (0.372)
University educated 0.296 0.201** 0.0392 -0.0236 -0.306
(0.186) (0.0793) (0.0556) (0.115) (0.379)
Female -1.665*** -0.489*** -0.139*** 0.000239 0.383**
(0.140) (0.0649) (0.0474) (0.0716) (0.155)
Partner -0.384 -0.243 -0.284 -0.325 -0.960
(1.209) (1.011) (0.762) (0.417) (1.092)
Log(Nr children+1) -0.171 -0.321 0.0354 -0.186 -0.305
(0.465) (0.208) (0.165) (0.197) (0.585)
Civil servant 0.290 -0.670*** -0.619*** -0.816*** -1.422***
(0.543) (0.188) (0.127) (0.227) (0.544)
No permanent contract 1.606*** 0.247 -0.0469 -0.307** -1.068***
(0.508) (0.253) (0.130) (0.141) (0.278)
Home owner 1.228** 0.200 0.861*** 0.207 1.537**
(0.510) (0.271) (0.248) (0.316) (0.719)
Saver 0.0213 0.125* 0.168* 0.302* 0.487**
(0.097) (0.0742) (0.094) (0.156) (0.224)
Urban area -1.805*** -0.365 0.944** 1.134*** 3.603***
(0.700) (0.475) (0.394) (0.391) (0.740)
Bad health -1.219** -0.334 -0.0382 0.201 -1.297***
(0.563) (0.407) (0.189) (0.223) (0.452)
μ -0.512** -0.512** -0.512** -0.512** -0.512**
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
μ × Saver 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136)
σ 0.541** 0.541** 0.541** 0.541** 0.541**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223)
σ × Saver 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338
(0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268)
Survival 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.811
(0.765) (0.765) (0.765) (0.765) (0.765)
Partner -0.283 -0.283 -0.283 -0.283 -0.283
(0.434) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434)
logNr Children+1 0.418* 0.418* 0.418* 0.418* 0.418*
(0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216)
Civil Servant 0.588*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 0.588***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
No permanent contract 0.772*** 0.772*** 0.772*** 0.772*** 0.772***
(0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231)
Home owner -0.756*** -0.756*** -0.756*** -0.756*** -0.756***
(0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 – continued from previous page
Quantile
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
Saver 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227***
(0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0580)
Urban area 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456
(0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474)
Bad health -0.890** -0.890** -0.890** -0.890** -0.890**
(0.364) (0.364) (0.364) (0.364) (0.364)
Constant -0.861* -0.565*** 0.538*** 2.038*** 3.481***
(0.456) (0.201) (0.143) (0.233) (0.691)
Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Households 491 491 491 491 491
p-value test Mundlak terms 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Time effects included, not reported
3.5.3 Linear models
A ﬁnal concern may be the degree of structure imposed on the data, in particular
the non-linear effects in age and the expected retirement date, the composition of
the dependent variable as well as the weighting procedure used to correct for sam-
ple selection effects. Therefore, I impose less structure to investigate whether or not
the results are created artiﬁcially. In particular, I set α = R = 1, and use either the
level of saving or the saving rate as dependent variables below. Table 3.7 shows
the results from using a random effects approach (RE) and a ﬁxed effects approach
(FE). Moreover, I also use a Heckman model, with the same selection equation as
used above.21 Of course, if sample selection effects or measurement errors are really
points of concern, the results shown below should be interpreted with caution.
The results indicate that the displacement effect is signiﬁcantly negative using
RE or a Heckman model when the level of saving is used as dependent variable,
and only for the Heckman model using the saving rate. The precautionary effect is
positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero for most speciﬁcations, except when
using the Heckman model for the saving rate. The effect of longer expected sur-
vival is signiﬁcantly positive. To sum up, while the results are more mixed using
21 For both dependent variables, the exclusion restrictions are on the variables describing violations for other proba-
bilistic questions, as well as on the lagged dependent variable in the selection equation. These variables jointly sig-
niﬁcant (p = 0.000) for the selection equation, and the estimated correlation between the error terms is signiﬁcantly
negative at the 5% level.
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Table 3.7. Results saving equation, linear models
Saving Saving rate
RE FE Heckman RE FE Heckman
μ -11.68** -3.515 -9.295** -0.0114 0.0228 0.0574*
(4.889) (5.092) (4.613) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0330)
σ 14.16*** 12.88*** 4.592 0.0654*** 0.0670*** 0.0460**
(4.681) (4.829) (9.452) (0.0195) (0.0206) (0.0213)
Survival 91.90*** 105.3*** 43.29* 0.350*** 0.461*** 0.163*
(15.42) (16.54) (24.79) (0.0641) (0.0709) (0.0886)
Observations 1010 1010 2148 1010 1010 2148
Households 491 491 1013 491 491 1013
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Same control variables as in Table 3.3, as well as age and its square, lagged ﬁnancial wealth and future income
The Heckman selection equation has the same variables as used in Table 3.2
the linear models or a simpler Heckman model, the main effects prevail in most
speciﬁcations, suggesting that the weighting, the construction of the composite de-
pendent variable and the non-linear age effects, all used in the quantile regressions,
are not driving the main results.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I show evidence of displacement of private saving by pension sav-
ing, as well as precautionary saving due to uncertain lifespan and uncertainty over
pension income, for a sample of Dutch households. The estimated saving equation
is based on a lifecycle model featuring rational individuals that work and consume
or save before retirement; income after retirement income is uncertain from today’s
perspective, as is remaining life expectancy. I use the answers from subjective prob-
abilistic survey questions to compute expected pension income and the standard
deviation of pension income as a measure for uncertainty, as well as the subjective
survival curve. Therefore, the subjective expectations vary between households,
and within households over time. Quantile regression results show that, for the
more afﬂuent respondents, saving increases with the uncertainty in pension income
and increase with expected length of life, as predicted by the theory. The displace-
ment effect is signiﬁcant for the higher quantiles as well, and shows that pensions
crowd out private saving, especially for those that state to have a preference for sav-
ing for retirement. These results are robust to the inclusion of correlated random
household effects, and are in line with the predictions from a version of the lifecycle
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model with liquidity constraints and retirement income uncertainty. Compared to
the empirical literature, the obtained displacement effect, measured as the increase
in private wealth due to a 1 Euro decrease in pension wealth, is rather low, at 11.5%.
It is consistent with earlier literature for the Netherlands, however. Moreover, I ﬁnd
that ignoring precautionary saving motives leads to an estimated crowding out ef-
fect which is too high, a feature which is likely to hold in the previous empirical
literature based on certainty equivalence as well.
For policy purposes, the paper suggests that Dutch employees do prepare for
retirement, as indicated by the expected sign for pension uncertainty and mortality
risk. However, for the less afﬂuent part of the sample, these effects are not found.
Liquidity constraints may indeed be an explanation for this ﬁnding, although time-
inconsistent preferences or ﬁnancial illiteracy are likely to play a role as well, as
argued by, amongst others, Choi et al. (2011) and Alessie et al. (2011b).
In future research, allowing for endogenous labor supply and retirement is the
obvious next step, but the expectations data collected thus far are not sufﬁcient at
this moment. Moreover, if utility is assumed to be separable in consumption and
leisure, the impact of endogenous retirement is likely to be small. At the least,
the subjective pension income expectations are shown to yield plausible results re-
garding saving behavior of the currently young population. Bigger samples and
better ways to elicit expectations, for instance using the procedure of Delavande
and Rohwedder (2008), may increase the explanatory power of these subjective ex-
pectations.
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3.A Derivation of equation 3.2
The problem the individual faces is to maximize lifecycle utility subject to the con-




























where cτ is consumption in period τ and Et is the expectation operator conditional
on information available in period t. I solve for today’s consumption, ct, in three
steps. First, I solve the retirement stage and calculate the value of future utility
streams, conditional on net worth available at the beginning of retirement, AK−1.
Second, I solve the problem for the working stage, and compute the value of utility
conditional on leaving AK−1 available for future consumption. Finally, I choose
AK−1 to maximize lifecycle utility.
3.A.1 Consumption during retirement
During retirement, when the uncertainty over pension income has resolved, the
















Aτ = RAτ−1 + yτ − cτ (3.A.2c)
AL = 0. (3.A.2d)





22 I use the ﬁrst-order condition, the consolidated retirement budget constraint (3.B.6) and the terminal condition
(3.B.8).
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RL−τ log (aτ) +
RL−K+1
∑Lτ=K RL−τ
AK−1 + yK. (3.A.3b)
For convenience I deﬁne





RL−τ log (aτ) ,










AK−1 + yK. (3.A.4)


















































which is a function of the state variable AK−1.
3.A.2 Consumption during working life















Rt−τyτ − Rt−K+1AK−1. (3.A.6b)
The solution for the consumption path during working life is given by
cτ = ct (3.A.7a)
23 Note that I assumed that aK=1, so that the solution for cK is still as in (3.A.3b).
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ct =
RAt−1 +∑K−1τ=t Rt−τyτ − Rt−K+1AK−1
∑K−1τ=t Rt−τ
. (3.A.7b)















which is also a function of the wealth stock to be used during retirement, AK−1.
3.A.3 Lifecycle consumption
Finally, I choose AK−1 to optimize the lifecycle utility function (3.A.1a) using (3.A.8)






























The ﬁnal task is to obtain an expression for log (Et (exp [−αyK])). For any ran-
dom variable x,
M(γ) = E (exp[γx])
represents the moment-generating function. For the case that yK ∼ N (μ, σ), I have
that M(γ) = exp[μγ] exp[σ2γ2/2], so that I can write
log (Et(exp [−αyK])) = −αμ + 12σ
2α2. (3.A.9)
Using this result and simplifying the remaining terms, setting r = ρ ,I end up with
equation (3.2):
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ct =


















This is equation 3.2.
3.B Incorporating a liquidity constraint
Suppose that at some date v < K− 1 the constraint binds, and that At−1 > 0. Then





























In general, there exists no closed-form solution for the date v at which the liquid-
ity constraint becomes binding. Furthermore, in a discrete-time setting, minimizing





is not a valid approach, since dv never ap-
proaches zero. Still, I proceed in this manner, as the intuition carries over directly
to the case of discrete differences, but is computationally more attractive for charac-
terizing the complete solution. I admit that I make an approximation error of order
O(1).





























Rt−τyτ = log (R) RAt−1.
There is no closed form solution for the exact date v, but note that for a concave











Under the assumption that the liquidity constraint is always binding24 this sufﬁces
for current consumption. Concluding, ct is independent of AK−1 and hence of μ, σ2
and survival probabilities.
If the level of current wealth is large, and/or the income path is increasing, the
constraint will not bind before retirement. If the constraint binds after retirement,
















Aτ = RAτ−1 + yτ − cτ . (3.B.7)
Av = 0 (3.B.8)









AK−1 + yK. (3.B.9)












t−v log (R)∑vτ=K Rt−τ log (aτ)
α (∑vτ=K Rt−τ)
2 +
Rt−v log (R) R1−KAK−1
(∑vτ=K Rt−τ)
2 = 0.
24 This is not unreasonable under the same concavity assumption for income, as v is already chosen as far away in the
future as possible depending on the level of At−1, see (3.B.4).
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Simplifying this FOC yields the implicit solution for v:
















= −α log (R) R1−KAK−1. (3.B.10)
There is no closed form solution for the date v, but I can gain more insight by taking





α log (R) R1−K(
∂2av







The sign of this expression depends on the structure on the survival function:
dv
dAK−1











After period v, the optimal consumption pattern simply equals the (realized)
value of pension income, as the possibility of death makes the agent impatient. The












with cK given by (3.B.9) and v implicitly by (3.B.10)
The working stage has not changed, so I immediately infer that
ct =
RAt−1 +∑K−1τ=t Rt−τyτ − Rt−K+1AK−1
∑K−1τ=t Rt−τ
,






























The value function depends on AK−1, both directly, via ct and cK, and indirectly,
due to it’s effect on v. I choose wealth for retirement by maximizing the value
function, as in the unconstrained case in Appendix 3.A. I use the fact that v =
argmin cK to infer that ∂cK/∂AK−1 equals the direct effect of AK−1 on period K
consumption, that is, ∂cK/∂AK−1 = Rt−K+1/∑vτ=K Rt−τ .
The FOC for AK−1 equals




= exp [−αct] Rt−K+1.





















= exp [−αct] Rt−K+1.

































And the solution for current consumption is equal to
ct =
























with H deﬁned in (3.B.11).
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3.C Forecasting household income
As saving decreases with future (labor) income, I need an estimate of household
income until the retirement age to control for this effect in the saving rate equation.
For this purpose, I employ the waves of 1996 until 2011 of the DHS to estimate a
model for household income. I employ a parsimonious model with age and house-
hold composition as the only explanatory variables. More speciﬁcally, I estimate
log (yit) = m (ageit) + hit + ui + 
it
where m (ageit) is a linear spline function with knots at 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 and 60
years of age, hit the (time-varying) number of persons in the family, ui is a house-
hold ﬁxed effect and 
it a random error term. This equation is combined with an
equation for predicting the number of persons in the family, which is regressed on
the same age spline and a household ﬁxed effect. The sample is restricted to house-
hold heads aged 25 until 70. I experimented with different parameter estimates by
education group and inserting Deaton and Paxson (1994)-type of orthogonalized
time effects, but this does not affect the results. The results are shown in table 3.C.1.
Table 3.C.1. Fixed effects model for log income









# Persons 0.0300*** (0.00974)
Constant 9.212*** (0.0712)
Observations 25678





p-value Age effects 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Household income is increasing rapidly for young household heads (± 6% per
year), and income growth is decreasing with age until the age path is essentially ﬂat
86 Chapter 3
after age 50. Using these parameter estimates, the forecast of household income at
age t+ s is calculated as
ŷit+s = exp
[
̂m (ageit+s) +̂hit+s + ûi + z
]
where z is a random draw from the normal distribution with mean zero and stan-
dard deviation 0.5 ∗ σ̂
. The scaling factor of 0.5 is in line with Knoef et al. (2009),
who estimate a similar model using administrative data from Statistics Nether-
lands, and obtain an estimate of σ
 of 0.205. Their estimate of the variance of the
error term is smaller due to using tax-records data, which are less likely to suffer
from measurement error as the survey data I employ. Note that I use forecasted
income as a left-hand-side variable in the main regressions to limit the effect of
measurement error in the estimate of future income.
Chapter 4
Demand for Annuities: A
Multivariate Binary Response
Model with Misclassiﬁcation∗
* This chapter is based on Alessie, Kalwij and Van Santen (2012)..
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4.1 Introduction
Annuities are theoretically superior to hedge against longevity risk. As shown
by Yaari (1965), when length of life is random, the agent should annuitize all his
wealth and consume out of the stream of money the annuity delivers, in order to
ensure dying with zero wealth. Yet, in practice, the degree of annuitization has
often been found to be low, an empirical phenomenon referred to as the ’Annuity
Puzzle’. Many reasons have been mentioned to explain this puzzle, some of which
are listed here. First, the result of Yaari (1965) is derived under some restrictive
assumptions, such as actuarially fair annuities and absence of other uncertainties.
Second, there may be bequest motives at work. Third, in absence of health care
insurance, large shocks to medical expenditures require some form of wealth to be
liquid. Fourth, annuities may simply be too expensive, due to adverse selection
effects or imperfect competition. Finally, as argued by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981),
pooling of longevity risks can be achieved within the family, essentially replicating
an incomplete annuity market.
The analysis of Davidoff et al. (2005) convincingly shows that Yaari’s result
holds under more general assumptions for preferences and the economic environ-
ment, although full annuitization may no longer be optimal. Even for annuity-
adverse scenario’s, such as incomplete markets and bequest motives, the consumer
should still annuitize a substantial fraction of his wealth. In contrast to most stud-
ies, d’Albis and Thibault (2012) instead ﬁnds that annuities are not optimal with
maxmin preferences and uncertainty on the probability of survival. The evidence
for bequest motives as an explanatory factor is mixed: Hayashi et al. (1996) do not
ﬁnd evidence in favor of the altruistic model underlying the bequest motive; Brown
and Warshawsky (2001) and Hurd and Panis (2006) do not ﬁnd an important role
for bequest motives in the decision to annuitize either, while Bernheim (1991) and
Laitner and Juster (1996) ﬁnd evidence in favor of the altruistic model. Simulation
studies by Videl-Meliá and Lejárrage-García (2006) and Lockwood (2012) do not
ﬁnd an important role for bequest motives in explaining the annuity puzzle. For
health, Hurd and Panis (2006) ﬁnd that individuals covered by medical insurance
are less likely to cash out pension rights, as are those in better health, pointing to
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a possible precautionary savings motive for out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Finally, Mitchell et al. (1999) show that US market prices for annuities are not too
high to prevent the rational agent from purchasing annuities, while Milevsky (1998)
instead calculates that, as long as a person is not too risk averse and is willing to
bear a small risk of out-living wealth, a female (male) has a 90% (85%) chance of
beating the return on annuities until age 80, given the load factors prevailing in the
Canadian insurance industry.
In practice, annuitization can take place via different channels. A typical social
security system is a form of mandatory annuitization for most countries: during
working life, the government taxes income, which is paid out during retirement
until death. For deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, a similar story holds, although in
this case the employer and employee contribute to a pension fund, which pays out
after retirement.1 For deﬁned contribution plans, a lump sum option is typically
available, and, in the US case, is typically preferred to the annuitization option
(Brown, 2001; Hurd and Panis, 2006). Butler and Teppa (2007) instead ﬁnd a full
annuitization rate of 72% using administrative data from Switzerland, and only
10% choosing the 100% lump sum. In total, it is fair to say that individuals are
typically forced to annuitize a substantial part of their wealth due to pensions and
social security. This holds speciﬁcally for the country studied in this paper, The
Netherlands, where both social security and occupational pensions are paid out on
an annuity basis (more details follow in Section 4.2). Voluntary annuitization in the
non-pension annuity market may therefore be more appropriate to look at.
In this paper, we try to offer an alternative explanation for the observed low
rate of annuitization, by analyzing the determinants of annuity ownership amongst
non-retirees, as well as by analyzing possible misreporting in a household survey.
The form of annuitization under study is arguably completely voluntary, in the
sense that households can choose to allocate their wealth between cash holdings,
buying annuities or private investments in ﬁnancial markets (stocks, bonds) or real
estate. As such, analyzing who purchases annuities and who do not can shed light
on the annuity puzzle. Moreover, as noted by Hurd and Panis (2006) for the Health
1 For the US, Brown and Warshawsky (2001) show an increase of DB plans offering a 100% lump sum
option to 22% by 1997.
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and Retirement Survey, respondents may report ownership with errors. In par-
ticular, when survey respondents underreport ownership of annuities, the annu-
ity puzzle may not be as large as usually perceived. Opposite to Hurd and Panis
(2006), our empirical model takes the measurement error problem into account, by
allowing for classiﬁcation errors in reported annuity ownership.
Exactly why ownership of annuities is misreported is not clear from the data,
but several reasons can be mentioned. First, in many surveys of household ﬁnances,
the questionnaires are lengthy and worded in jargon. Second, even if the respon-
dents take the time and energy to ﬁll out the questionnaire correctly, they may not
understand the concept of annuities, and hence claim to own an annuity while in
fact they have, say, a life insurance policy. Third, there may be a change in the
household composition due to divorce, or due to a change in the ﬁnancial respon-
dent of the questionnaire, resulting in a wrong answer. Empirically, we cannot
observe who is making the reporting errors and who are not, but in the estima-
tion procedure, detailed in section 4.4, we can simultaneously estimate the param-
eters governing the determinants of ownership and the probability of misreporting,
which may be either over- or underreporting.
We analyze joint ownership of two types of retirement saving products: annu-
ities (i.e. a ﬂow of money until death) and endowment policies (i.e. a lump sum
payment), as these are likely to be substitutes. An endowment policy may be pur-
chased to close the gap between intentions and actions with regard to retirement
saving (Laibson et al., 1998), as the money is locked away safely, or to exploit the
tax-preferred nature of the policies. As with annuities, ownership of an endowment
policy may also be reported with error, for which we make a similar adjustment.
Our estimation strategy thus covers misclassiﬁcation errors in a bivariate setting,
generalizing the model of Hausman et al. (1998), and the likelihood function for
this model is derived in detail. We apply this model to a panel of Dutch house-
holds followed between 2000-2011.
We ﬁnd a clear socio-economic gradient between owners and non-owners: the
results indicate that age, income and wealth are important determinants for own-
ership of annuities and endowments. Moreover, the degree of underreporting an-
nuity ownership is around 32%-points, which is a considerable fraction of the pop-
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ulation. Around 12% is estimated to report to own an annuity while the household
does not. On the contrary, we do not ﬁnd evidence of over- or underreporting
ownership of endowment policies. The results suggest that the annuity puzzle is
not as large as usually perceived, and that older, richer and wealthier households
are more likely to buy annuities.
The paper is structured in the following way. First, we brieﬂy describe the Dutch
pension system in Section 4.2. The data is discussed in Section 4.3, which contains
descriptive evidence of classiﬁcation errors. The empirical models are derived in
Section 4.4 and the results are discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Overview of the Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars.2 The ﬁrst pillar is the ﬂat-
rate state pension beneﬁt, provided to all inhabitants aged 65 and above, which
is the current retirement age. The only requirements for receiving social security
are reaching the retirement age and living and/or working in The Netherlands; the
accrual rate for each year lived in The Netherlands is 2%. In 2012, the gross monthly
beneﬁt amounted to e1085 for singles and e1513 for couples, paid out until death.
The second pillar, the occupational pensions, are mandatory for most employ-
ees, and both employers and employees contribute to a (usually deﬁned beneﬁt)
pension fund. Traditionally, the Dutch occupational pension system is one of the
most developed in the world, with pension funds holding around 125% of Dutch
GDP in investments in 2008. Employees working for a given employer do not have
freedom of choice in the decision to contribute to a pension fund, nor the decision
which pension fund to contribute to; participation is mandatory and organized by
the employer. The DB plans are converted into an annuity when reaching the re-
tirement age, although there are some degrees of freedom to postpone claiming.
Recently, proposals have been made to reform the ﬁrst and second pillars of the
pension system due to ageing of the population as well as underfunding of pension
funds during the crisis. These proposals encompass an increase in the statutory
retirement age, from currently 65 to 67 in 2023. Furthermore, the occupational pen-
2 See Bovenberg and Gradus (2008) for an overview of the Dutch pension system and its reforms.
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sion system will shift from a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) to a deﬁned contribution (DC)
system. For this paper, these future reforms are less important, although the uncer-
tainty caused by the political debate as well as the ﬁnancial crisis might have led
to more purchases of annuity products. For an analysis of the (positive) effect of
uncertainty on saving, see Van Santen (2012).
The third pillar of the pension system concerns private pension savings, such as
annuities bought from banks or insurance companies or private retirement saving
accounts. The annuities and endowments policies studied in this paper fall in this
third pillar. The third pillar is less popular in the Netherlands, as documented by
Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2011). In our empirical analysis, we control for wealth
holdings in other forms, such as housing, stocks, bonds and bank accounts.
4.3 Data
For the empirical analysis, we use the DNB Household Survey (DHS). This annual
household survey is administered by CentERData, Tilburg, The Netherlands, and
invites all adult members of a household to participate, following them over time.
The respondents represent the Dutch population aged 16 and above. The DHS is
administered via the internet, and internet access is provided to those that do not
have access themselves. The DHS has been running since 1993, and the data from
2011 are the most recent available. The DHS collects information on many socio-
economic characteristics of the household and its members, including a detailed
breakdown of household income and wealth holdings, which can be used to con-
struct measures of total assets, ﬁnancial assets and housing assets; see Alessie et al.
(2002) for an extended description. We use the DHS data from 2000 onwards.
The questions on assets and liabilities are of special interest for this study. This
questionnaire is answered by all adult members of the household, and subsequently
aggregated to the household level. The so-called “ﬁnancial respondent” answers
the questions for joint household assets and liabilities. The DHS asks respondents
to indicate whether or not they own an annuity, and if they do, the value of the
annuity. The exact wording of the question is as follows:
Question 4.1. Did you, in or before year T, take out SINGLE-PREMIUM INSURANCE
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and/or ANNUITY INSURANCE (pension insurance), which was still in effect on 31 De-
cember T? Do not include annuity insurance that you have taken out by using money from
your employer-sponsored savings plan, nor include pension arrangements provided by your
employer or professional pension plans here.
The survey software allows the respondents to see (via a hyperlink) the follow-
ing deﬁnitions of the single-premium insurance and the annuity insurance referred
to in question 4.1:
Deﬁnition 4.1. By taking out annuity insurance the insured is entitled to periodic pay-
ments, the so-called annuity. The ANNUITY is paid out periodically (for example annu-
ally) as of a certain date until the time of death of the insured. PENSION INSURANCE
is a speciﬁc type of annuity insurance. SINGLE-PREMIUM INSURANCE is also a spe-
ciﬁc type of annuity insurance, which involves (as the name indicates) a one-time premium.
Other types of annuity insurance involve periodical (for example annual) premium pay-
ments. Under certain conditions, these premium payments are income tax deductible.
The question for endowment policies is worded as follows:
Question 4.2. Did you, on 31 December year T, have one or more ENDOWMENT IN-
SURANCE POLICIES that were still in effect? Do not include life-insurance policies
connected to an (improved) traditional life-insurance mortgage here. These will be reported
later.
Respondents can see the following deﬁnition of the endowment policy:
Deﬁnition 4.2. ENDOWMENT INSURANCE is a kind of life-insurance that pays out
a lump sum (so, this is not an annuity) to the insured at the maturity of the insurance (or,
in some cases, at the time of death of the insured, whichever comes ﬁrst). The premium
payments cannot be deducted from the taxable income, but the lump sum payment is under
certain conditions tax free. The life-insurance which is connected to an improved traditional
life-insurance mortgage is an example of an endowment insurance. With certain kinds of
endowment insurance policies, the insured can decide upon the way his premium payments
will be invested (for example in deposits, shares, or bonds).
The assets and liabilities questionnaire further asks details (i.e. ownership and
amounts) on around 40 other asset and liability categories, such as bank accounts,
credit cards, vehicles and risky assets. These allow the construction of ﬁnancial
wealth (liquid assets and liabilities, stocks and bonds) as well as net worth (ﬁnan-
cial wealth, durable goods, housing wealth minus any debts on them) as control
variables.
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The dependent variables in our analysis thus consist of ownership of annuities
and endowment policies; both are a binary variable. As explanatory variables we
take Age and its square, Education (benchmark lowest educated), Marital status
(benchmark single), Log of (Number of children+1), Home ownership (benchmark
tenants), Health status and Time ﬁxed effects. Employment characteristics are cap-
tured by the variables No permanent contract, self-employed (benchmark employ-
ees with permanent contract) and Civil servant. Moreover, we control for the level
of net worth (ﬁnancial wealth, housing wealth, durable goods minus loans, mort-
gage etc.) of the household, to which we apply an inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formation to minimize the impact of outliers. Finally, we control for the natural
logarithm of (real) household income. Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of
all variables used. The sample consists of 7089 observations in 2065 households,
and is selected to include those aged 25-64, and to be active on the labor market,
either working (93%) or unemployed (7%). (Early) retirees are not included in the
sample.
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median St. dev.
Ownership annuities 0.32 0.00 0.47
Ownership endowments 0.17 0.00 0.38
Value annuities 5012.45 0.00 21404.92
Value endowments 3933.82 0.00 18452.85
Value annuities|Ownership 15841.85 4014.561 35733.12
Value endowments|Ownership 22709.16 10314.27 39246.51
Financial wealth 37144.50 13911.75 89434.31
Net wealth 6.73×107 108699.93 5.64×109
Real income 31584.72 27705.67 20036.64
Age 44.99 46.00 10.14
Low secondary educated 0.25 0.00 0.43
High secondary educated 0.31 0.00 0.46
Vocational educated 0.29 0.00 0.45
University educated 0.15 0.00 0.36
Home owner 0.68 1.00 0.47
Partner 0.65 1.00 0.48
Number of children 0.87 0.00 1.14
No permanent contract 0.07 0.00 0.25
Self employed 0.05 0.00 0.21
Civil servant 0.18 0.00 0.39
Good health 0.87 1.00 0.33
Disabled 0.18 0.00 0.38
Note: N=7089. All values in real 2006 Euros.
Table 4.1 shows an ownership rate of 32% for annuities, and 17% for endowment
policies. Conditional on ownership, the values of the annuity and endowment pol-
icy are typically low. Analyzing the values is left for further research. Especially
net worth and, to a lesser extent, real income and number of children, are skewed,
hence we apply the transformations alluded to.
4.3.1 Misclassiﬁcation: descriptive evidence
We analyze the determinants of the binary variables “Annuities” and “Endow-
ments”. Here, we give some descriptive evidence of why we should consider mis-
classiﬁcation in these variables. Table 4.2 shows, for Annuities in panel A and for
Endowments in Panel B, why misclassiﬁcation may be important. In panel A (B),
on the left side, we compare ownership of annuities (endowments) with the corre-
sponding value of annuities (endowments) asked in a follow-up question. For 2.6%
(4.6%), we ﬁnd that the value of annuities (endowments) is either zero, or the re-
spondents do not give any value of the annuities (endowments). On the right side,
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we compare ownership in year t− 1 with ownership in year t. Due to the very na-
ture of both annuities and endowments, it is unlikely that the household sells the
product, as there basically is no secondary market for annuities. Moreover, termi-
nating the contract is typically subject to a ﬁne, which has to be paid to the issuing
party. As such, once the household buys the annuity or endowment policy, it is
likely to keep the product until it starts paying out, which typically occurs at re-
tirement. We see in Table 4.2 that 3.0% of the respondents appear to have “sold”
their annuity, and 2.5% have “sold” their endowment policy. Most likely, these
are reporting errors. Of course, there may be other forms of misclassiﬁcation in
ownership, such as, confusions with life insurances or other insurance products, or
recall bias. To estimate the degree of misclassiﬁcation, we use an empirical model
explained in Section 4.4 below.
Table 4.2. Sources of potential misclassiﬁcation
Panel A: Annuities
Value of annuities Lagged ownership
Zero/missing Positive No annuities t− 1 Annuities t− 1
No annuities 68.36 0.00 64.59 3.03
Annuities 2.61 29.03 2.95 29.44
Panel B: Endowments
Value of endowments Lagged ownership
Zero/missing Positive No endowments t− 1 Endowments t− 1
No endowments 82.68 0.00 80.28 2.51
Endowments 4.63 12.70 1.84 15.37
Entries are percentages of cross-tabulation of ownership and an indicator whether or not the
value of the annuity/endowment is zero or missing (N = 7089), as well as cross-tabulation
with lagged ownership of annuities/endowments (N = 5055)
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4.4 Models
4.4.1 Pooled, univariate model
This section draws upon Hausman et al. (1998).3 Let yit denote the observed (di-
chotomous) ownership of annuity products for household i in year t. In particular,
yit = 1 if the household owns an annuity, and yit = 0 if it does not.4 We can
write the probability of owning an annuity, as a function of a vector of household
characteristics xit, as a probit model:





As explained in the previous section, for various reasons, ownership is likely
to be coded with error. Denote the (unobserved) true value of ownership by y˜it,
not to be confused with the underlying latent variable sometimes denoted simi-
larly. Then, the probit model allowing for misclassiﬁcation is derived as follows,
where we suppress the household and time indexes and the dependence on x for
notational convenience:
P(y = 1) = P(y = 1|y˜ = 1) ·P(y˜ = 1) +P(y = 1|y˜ = 0) ·P(y˜ = 0)
= [1−P(y = 0|y˜ = 1)]P(y˜ = 1) +P(y = 1|y˜ = 0) · [1−P(y˜ = 1)]
(4.2)
We make the following deﬁnitions on the misclassiﬁcation probabilities:
α0 = P(y = 1|y˜ = 0) : Wrongly classiﬁed as owner (4.3a)
α1 = P(y = 0|y˜ = 1) : Wrongly classiﬁed as non-owner (4.3b)
Then we can write the above expression (4.2) as
P(y = 1) = [1− α1]P(y˜ = 1) + α0 [1−P(y˜ = 1)]
3 For an ordered response model with misclassiﬁcation errors, see Dustmann and van Soest (2004).
4 A similar indicator can be used for the ownership of an endowment policy. To ease notation, we will
introduce the distinction in section 4.4.2 analyzing annuities and endowments jointly.
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= [1− α0 − α1]P(y˜ = 1) + α0 (4.4)
The density function of the outcome variable, which follows the Bernoulli dis-
tribution, is written as
f (yit|xit, β) =
(





)yit (1− α0 − (1− α0 − α1)Φ (x′itβ))1−yit
Taking the log gives the sample likelihood for the pooled probit model with
misclassiﬁcation:















+ (1− yit) ln
(




Identiﬁcation of this model is discussed in Hausman et al. (1998), who show that
due to the functional form of the probit model, one can identify α0 and α1 under the
condition that α0 + α1 < 1.5 Hausman et al. (1998) also introduce a semi-parametric
estimator to avoid the normality assumption and still identify the misclassiﬁcation
parameters, but the results, when applied to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
analyzing job changes, are rather similar. A semi-parametric analysis of annuity
and endowment policy ownership is left for future work.
The model presented above can be extended in several ways. First, one can
make the misclassiﬁcation parameters conditional on observed characteristics, i.e.
we model α0 = α0 (zit) for a vector of explanatory variables zit. Second, we can
exploit the panel feature of the data, by introducing (random) household effects.
Both extensions are beyond the scope of this paper, although we do use panel-
robust standard errors.6 Instead, we introduce a system of equations in section
5 In constructing the likelihood, we use a logit transformation of the probabilities, and estimate the
parameters γ0 and γ1 in αj =
exp[γj]
1+exp[γ0 ]+exp[γ1 ]
, j = 0, 1. This ensures the identiﬁying condition is
fulﬁlled, and that both probabilities are between zero and one. The Delta method is used to construct
conﬁdence intervals for α0 and α1.
6 Dustmann and van Soest (2001) introduce a panel data ordered response model with misclassiﬁed
language ﬂuency indicators.
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4.4.2 below to analyze ownership of annuities and endowments policies jointly.
4.4.2 Bivariate model
The bivariate model can be described as follows. Let y∗1 and y
∗




1β1 + u1 (4.5a)










⎞⎠⎞⎠. The observation rule is as follows:
y1 = 1(y∗1 > 0) (4.6a)
y2 = 1(y∗2 > 0) (4.6b)
with 1(A) = 1 if event A occurs and zero otherwise. In the bivariate model with
misclassiﬁcation, without making any assumptions on the misclassiﬁcation proba-
bilities, there are 12 possible classiﬁcation errors. These arise from either y1 or y2 or
both being misclassiﬁed. Hence, for each pair of “true values”, there are 3 misclas-
siﬁcation probabilities. The probabilities and notation used are given in table 4.3
below.
To reduce the number of additional parameters to be estimated, we can make
an independence assumption: the probability of misclassifying y1 is independent
of the probability of misclassifying y2. This assumption is not innocuous, as there
may well be reasons for dependence between the probabilities. For example, those
misclassifying annuity ownership might also misclassify ownership of endowment
policies, both due to a lack of ﬁnancial literacy or unobserved heterogeneity. Simi-
larly, the respondent may confuse an annuity with an endowment policy, imposing
a correlation between the misclassiﬁcation probabilities. Still, under independence,
there are just 4 additional parameters to be estimated: αk0 and α
k
1, for k = 1, 2, de-
ﬁned as in (4.3a) and (4.3b). Multiplying these 4 probabilities exhausts all possible
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Table 4.3. Bivariate misclassiﬁcation probabilities
Number of Notation under
Errors Misclassiﬁcation probability Independence
2 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) α11 · α21
1 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) α11 · (1− α21)
1 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) (1− α11) · α21
0 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) (1− α11) · (1− α21)
2 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) α11 · α20
1 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) (1− α11) · α20
1 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) α11 · (1− α20)
0 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) (1− α11) · (1− α20)
2 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1) α10 · α21
1 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1) α10 · (1− α21)
1 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1) (1− α10) · α21
0 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1) (1− α10) · (1− α21)
2 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) α10 · α20
1 P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) α10 · (1− α20)
1 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) (1− α10) · α20
0 P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) (1− α10) · (1− α20)
misclassiﬁcation possibilities, as shown in table 4.3.7
7 Without the assumption of independence, the likelihood function did not converge for the dataset at
hand.
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Likelihood contributions
We assume that the probabilities for the true values follow a bivariate probit model:
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) = Φ2(x′1β1, x
′
2β2, ρ)
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) = Φ2(x′1β1,−x′2β2,−ρ)
P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1) = Φ2(−x′1β1, x′2β2,−ρ)
Here, y1 denotes Annuity ownership, y2 denotes Endowment policy ownership,
x1 and x2 denote the vectors of (possibly different) explanatory variables in the
two equations,8 β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated, and ρ is the correlation
between the error terms (see equations 4.5a and 4.5b). Φ2 denotes the bivariate
normal CDF and, as before, a tilde indicates a true value.
The probability of observing y1 = 1, y2 = 1 can be obtained by summing four
different probabilities, namely, of (correctly) observing y1 = 1, y2 = 1 and of (incor-
rectly) observing y1 = 1, y2 = 1 while in fact the household does not own annuities
or endowments, or both. We assume independence between misclassifying either
binary variable, and use the notation from Table 4.3 to arrive at the following prob-
ability of this event:
P(y1 = 1, y2 = 1) = P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
= [1−P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)]P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
8 Note that, unlike a linear (SUR) model, even when x1 = x2, the system estimator for probit regressions
is more efﬁcient.
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+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) [1−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)]
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
=
[
1− α11α21 − α11(1− α21)− (1− α11)α21
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
+ α10α
2
0 [1−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)−P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)]
+ (1− α11)α20P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) + α10(1− α21)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
=
[
(1− α11)(1− α21)− α10α20
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) + α10α
2
0
+ α20(1− α10 − α11)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0) + α10(1− α20 − α21)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
The remaining probabilities, P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0) and P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1) are deter-
mined in a similar fashion, and are given in the appendix. With these probabilities
in hand, we can write down the log-likelihood function for the pooled bivariate
probit model with misclassiﬁcation, where yjk denotes the indicator for observing





lnP(y1 = 1, y2 = 1) + y10 lnP(y1 = 1, y2 = 0) + y01 lnP(y1 = 0, y2 = 1)
+ (1− y11 − y10 − y01) ln (1−P(y1 = 1, y2 = 1)−P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0)
−P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1))
Identiﬁcation is again on functional form. A panel data model with (correlated)
random household effects is feasible, but numerically challenging, and left for fu-
ture research. Moreover, as Wooldridge (2010) argues, a pooled model has the ad-
ditional robustness advantage against misspeciﬁcation of the joint density, i.e. we
use a partial likelihood approach. The log-likelihood is optimized9 using the Mata
matrix language of Stata 10.1, based on analytical gradients and the BHHH routine
(Berndt et al., 1974).
9 We use (re-scaled) logit transformations of the misclassiﬁcation parameters and the correlation pa-
rameter ρ to ensure the probabilities (correlation) are between zero (minus one) and one.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Univariate probit models
We start the discussion of the results with a simple, univariate probit model with-
out misclassiﬁcation, as a benchmark to compare the remaining results against. In
table 4.4, we present parameter estimates and marginal effects, evaluated at the
means of the explanatory variables (see table 4.1). For the transformed variables
net wealth, real income and the number of children, we present the marginal effect
for the mean individual of the untransformed variable. Standard errors are based
on a panel-robust estimate of the covariance matrix, allowing for within-household
correlations over time and arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity. All regressions in-
clude a full set of time ﬁxed effects.
We ﬁnd an upward sloping age path for both endowments and annuities, with
the probability of owning an annuity increasing by 0.3%-point at each age; for en-
dowments the marginal effect is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. We observe
a clear socio-economic gradient: higher-educated and higher-income households
are more likely to own annuities, and wealthier and higher-income households
are more likely to own endowment policies. The marginal effects of income and
wealth are small however; an extra 100,000 euro in wealth results in a 0.0066%
higher probability of owning an endowment policy, while an extra 1,000 euro an-
nual income increases the probability of owning an annuity by 3.9%. Home owners
are more likely to own annuities and endowment policies; for endowment policies,
this might actually point towards misclassiﬁcation errors, as mortgages providers
typically require the household to purchase a life insurance policy.10 The employ-
ment indicators are insigniﬁcant, except for being a civil servant, which are 6.5%
less likely to own annuities compared to wage workers, which may be due to a less
risky wage proﬁle.11 We don’t ﬁnd big effects of health, except for being disabled
10 When allowing the misclassiﬁcation parameters to depend on home ownership (not reported), we
ﬁnd that homeowners are more likely to underreport annuity ownership, but no signiﬁcant differences
for overreporting annuity ownership. The misclassiﬁcation probabilities for endowment policies do not
depend on home ownership.
11 In results not reported here, we have added an indicator variable for being enrolled in an occupational
pension fund, as well as its interaction with the indicators No permanent contract and Self employed.
We ﬁnd that the pension fund dummy has a signiﬁcant positive effect on endowment policies; the in-
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Table 4.4. Univariate probit estimates and marginal effects
Annuities Endowments
Probit estimates Marginal effects Probit estimates Marginal effects
Age 0.0850*** 0.0031** 0.0827** -0.0012
(0.0296) (0.0013) (0.0336) (0.0011)
Age2 /100 -0.0851** -0.0968**
(0.0333) (0.0380)
IH (Net wealth)a 0.00367 2.99×10−11 0.0112** 6.62×10−11*
(0.00432) (3.57×10−11) (0.00540) (3.53×10−11)
Log (real income)a 0.339*** 3.92×10−6*** 0.233*** 1.95×10−6***
(0.0586) (0.69×10−6) (0.0661) (0.56×10−6)
High secondary educated 0.164* 0.0608* 0.136 0.0368
(0.0930) (0.0347) (0.107) (0.0297)
Vocational educated 0.280*** 0.105*** 0.143 0.0389
(0.0971) (0.0369) (0.109) (0.0304)
University educated 0.266** 0.100** 0.0823 0.0223
(0.113) (0.0437) (0.132) (0.0368)
Home owner 0.167** 0.0603** 0.463*** 0.113***
(0.0833) (0.0295) (0.101) (0.0224)
Partner 0.153* 0.0552* 0.118 0.0307
(0.0827) (0.0298) (0.0940) (0.0242)
Log (nr children+1)a -0.115* -0.0485 -0.0316 -0.0097
(0.0692) (0.0304) (0.0768) (0.0240)
No permanent contract 0.0451 0.0166 -0.0111 -0.0029
(0.0976) (0.0363) (0.102) (0.0267)
Self employed -0.186 -0.0654 -0.0888 -0.0226
(0.128) (0.0433) (0.129) (0.0319)
Civil servant -0.183** -0.0650** -0.0643 -0.0167
(0.0858) (0.0297) (0.0998) (0.0254)
Good health 0.0681 0.0246 0.0176 0.0046
(0.0594) (0.0213) (0.0649) (0.0170)
Disabled -0.0351 -0.0128 0.160** 0.0442**






log L -4218.022 -3085.397
p-value model 0.000 0.000
p-value education 0.0247 0.536
p-value time effects 0.0157 0.0633
Mean dep. var. 0.316 0.173
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Time effects included, not reported. Marginal effects calculated for mean individual
a Marginal effects calculated for untransformed net wealth, real income and number of children
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(self-reported), which increases the probability of owning a endowment policy.
Table 4.5 shows the result of the univariate probit model allowing for misclas-
siﬁed ownership indicators. The coefﬁcients of the explanatory variables in the
annuity ownership equation remain similar in sign, and signiﬁcance, although the
magnitude increases in absolute value, as expected.12 In particular, the slope of the
annuities-age proﬁle now becomes more hump-shaped, and the socio-economic
gradient becomes even sharper. Home ownership is no longer signiﬁcant, as is the
civil servant dummy.
The misclassiﬁcation parameters for annuities are signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the conventional 5% level, and are remarkably high. We estimate an over-
reporting of annuity ownership by 12%-points, and under-reporting of 36.3%-points.
As such, misclassiﬁcation of annuity ownership in a socio-economic survey can
resolve part of the annuity puzzle: a substantial fraction of the population is es-
timated to own annuities, while they report not to own annuities. The reported
probability of owning annuities was 32% (see table 4.1), while we estimate this
probability to be 56.3%. On the contrary, for endowment policies, we do not ﬁnd
any evidence of misreporting ownership; the sample likelihood is highest by setting
both misclassiﬁcation parameters equal to zero. Therefore, the reported parameters
are identical to those presented in table 4.4.
teraction terms are negative but jointly insigniﬁcant. For annuities, the pension fund dummy is positive
but insigniﬁcant; the interaction terms are negative and not signiﬁcant. Hence, we do not ﬁnd evidence
in favor of hedging against a risky income proﬁle.
12 Note that E(y|x) = α0 + (1− α0 − α1)Φ(x′β), and hence the estimated β parameters are scaled up-
ward.
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Table 4.5. Univariate probit estimates with misclassiﬁcation
Annuities Endowments
Estimates Marginal effects Estimates Marginal effects
Age 0.183** 0.0074 0.0827** -0.0012
(0.0779) (1.982) (0.0336) (0.0011)
Age2/100 -0.183** -0.0968**
(0.0837) (0.0380)
IH(Net wealth)a 0.0049 4.27×10−11 0.0112** 6.62×10−11*
(0.0092) (8.13×10−11) (0.0054) (3.53×10−11)
Log (real income)a 0.750** 9.29×10−6** 0.233*** 1.95×10−6***
(0.3055) (4.21×10−6) (0.0661) (0.56×10−6)
High secondary educated 0.357 0.140 0.136 0.0368
(0.243) (0.0957) (0.107) (0.0297)
Vocational educated 0.612* 0.240* 0.143 0.0389
(0.332) (0.129) (0.109) (0.0304)
University educated 0.580* 0.228* 0.0823 0.0223
(0.322) (0.123) (0.132) (0.0368)
Home owner 0.313 0.120 0.463*** 0.113***
(0.200) (0.0811) (0.101) (0.0224)
Partner 0.312 0.120 0.118 0.0307
(0.195) (0.0743) (0.0940) (0.0242)
Log (nr children +1)a -0.233 -0.105 -0.0317 -0.0097
(0.147) (0.0709) (0.0767) (0.0240)
No permanent contract 0.123 0.0484 -0.0110 -0.0029
(0.206) (0.0814) (0.102) (0.0267)
Self employed -0.402 -0.148 -0.0888 -0.0226
(0.313) (0.115) (0.129) (0.0319)
Civil servant -0.424 -0.159 -0.0643 -0.0167
(0.266) (0.0992) (0.0998) (0.0254)
Good health 0.127 0.0490 0.0177 0.0046
(0.142) (0.0539) (0.0649) (0.0170)
Disabled -0.0946 -0.0367 0.160** 0.0442**










log L -4213.896 -3085.397
p-value α0,α1 0.003 1.000
p-value model 0.000 0.000
p-value education 0.288 0.536
p-value time effects 0.829 0.063
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Time effects included, not reported. Marginal effects calculated for mean individual
α0: Wrongly classiﬁed as y = 1; α1: Wrongly classiﬁed as y = 0
a Marginal effects calculated for untransformed net wealth, real income and number of children
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4.5.2 Bivariate probit models
In the bivariate case, we estimate β1 and β2 jointly with the correlation parameter
ρ. The ﬁrst two columns of table 4.6 shows the parameter estimates for the bivariate
probit model ignoring potential misclassiﬁcation errors. We observe that the errors
are correlated, and the estimated correlation coefﬁcient equals 0.216. This positive
correlation points towards annuities and endowment policies being complements,
rather than substitutes: those owning an annuity are more likely to own an endow-
ment policy. However, it may well be that ownership of both products is concen-
trated in the highest socio-economic classes of the Dutch population, who simply
have more wealth to allocate to retirement products. Furthermore, this group has
most to gain of the tax-preferred nature of these products; in fact in tax avoidance
terms, the products are complements. The estimated coefﬁcients are very similar
to those obtained in table 4.4 above, as was to be expected. The efﬁciency gain of
estimating both equations jointly is small, given the incremental decrease in the
standard errors compared to table 4.4.
In the bivariate probit model with misclassiﬁcation, presented in the last two
columns of table 4.6, we observe that the probabilities of misclassiﬁcation are again
zero for endowment policies, and smaller and less signiﬁcant for annuities, al-
though the probability of under-reporting is still signiﬁcantly different from zero
at the 10% level. The estimated error correlation is somewhat higher at 0.364. The
remaining coefﬁcients still point towards the socio-economic gradient in ownership
of both annuities and endowment policies.
Table 4.6. Bivariate probit estimates
No misclassiﬁcation With misclassiﬁcation
Annuities Endowments Annuities Endowments
Age 0.0860*** 0.0842** 0.154* 0.0843**
(0.0296) (0.0334) (0.0886) (0.0335)
Age2 /100 -0.0862*** -0.0987*** -0.155* -0.0988***
(0.0333) (0.0378) (0.0937) (0.0378)
IH (net wealth) 0.00378 0.0118** 0.00496 0.0118**
(0.00432) (0.00530) (0.00754) (0.00531)
Log (real income) 0.339*** 0.236*** 0.620** 0.236***
(0.0585) (0.0656) (0.300) (0.0658)
High secondary educated 0.163* 0.133 0.263 0.133
(0.0930) (0.107) (0.190) (0.108)
Vocational educated 0.280*** 0.144 0.471* 0.144
(0.0970) (0.108) (0.242) (0.108)
University educated 0.265** 0.0833 0.457* 0.0844
(0.113) (0.132) (0.261) (0.132)
Home owner 0.167** 0.464*** 0.282 0.462***
(0.0832) (0.101) (0.182) (0.101)
Partner 0.153* 0.114 0.246 0.115
(0.0825) (0.0937) (0.164) (0.0937)
Log (nr children+1) -0.117* -0.0348 -0.208 -0.0344
(0.0692) (0.0765) (0.148) (0.0766)
No permanent contract 0.0449 -0.0207 0.0952 -0.0181
(0.0977) (0.101) (0.178) (0.101)
Self employed -0.186 -0.0918 -0.336 -0.0919
(0.129) (0.129) (0.279) (0.129)
Civil servant -0.182** -0.0651 -0.358 -0.0651
(0.0858) (0.0995) (0.288) (0.0996)
Good health 0.0673 0.0156 0.0966 0.0160
(0.0594) (0.0648) (0.114) (0.0648)
Disabled -0.0348 0.160** -0.0735 0.160**
(0.0721) (0.0778) (0.132) (0.0777)
Constant -6.482*** -5.778*** -11.14** -5.777***
(0.806) (0.860) (4.873) (0.863)
ρ (Error correlation) 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.364* 0.364*









Observations 7089 7089 7089 7089
Households 2065 2065 2065 2065
log L -7259.436 -7259.436 -7257.727 -7257.727
Pseudo-R2 0.0470 0.0470 0.0473 0.0473
p-value model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value education 0.0244 0.544 0.261 0.543








Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Time effects included, not reported
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the ’Annuity puzzle’, stating that only a frac-
tion of households annuitize their wealth, despite the theoretical attractiveness of
annuities as a hedge against lifespan uncertainty. Our empirical model accounts
for misclassiﬁcation errors of owning annuities and endowment policies in a socio-
economic survey, which may be due to changes in household composition over
time, confusion with similar products such as pension insurance or mortgage-related
life insurance policies, recall bias or other reasons. Using a panel of Dutch house-
holds, we ﬁnd that annuities are most likely to be misclassiﬁed, in a direction that
can help to understand the annuity puzzle. 36% of the sample is estimated to own
an annuity, but have reported not to own annuities; 12% is estimated not to own
an annuity while they report to own an annuity. As such, the sample proportion
of households owning an annuity increases from 32% to 56%. If our speciﬁcation
is correct, part of the annuity puzzle can simply be explained by measurement er-
rors. On the contrary, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of misreporting ownership of
endowment policies, which pay out a lump sum on maturity, and are therefore not
hedging against lifespan uncertainty.
The determinants of ownership of both annuities and endowment policies iden-
tify a socio-economic gradient, with the higher-educated, higher-income and wealth-
ier households more likely to own either product. Moreover, ownership of annu-
ities is positively correlated with ownership of endowments, which could reveal
that ownership is indeed concentrated in the highest socio-economic class of the
population. If government policy is to be designed to stimulate the ownership of
annuities, in order to prevent individuals from out-running their wealth during re-
tirement, policy should be aimed at the less afﬂuent subset of the population. It is
likely that ﬁnancial literacy is low amongst non-owners (Alessie et al., 2011a), while
literacy seems necessary to be able to understand and buy these products.
Future research can provide interesting extensions. First, the probabilities of
misclassiﬁcation can be made conditional on observed characteristics, such as ed-
ucation, changes in household composition or other factors. Second, we have not
yet exploited the panel feature of the data; allowing for time-persistent or time-
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independent misclassiﬁcation errors as in Dustmann and van Soest (2001) may
yield valuable insights in how measurement errors should be prevented in a sur-
vey. Given the current results, both these extensions may well be preferred to the
bivariate case, for which we need a restrictive assumption of conditional indepen-
dence. Finally, we can analyze the effects of uncertainties in lifespan or pension
income, measured using probabilistic survey questions as in Van Santen (2012), on
the ownership rate of annuity products.
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4.A Remaining probabilities in the likelihood function
P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0) = P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
+P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
+P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)
= [1−P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)]P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
+P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) [1−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)−P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)]
+P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P(y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
=
[
α21(1− α11)− α10(1− α20)
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) + α10(1− α20)
+
[
(1− α20)(1− α10 − α11)
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
−
[
α10(1− α20 − α21)
]
P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1) = P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
+P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
+P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0)
= [1−P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 1, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P (y1 = 0, y2 = 0|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)]P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
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+P (y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 0) [1−P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1)
− P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)−P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)]
+P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+P(y1 = 0, y2 = 1|y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
=
[
α11(1− α21)− α20(1− α10)
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 1) + α20(1− α10)
−
[
α20(1− α10 − α11)
]
P(y˜1 = 1, y˜2 = 0)
+
[
(1− α10)(1− α20 − α21)
]
P(y˜1 = 0, y˜2 = 1)
Chapter 5
Pension Wealth and Household
Savings in Europe: Evidence
from SHARELIFE∗
* This chapter is based on Alessie, Angelini and Van Santen (2011).
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5.1 Introduction
The demographic challenge of ageing populations has led and will lead European
countries to reform their pension systems. For policymakers, understanding the ef-
fect that pension reforms will have on household and national saving is crucial. In
particular, the effect of changes in pension wealth on private wealth is vital infor-
mation for assessing the welfare effects of these reforms. A stylized version of the
life–cycle model suggests that generous social security beneﬁts will have a nega-
tive effect on the accumulation of private savings if households save only for retire-
ment, i.e. crowding out of private wealth by pension wealth. However, the extent
to which households offset pension wealth with other forms of wealth accumula-
tion is difﬁcult to gauge. From a theoretical point of view, the extent of the offset
depends on a variety of other factors, such as the presence of binding liquidity con-
straints, the distortional effects of taxation and the fact that households might save
for reasons other than retirement or may lack a basic level of ﬁnancial literacy. From
an empirical point of view, the econometric identiﬁcation of the offset is made dif-
ﬁcult by the lack of data on lifetime earnings and by the fact that pension wealth is
typically measured with error in surveys.
In this paper we estimate whether and to what extent European households off-
set pension wealth with private savings. An innovative aspect of our paper is that
we use retrospective data from the third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARELIFE), which collects information on the entire job
and wage histories of older workers and retirees in 13 European countries. In this
way we are able to construct measures for both the present value of past and fu-
ture earnings and pension wealth at the individual level, a feature missing in most
studies estimating the displacement effect.
Many papers have made attempts to estimate the displacement effect but the
empirical evidence is mixed. In his seminal article, Feldstein (1974) uses aggregate
time-series data for the US and shows that a 1 dollar in increase in Social Security
Wealth (SSW) depresses private saving by about 40 dollar cents. However, Feld-
stein and Liebman (2002) point out that this estimate of the displacement effect
might be inconsistent because of aggregation problems. For that reason many pa-
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pers have used cross-section data to investigate the level of displacement between
SSW and wealth (see e.g. Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Dicks-Mireaux and King
(1984), Hubbard (1986) and Jappelli (1995)). In these earlier studies non-pension
wealth is typically regressed on cash earnings and pension wealth (and some other
controls). Gale (1998) convincingly shows that in such regressions the estimated
displacement effect is biased downwards. He proposes and applies a method to
remove this bias, which boils down to multiply pension wealth by an age-speciﬁc
adjustment factor, called “Gale’s Q”. He ﬁnds an estimated offset close to 100%
for a sample of US households in which the head is employed and aged between
40 and 64. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003)
use time series of cross-section data to estimate saving rate equations derived from
life–cycle models, exploiting pension reforms in the United Kingdom and Italy re-
spectively to identify the displacement effect. Their results indicate that the effects
of pensions on wealth vary signiﬁcantly across households, with nearly retired in-
dividuals showing more crowd out than young workers. Engelhardt and Kumar
(2011) use data on 51-61 years old working individuals from the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS) in the US and adopt an instrumental variables approach to ac-
count for measurement error in wealth and individual heterogeneity, such as taste
for saving. They ﬁnd an average displacement effect between 53 and 67 percent.
However, quantile estimates show substantial heterogeneity across the wealth dis-
tribution, with crowd–in at lower quantiles, no offset at the median and signiﬁcant
crowd–out for afﬂuent households. Kapteyn et al. (2005) exploit productivity dif-
ferences across cohorts and the introduction of social security in the Netherlands
to ﬁnd a small but statistically signiﬁcant displacement effect of 11.5%. Hurd et al.
(2012) use cross-country variation and cross-sectional variation in education and
marital status to identify the displacement effect on ﬁnancial wealth from a pooled
sample of retired males aged 65 to 75 from the HRS, ELSA (UK) and SHARE (ten
continental European countries). To pool these samples, all variables are aggre-
gated by education and marital status. Their estimated displacement effect ranges
between 23 and 44 percent.
We contribute to the literature by presenting new estimates of the displacement
effect using micro data on both older workers and retired individuals collected by
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the SHARELIFE project in 13 European countries. Opposite to Hurd et al. (2012)
and like Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011), we perform our analysis
on a cross-section of households. Thanks to the retrospective nature of the data,
we are able to construct a measure of the present value of past earnings using the
entire job history of each respondent and the information on the ﬁrst wage earned
in each job. With the exception of Engelhardt and Kumar (2011), all previous stud-
ies instead had to rely on proxy measures for past earnings, most notably current
income, age, education and marital status. Moreover, actual pension beneﬁts for
those that are retired allow us to construct pension wealth; for the non-retired, we
use subjective information on individuals’ expected retirement age and replace-
ment rate to compute expected pension wealth. We show that the retrospective
survey data are able to generate cross-country differences in wages and pensions,
as well as age-earnings proﬁles that are in line with expectations.
An important econometric phenomenon both in this study and the empirical
literature discussed above is the impact of measurement errors on the parameter
estimates. Both pension wealth and the present value of past and future earnings
are typically measured with error, if not unobserved. Typically, these two mea-
surement errors are positively correlated with each other. We show in Section 5.2.1
that the bias which stems from those two positively correlated measurement errors,
might well lead to a spurious positive partial correlation between pension wealth
and private wealth. Therefore, we introduce a restricted model for which we can
sign the impact of correlated measurement errors on the estimators. Furthermore,
we provide lower bounds to the true offset using a sample of retirees, for whom
we know lifetime income and pension wealth from two independent series of sur-
vey questions. Although both are measured with error, the correlation between
these measurement errors is likely to be small or even negligible. We cannot make
this claim for the non–retired included in the full sample, for whom we infer pen-
sion beneﬁts from multiplying the (individual-speciﬁc) expected pension income
replacement rate by current income, which essentially imposes correlation between
the measurement errors.
The estimated displacement effect for the full sample is equal to 47.1% using
robust regression and 60.9% using median regression techniques, and in both cases
Pensions and savings in Europe 117
signiﬁcantly different from zero and 100%. We obtain lower bounds between 17%
and 30%, signiﬁcantly different from zero. When we use ﬁnancial wealth as the
dependent variable instead of net worth, we estimate the crowd-out to be between
77.8% and 87.0%, and obtain a lower bound between 53% and 69%. Using the
Instrumental Variable strategy of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005,0) to avoid at-
tenuation bias from measurement errors and unobserved heterogeneity, we obtain
less precise estimates which suggest full displacement.
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst present a simple life-cycle model to guide
our empirical analysis in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the variables used in
this study and the assumptions we made in the computation of lifetime earnings




As most studies on this subject, we derive the equation of interest from a simple
life–cycle model, which is the discrete–time counterpart of Gale (1998). Like Gale,
we assume that past changes in the pension system have been fully anticipated
by the agents at the beginning of their life. We ignore uncertainty and liquidity
constraints, and assume perfect capital markets that produce a constant real interest
rate, r. Moreover, we assume that the retirement age, R, and non capital income at
age τ, yτ , are exogenous variables. The within period utility function is assumed
to be isoelastic (constant relative risk aversion [CRRA]). The consumer maximizes




























where cτ denotes consumption at age τ, Eτ pre–retirement earnings, Bτ pension
beneﬁts, ρ is the discount rate, L the maximum age and γ the coefﬁcient of relative




















where λ = ((1+r)/(1+ρ))
1/γ
1+r . By deﬁnition, wealth at the end of period t, At is equal




























is the so-called "Gale’s Q" (see Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011)). Us-






















(1+ r)t−τBτ denotes pension wealth at age t, i.e. the present value
of pension beneﬁts.
5.2.1 Empirical implementation
Expression (5.5) leads to the following equation to be estimated for the sample of
retired and non-retired individuals:



















(1+ r)t−τBτ ("Q adjusted pension wealth")
xt= a vector of demographic household characteristics that might affect savings.
The main parameter of interest is β2, which measures the extent of displacement
between discretionary household wealth and pension wealth. The canonical life–
cycle model sketched above predicts full displacement (β2 = −1) and β1 = 1.
However, the extent of displacement might be smaller because of factors which
are not considered in the canonical model such as (binding) liquidity constraints,
uncertainty, endogeneity of the retirement decision and lack of ﬁnancial literacy.
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Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) also use equation (5.6) as the basis of
their empirical work. In the earlier literature (see e.g. Jappelli (1995) and Hubbard
(1986)) the pension wealth variable is typically not interacted with the adjustment
factor Q. Gale (1998) points out that this might lead to a considerable underestima-
tion of the crowding out effect. At the same time, Gale (1998, p. 711) shows that the
Q-adjustment is also valid even if the true model does not embody perfect offset.
One of the attractive features of the SHARE survey is that it contains sufﬁcient
retrospective and prospective information to proxy the variables z∗1t and z
∗
2t in a
convincing way without relying on too many arbitrary assumptions. Gale (1998),
who uses the 1983 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), instead does
not observe directly the present value of past and current earnings (i.e the ﬁrst
term of z1t). He therefore replaces the z∗1t regressor in equation (5.6) with the fol-
lowing variables: current income, age of the head of household and his/her spouse
and earnings interacted with age and other demographic factors.1 This approxi-
mation procedure, which is also used in many other studies, might provide rather
imprecise proxies and consequently might lead to an inconsistent estimate of the
displacement effect. As far as we know, Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) is the only
other study to use a direct measure for the present value of past earnings, which
stems from administrative records and is consequently precisely measured.
As we said before, our empirical speciﬁcation is based on a very stylized version
of the life cycle model. Blau (2011) formulates a richer economic model which takes
into account, amongst other things, endogenous retirement choice, uncertainties
and stochastic income proﬁles. He uses his model to generate a simulated dataset
on which he ﬁts the linear speciﬁcation of Gale. He ﬁnds that this linear model
over–estimates the crowd-out effect. However, Blau shows that the coefﬁcient for
pension wealth is much closer to the true displacement effect, if one adds lagged
wealth to the static model of Gale. The advantage of the dynamic speciﬁcation
is that it controls for initial conditions such as the present value of past earnings.
We believe that our model is more similar to the dynamic speciﬁcation because we
1 In Appendix 5.B, we show the results when applying Gale (1998)’s method to the SHARE dataset. We
obtain positive but insigniﬁcant estimates of the displacement effect, contrary to Gale. Our result can be
explained by the presence of correlated measurement errors in income and pension wealth, as we detail
in Appendix 5.B. For the SCF, such a problem does not occur.
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control for lifetime earnings in the equation.
Our ﬁrst results were rather disappointing and completely refuted the basic life–
cycle model: we found a negative OLS estimate for β1 and a positive estimate for
β2. However, we argue that these results could be driven by serious measurement
error problems: instead of z∗1 and z
∗
2
2, we observe the error ridden variables z1 and
z2:
zk = z∗k + ηk, k = 1, 2 (5.7)
As we explain in more detail in Section 5.3, there are two main reasons for measure-
ment errors in these variables. First, the wage earned (or pension beneﬁt received)
may be reported incorrectly. Second, we interpolate the wages and extrapolate
pension beneﬁts to compute the lifetime wage path and pension wealth, which
is obviously a simpliﬁcation of reality. Moreover, it is rather likely that in our
data the measurement errors η1 and η2 are positively correlated with each other:
Cov(η1, η2) ≥ 0. On top of this we make the following assumptions about the mea-
surement errors:
• E(ηkz∗k ) = E(ηkε) = E(ηk) = 0, k = 1, 2
• E(ηkx) = 0, k = 1, 2
• E(η1z∗2) = E(η2z∗1) = 0
• Var(ηk) = σ2ηk , k = 1, 2; Cov(η1, η2) = ση1η2 ≥ 0 (homoskedasticity)
Substitution of equation (5.7) into (5.6) yields
A = β0 + β1z1 + β2z2 + x′γ+ ε − β1η1 − β2η2 (5.8)
The linear projection Eˆ∗(A|1, z1, z2, x) is equal to
Eˆ∗(A|1, z1, z2, x) = β0 + β1z1 + β2z1 + x′γ+ Eˆ∗(ε|1, z1, z2, x)−
β1Eˆ∗(η1|1, z1, z2, x)− β2Eˆ∗(η2|1, z1t, z2t, x)
(5.9)
Given our assumptions on the measurement errors, one can easily show that Eˆ∗(ε|1, z1, z2, x) =
0. So the biases, if any, are equal to −β1Eˆ∗(η1|1, z1, z2, x)− β2Eˆ∗(η2|1, z1, z2, x). Let






x) be the projection coefﬁcients of (z1, z2, x) in Eˆ∗(ηk|1, z1, z2, x), k = 1, 2.
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Given our assumptions, Cov(z2, η1) = ση1η2 ≥ 0 and Cov(x, η1) = 0. Obviously,





⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = σ2η1a1 + ση1η2a2 (5.11)
where a1 and a2 are respectively the ﬁrst and second column of the inverse variance-
covariance matrix⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
Var(z1) Cov(z1, z2) Cov(z1, x′)
Cov(z2, z1) Var(z2) Cov(z2, x′)







⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = σ2η2a2 + ση1η2a1 (5.12)
Therefore the biases in the OLS estimators βˆOLS1 and βˆ
OLS
2 are equal to
plim βˆOLS1 − β1 = −β1(σ2η1a11 + ση1η2a21)− β2(σ2η2a21 + ση1η2a11)
= −(β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a11 − (β2σ2η2 + β1ση1η2)a21 (5.13)
and
plim βˆOLS2 − β2 = −β2(σ2η2a22 + ση1η2a21)− β1(σ2η1a21 + ση1η2a22)
= −(β2σ2η2 + β1ση1η2)a22 − (β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a21 (5.14)
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The direction of the asymptotic bias in the OLS estimator βˆOLS1 depends on the
signs of the elements in the vector a1. The ﬁrst element of a1, a11, is unambigu-
ously positive (it is a diagonal element of the inverse of a variance-covariance ma-
trix). The second element a21 is presumably negative because one would expect
that Cov(z1, z2) > 0 and that the correlation between (z1, z2) and x is not unusu-
ally large. In our data aˆ21 is indeed negative. Equation (5.13) suggests that under










the OLS estimator βˆOLS1 is downward biased. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of equation (5.13), (−(β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a11) depicts the usual (downward) attenua-
tion bias. The second term on the right hand side of equation (5.13) reveals that,
since aˆ21 is actually smaller than zero, the measurement error in z2t aggravates the
downward bias in βˆOLS1 . The estimator could even converge in probability to a
negative number! Along the same line of reasoning one can argue that βˆOLS2 is up-
ward biased and that the upward bias in this OLS estimate is exacerbated by the
measurement error in z1. As we said before, we ﬁnd that the OLS estimate of β2 is
positive. In other words, measurement error problems could drive the estimation
results indicated above.3 The OLS estimate of the displacement effect presented
by Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) also suggests pensions wealth crowds in non–
pension wealth. We believe that their OLS estimate of the displacement effect is
severely upward biased because the measurement errors in their right hand side
variables "current earnings" and "Q adjusted pension wealth" are likely to be posi-
tively correlated.4
3 This line of reasoning extends directly to applying Gale (1998)’s method, as we document in Appendix
5.B.




(1 + r)t−τEτ) but proxy this
regressor by a survey measure of current earnings, age, expected retirement age and region of birth plus
some interaction terms. They address the measurement error in the pension wealth variable by adopting
IV estimation. However, they do not take into account that the measurement error in current earnings
might affect their estimate of the displacement effect.
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In order to be able to sign the bias associated with the measurement error prob-
lem, we impose the restriction β1 = 1 in the estimation. In other words, we estimate
the following model instead of equation (5.8):
A− z1 = β0 + β2z2 + x′γ+ ε − η1 − β2η2 (5.16)
It is easy to show that in this case the bias in the OLS estimator βˆOLS2 is equal to
plim βˆOLS2 − β2 = −(ση1η2 + β2σ2η2)a˜11 (5.17)
where a˜11 is the ﬁrst diagonal element of the inverse variance-covariance matrix⎛⎝ Var(z2) Cov(z2, x′)
Cov(x, z2) Var(x)
⎞⎠−1
Obviously, a˜11 > 0. In case of 1) full displacement (β2 = −1), 2) zero correlation
between x and z2, 3) nonnegatively correlated measurement errors (ση1η2 ≥ 0) and
4) under assumption (5.15b), equation (5.17) implies that the OLS estimate for β2
is upward biased and that −1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0.5 If there is only partial displace-
ment (−1 < β2 < 0), we cannot determine the direction (upward or downward) of
the bias in the OLS estimate. In the empirical section we will carry out a sensitivity
analysis in which we estimate model (5.16) on the subsample of retirees. As we will
explain in the next section, for this subsample the measurement errors in z∗1t and z
∗
2t
are likely to be uncorrelated (ση1η2 = 0). In that case, the estimate of the displace-
ment coefﬁcient will be attenuated irrespective of the true value of β2. However,
we still learn something from the estimation using both retired and non-retired in-
dividuals. Even in the presence of measurement error in pension wealth we would




If we additionally assume zero correlation between x and z2 (a˜11 × Var(z2) = 1) and 0 ≤ ση1η2 <








< 1 and consequently −1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0. In our data, the
correlation between z2 and x is low enough, as we ﬁnd that a˜11 × Var(z2) = 1.30× 0.68 = 0.884, and
hence equations (5.17) and (5.18) imply that 0 < plim βˆOLS2 + 1 < 1, or −1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0.
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expect that the estimate of the displacement coefﬁcient is negative.6
In order to address the measurement error problem, one could opt for IV estima-
tion as in Engelhardt and Kumar (2011). Like Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and
Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), they point out that Q adjusted pension wealth
should be instrumented for other reasons, such as omitted variable bias resulting
from unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, some ’patient’ households may have
a high taste for saving. We pursue this strategy in Section 5.4.1. In all cases, to limit
the impact of outliers (e.g. due to measurement error), we use robust and median
regression techniques to estimate β2 and γ.
5.3 Data
In our empirical analysis we use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Re-
tirement in Europe (SHARE). The SHARE project started with wave 1 in 2004/05,
collecting information on the current socio–economic status (income, wealth, hous-
ing), health and expectations of European individuals aged 50 and over and their
partners. A ﬁrst longitudinal follow–up was collected with wave 2 in 2006/7, when
new countries joined the project and a refresher sample was added to maintain the
representativeness of the survey. In 2008/2009 the third wave of data collection,
known as SHARELIFE, asked all previous respondents (waves 1 and 2) and their
partners to provide information not on their current situation but on their entire
life–histories. The retrospective information ranges from childhood health to rela-
tionships to housing to work careers.7 SHARELIFE interviewed 15,170 females and
11,666 males in 17,901 households and was conducted in thirteen European coun-
tries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark,
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Our analytical sample consists of 3,590 males born between 1931 and 1952, aged
6 This can be seen as follows: if 0 ≤ ση1η2 equation (5.17) implies that:

















< 1 because a˜11Var(z2) = 0.884 (see footnote 5). Therefore
equation (5.19) implies that plim βˆOLS2 < 0 if there is any displacement (β2 < 0).
7 Börsch-Supan et al. (2011) characterizes the data and presents the ﬁrst descriptive statistics.
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55-75 in the interview year of wave 2. We restrict the sample to males as we would
need to make many assumptions for broken careers, typical for women with chil-
dren. The literature discussed in Section 5.1 focuses on males as well. In our sam-
ple selection, we drop those individuals who never worked or did not report any
wage in SHARELIFE (2,012 cases), and respondents aged below 55 or above 75
(2,581 cases) to have a sample consisting of individuals around retirement. We
keep persons that have been self-employed at any stage during their career, but
drop those that worked for less than 20 years (97 cases) to exclude the disabled. We
exclude males for whom only one wage point is available (1,670 cases), and retirees
with missing pension beneﬁts or workers with missing expected replacement rates
(1,592 cases). We trim compounded labour income and pension wealth by 1% from
above and below in each country to end up with our ﬁnal sample of 3,590 obser-
vations. All monetary amounts are expressed in PPP-adjusted 2006 German Euros,
irrespective of in which country and in which year these amounts were earned. To
estimate equation (5.16), we compute the following variables.
• Non–pension wealth, At, is mostly obtained from wave 2. We resort to informa-
tion from wave 1 only for those individuals who dropped out of the survey in
wave 2 but were then retrieved in SHARELIFE. In our analysis we use both
household net worth and net ﬁnancial wealth as dependent variables. Ac-
cording to Gale (1998, p. 713) a narrow measure of non–pension wealth, such
as ﬁnancial wealth, may be unable to detect much of the displacement, as pen-
sion wealth is accumulated over a long period. On the other hand, Hurd et al.
(2012, p. 10) argue that ﬁnancial wealth is more liquid than real wealth and
hence more prone to being displaced by pension wealth. Our measure of net
ﬁnancial wealth is equal to gross ﬁnancial assets (bank accounts, government
and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement accounts,
contractual savings for housing and the face value of life insurance policies)
minus ﬁnancial liabilities. Net worth is the sum of net ﬁnancial wealth and
real wealth, where the latter is the sum of the value of the primary residence
net of the mortgage, the value of other real estate, owned share of own busi-
ness and owned cars. Missing values for each of the components of wealth
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are replaced by ﬁve simulated versions, following multiple imputation tech-
niques (Christelis, 2011). In total, for 56% of the analytical sample one of the
separate components of net worth has been imputed, although for less than
15% of the sample more than one component was imputed. All equations are
estimated using multiple imputations techniques.




(1+ r)t−τEτ , is calculated from SHARE-
LIFE. The job history section in SHARELIFE asks the respondents to provide
start and end dates of each job the respondent has held, as well as the ﬁrst
monthly wage after taxes. For the self-employed, monthly income from work
after taxes is asked instead. The respondent also identiﬁes his main job dur-
ing his career. For the retirees, the last monthly net wage (or, for the self-
employed, net income from work) of the main job is asked. For those that
are still employed at the time of the SHARELIFE interview, the current wage
is asked instead. We use the data to construct a panel with one observation
per year per individual, from birth to the wave 2 interview year. The wage
path is obtained using linear interpolation between the ﬁrst wage on each
job, the last wage of the main job and the current wage for the employed. For
those still working in wave 2, we use the wage in that year as an additional
point on the wage path.8 As for non–pension wealth, these wages have been
imputed in case of missing values (9%). During unemployment years, we as-
sign the respondent a wage equal to 80% of their last earnings. We convert all
incomes to annual PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006 following the proce-
dure explained in Trevisan et al. (2011). Period 1 is taken to be the start of the
working career, and we compound up to the wave 2 interview year for the
employed9, and the year before receiving retirement beneﬁts for the retired10,
8 One important difference between the ﬁrst two survey waves is that wages and pensions were elicited
gross (before taxes) in wave 1, and net in wave 2, which is why we only use wave 2 information to
generate our main variables.
9 We use the term employed to denote the non-retired, although it is not necessary to be actually em-
ployed in wave 2 due to e.g. unemployment. Also, this term includes the currently self-employed.
10 For the retired, this means that the dependent variable is At − z1R, and hence these two components
are measured at different ages. We made this assumption to prevent correlated measurement errors,
which would otherwise (using At − z1t) obviously arise for the retired subsample. Moreover, we have
selected respondents around retirement, which means this assumption should not much affect our re-
sults.
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using an annual real interest rate of 3%, as in Hurd et al. (2012) and Attana-
sio and Rohwedder (2003). After compounding, we have a cross-sectional
dataset, with one observation per individual, as observed in the interview
year of wave 2.




(1 + r)t−τEτ , which needs to be calculated only
for the employed sample, is computed under the assumption of constant real
wages (yτ = yt τ = t + 1, ...,R). Retirement starts in the in which the in-
dividual reaches his expected retirement age, obtained from wave 2, or the
statutory retirement age (65 in each country except France (60) and Czech Re-
public (62) in 2007, as reported in Angelini et al. (2009)) in case of item non-
response to that question. We use country-speciﬁc 2006 life tables from the
Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) to weight all future incomes
by the probability of survival.




(1 + r)t−τBτ , for the retired is calculated under
the assumption of constant real pension beneﬁts, which is more or less in line
with pension systems in the countries we study. The level of beneﬁts is taken
primarily from SHARELIFE, and wave 2 pension beneﬁts are used in case of
item non-response (13% of the analytical sample). For the employed, we use
the expected replacement rate11 from wave 2, multiplied by current wage, to
obtain expected pension beneﬁts12. Again, all future incomes are weighted
by survival rates and we assume a maximum age of 110.
• Pension wealth adjustment, Q(λ, t) is computed using expression 5.4, with r =
ρ = 0.03 (or λ = 1.03−1).
• Explanatory variables, xt, include a set of indicator variables to capture dif-
ferences across households. Speciﬁcally, we include an indicator for higher
11 The exact question to elicit the expected replacement rate for old age pensions, occupational pensions
or early retirement beneﬁts is stated as follows: "Please think about the time in which you will start
collecting this pension. Approximately, what percentage of your last earnings will your pension amount
to?". We take the maximum replacement rate from these pension categories as the individual’s expected
replacement rate. Given our age selection (55-75), we believe that the employed respondents provide
sensible answers to this question.
12 For those that retired between waves 2 and 3, we take their pension beneﬁt as reported in SHARELIFE.
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education (ISCED ≥ 4, post-secondary and tertiary education), medium ed-
ucation (ISCED=3, secondary education), aged 55-60, aged 70-75, married,
no children, self-reported bad health, second earner in the household, and
spells without work during the career. In other speciﬁcations, we control ad-
ditionally for inheritances received in the past using both an indicator and
the amount; an indicator for being retired; or characteristics (education and
health) of the spouse. All regressions have a full set of country ﬁxed effects,
with Germany as the base country.
We emphasize that compounded labour income and pension wealth, z1t and z2t, for
the retired subsample are computed from two different sets of questions. Therefore,
while both are likely measured with error, these errors are less likely to be corre-
lated. For the working, by using the expected replacement rate, pension wealth is
nearly a linear function of current income, with a sample correlation of 0.83, and
hence the measurement errors are likely correlated. We use this observation to con-
duct a sensitivity analysis in Section 5.4 by selecting only the retired subsample.
5.3.1 Sample characteristics
Table 5.1 shows sample statistics for the two main variables obtained from the ret-
rospective survey, annual labour income and annual pension income, as well as
for net worth and ﬁnancial wealth, by country and work status. We compute av-
erage annual labour income as the sum of all annualized wages divided by years
worked13; annual pension income is equal to the sum of pension incomes until
death divided by remaining life expectancy.14 We emphasize that the amounts re-
ported here are for one earner only, hence household labour income or pension
income is likely to be higher. Furthermore, the amounts, although corrected for
inﬂation and currency devaluations, could have been earned already in the 1950’s,
and hence are relatively low compared to current earnings. The cross-country pat-
tern of median labour incomes is encouraging, we believe, for the reliability of ret-
rospective data; countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have considerably
13 Note that this is similar to our measure of compounded labour income, using r = 0 instead, and
dividing by years worked.
14 Remaining life expectancy is calculated using the country-speciﬁc mortality rates, conditioning on
survivorship until the real age at the wave 2 interview year.
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lower wages and pensions compared to Western European countries, while wages
and pensions in Switzerland are higher. Table 5.1 also makes clear that there are
likely to be cohort effects in earnings and, via the replacement rate, in pensions:
those still working in the wave 2 interview year have substantially higher wages
and pensions than those already retired.
Table 5.1. Medians by country and retirement status
Country Annual labour income Annual pension income Wealth Observations
Working Retired Working Retired Net worth Financial
Austria 20,786 16,236 21,151 13,209 180,990 17,698 123
Germany 24,226 17,922 21,999 11,669 221,174 36,426 365
Sweden 24,747 20,765 16,046 12,272 206,176 57,980 341
Netherlands 23,810 16,526 24,122 11,973 222,288 39,273 334
Spain 16,954 15,603 19,710 9,149 302,695 6,827 176
Italy 17,255 12,650 14,421 9,853 212,103 8,169 486
France 26,268 24,582 18,400 15,516 325,397 36,672 256
Denmark 23,778 19,153 14,701 9,524 216,381 69,687 328
Greece 22,914 16,304 16,695 12,939 216,650 2,917 119
Switzerland 38,930 33,455 25,051 20,434 305,083 99,882 221
Belgium 22,559 18,552 18,258 12,968 304,183 54,116 398
Czech Republic 11,375 9,369 8,226 5,794 107,005 8,218 305
Poland 8,507 8,056 7,754 5,349 58,597 1,946 138
Total 22,733 16,441 17,016 10,723 217,488 25,672 3,590
Table shows the median values for annualized labour and pension incomes obtained from the retrospective survey,
by country and retirement status, as well as the levels of wealth obtained from wave 2.
All amounts are in PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006.
We also investigate the dynamic properties of earnings by estimating age-earnings
proﬁles by country group: North represents Sweden, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, Mid-West includes Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium,
South includes Spain, Italy and Greece and East represents Poland and Czech Re-
public. In particular, we estimate a regression of the log of monthly real wage (in
e1,000) on a 4th-order polynomial in age, for both low and high educated individ-
uals. We use a ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation to deal with unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure 5.1 shows the implied age-earnings proﬁles. Earnings for low-educated in-
dividuals are lower than for high-educated persons, as expected. Moreover, we
observe a more hump-shaped proﬁle for high-educated, with wages rising faster
in early ages. From what we know from earlier literature, these patterns are not
surprising, and provide evidence in favor of retrospective earnings information.15
15 We do not correct for cohort effects and labor supply effects (e.g. reduced hours of work later in life).
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Table 5.2 shows sample statistics for the remaining variables used in this study.
69% of the sample is retired at the time of the wave 2 interview, while only 0.3% is
unemployed. On average, the males in our analytical sample have only one year of
unemployment, and have been working for 40 years. The vast majority is married,
and 61% have a second earner in the household.
Given our sample selection (20 year-of-birth cohorts and men with at least 20 years of work experience),
these are not likely to distort the age-earnings proﬁles much.
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Actual retirement age (retired) 59.1 4.6
Expected retirement age (working) 63.2 2.5
Actual replacement rate (%, retired) 70.1 35.0
Expected replacement rate (%, working) 66.4 17.4
Years worked 40.3 5.5
Years not worked 1.2 2.6
Gale’s Q 0.5 0.1
% High educated 29.7
% Medium educated 33.4
% Married 88.2
% Second earner 61.3
% Bad health 26.2
% Inheritance received 36.4
Amount inherited (× e1, 000) 14.2 49.4
Table shows the mean and standard deviation of household characteristics.
N=3,590 except for retired (N=2,487) or working (N=1,103) speciﬁc variables.
5.4 Results
We estimate the model represented in equation (5.16) both using robust regression
and median regression techniques, as Gale (1998) does. Since wages and pension
beneﬁts from wave 2 and the measures of non–pension wealth have been imputed
ﬁve times in case of missing values, we use multiple imputation techniques to ob-
tain the correct coefﬁcients and standard errors (Little and Rubin, 2002).16 The re-
sults are presented in Table 5.3. Our controls include two age dummies17, marital
status, presence of children, education, health, the country of residence and indica-
tors for whether in the family there has been a second income earner and whether
there were years of unemployment in the working career, as well as country ﬁxed
effects (see Table 5.A.1). For median regression, standard errors are based on 1000
bootstrap replications.
16 If βˆm and Vˆm denote the vector of parameter estimates and variance matrix for imputation



















, which takes into account both within- and between-imputation variance.
17 As we estimate a cross-sectional regression, we cannot distinguish between age, cohort and time ef-
fects.
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Table 5.3. Estimates of the displacement effect
Robust regression Median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Retired Old Full Retired Old
sample sample sample sample sample sample
Pension wealth -0.471*** -0.205** -0.173* -0.609*** -0.296 -0.306*
(0.0878) (0.0936) (0.0965) (0.151) (0.180) (0.177)
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Bootstrapped standard errors for median regression, 1000 replications.
Our results for the full sample imply an estimated offset18 between 47.1% and
60.9% depending on the estimation method: the offset is signiﬁcantly different from
zero at all conventional levels and signiﬁcantly different from 100%, although not at
the 1% level in the case of median regression (columns (1) and (4) of Table 5.3). As
Gale (1998), we also ﬁnd that robust regression estimates of the offset are qualita-
tively the same as median regression estimates but quantitatively smaller. The con-
trol variables are mainly insigniﬁcant, with the exception of the indicator for gaps
in the career, resulting in less wealth, and strongly signiﬁcant age effects. Although
insigniﬁcance of, for example, education may seem surprising, we emphasize that
education correlates with compounded labour income, included in our regressions.
The country-ﬁxed effects are highly signiﬁcant.
As argued in Section 5.2.1, the estimates for the full sample are likely to be bi-
ased, away from zero due to the fact that measurement errors in z1t and z2t are
possibly correlated for the non–retired (cf. equation (5.17)) and towards zero due
to measurement error in pension wealth. Since these biases work in opposite di-
rection, we can only hope that these balance out on aggregate. In columns (2) and
(5) we report the estimated crowd-out for the group of retirees. For this group,
as argued above, the correlation between the measurement errors in compounded
labour income and pension wealth (i.e. ση1η2 from Section 5.2.1) should be consider-
ably smaller or even negligible for this group, and hence, the estimate should only
be affected by attenuation bias due to measurement error in pension wealth. There-
fore, we can consider the estimates for the group of retirees as a lower bound for
18 The offset is simply the negative of the estimated coefﬁcient for pension wealth.
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the true offset. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the attenuation bias gives parameter estimates
towards zero, and hence a lower estimated offset compared to the full sample re-
sults. The estimated displacement effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero only
with robust regression.
One issue with selecting the sample of retirees is that, although we do not explic-
itly model the retirement decision, it might be endogenous. Therefore, in columns
(3) and (6), we do not select the sample based on retirement status, which could
lead to endogenous sample selection and hence inconsistent parameter estimates,
but using an age criterion: those aged 60 or below are dropped independent of
retirement status (in our sample average retirement age is 59.1, see Table 5.2). In
the remaining group of 2415 males, around 90% is retired, compared to 70% in our
baseline results. Effectively, for this old sample, the effect of correlated measure-
ment errors should be similar to selecting only the retirees, which is conﬁrmed by
the parameter estimates. The estimated offset is between 17.3% and 30.6%, and is
signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level. 19
Table 5.4. Robustness checks displacement effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Robust regression -0.778*** -0.614*** -0.532*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.215* -0.833*** -0.380***
(0.0738) (0.0734) (0.0779) (0.0877) (0.0876) (0.122) (0.153) (0.121)
p-value β2 = −1 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.277 0.000
Median regression -0.870*** -0.692*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.660*** -0.275 -1.099*** -0.740***
(0.114) (0.121) (0.118) (0.163) (0.162) (0.192) (0.286) (0.226)
p-value β2 = −1 0.253 0.0130 0.001 0.0210 0.0420 0.000 0.729 0.253
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
Standard errors in parentheses; 1000 bootstrap replications for median regression; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Table shows the coefﬁcient for pension wealth from a regression similar to Table 5.3 with the following modiﬁcations:
(1) using ﬁnancial wealth as dependent variable, full sample, (2) using ﬁnancial wealth as dependent variable, retired sample,
(3) using ﬁnancial wealth as dependent variable, old sample, (4) controlling for received inheritances (binary and amount),
(5) controlling for partner’s education and health status, (6) and (7) interacting all covariates with the high-education dummy
and (8) excluding countries with large occupational pensions
We check the robustness of our results in Table 5.4 (see Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3
for detailed results). In columns (1) to (3) we consider net ﬁnancial wealth rather
than total net worth and we include housing wealth among the control variables.20
19 For both the samples of retirees and older males, the difference with the full sample estimates might
be partly driven by cohort effects, although these are likely small given our age restriction in the full
sample (55-75 years old).
20 We have carried out our estimations including other forms of non–ﬁnancial wealth as well as not
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The reason for doing so is that, according to Hurd et al. (2012), real wealth is mostly
illiquid and its accumulation is likely to be driven by motives other than retirement
planning. Housing in particular may be a consumption rather than an investment
good, and as such affect the displacement effect. When we use ﬁnancial wealth, for
the full sample we cannot reject the hypothesis of full displacement using median
regression. This result is in contrast with the ﬁndings of Gale (1998), according to
which the offset is larger when using broader measures of wealth. For the sample
of retirees, we ﬁnd that for ﬁnancial wealth the displacement effect is signiﬁcantly
different from zero, while for net worth this was true only using robust regression.
Using the reasoning of Section 5.2.1, as ση1η2 ≈ 0, these estimates may be inter-
preted as lower bounds for the true offset, and hence we reject the hypothesis of no
displacement. As expected, the offset for the old sample is very similar in magni-
tude to that estimated for the sample of retirees.
In the remaining robustness checks we focus only on the full sample because the
results are qualitatively unchanged when we select the retirees or the old sample
(they are available upon request from the authors). In columns (4) and (5) we add
to our speciﬁcation other explanatory variables that might be relevant in determin-
ing non–pension wealth. In particular, in column (4) we control for whether the
individual has ever received inheritances or gifts worth more than e5,000 during
his life and the total amount received. Indeed, for some individuals inheritances
and monetary gifts might be an important component of non–pension wealth. Our
results show that, although these variables are highly signiﬁcant with the expected
positive sign (see Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3), the estimated offset is still in the same
range as before and signiﬁcantly different from 0 and 100%. Column (5) shows that
including controls for the education level and health status of the partner does not
affect our main results. Changing the ﬁxed parameters r and ρ to 2% (4%) does
not affect the qualitative results (not reported); the estimated offset equals 23.6%
(87.7%) using robust regressions, signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level.
As in Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011), in columns (6) and (7) we
controlling for housing wealth. The results are virtually unchanged (they are available upon request
from the authors).
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interact all covariates with the high-education dummy, and report the estimated
displacement effect for the high- and low educated groups21. We ﬁnd that the off-
set is not signiﬁcantly different from 100% for the highly educated, while the dis-
placement effect is substantially lower in absolute value terms and not signiﬁcantly
different from zero offset for the less-educated sample. This result can be explained
by the fact that individuals with higher education are more likely to be ﬁnancially
literate and to plan for retirement, while less educated individuals are more likely
to procrastinate (see e.g. Laibson (1998)).
Finally, in column (8) we exclude those countries for which occupational pen-
sions are typically a substantial share of pension income for retirees: Germany, Swe-
den, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium. In these countries, pensions may be
seen as a form of private wealth, causing wrong inference on the displacement ef-
fect. The estimated crowd-out is about 10 percentage points lower compared to our
baseline result using robust regression, and 15 percentage points higher using me-
dian regression. Overall, the results do not seem to be driven by the type of pension
system in a particular country. The results are also robust to leaving one country
out at the time (not reported). Using robust regression, the estimated displacement
effect ranges between 38.6% when The Netherlands is left out of the analysis, to
57.5% when leaving out Italy, all signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level.
21 The hypothesis of equal slope coefﬁcients across education groups cannot be rejected for median
regression (p = 0.326) and is marginally rejected for robust regression (p = 0.044).
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Figure 5.2 shows the displacement effect by country group22, where North rep-
resents Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands; Mid-West represents Austria, Ger-
many, Switzerland, France and Belgium; South includes Spain, Italy and Greece
and East represents Poland and Czech Republic. The estimates are obtained using
robust regressions, and we plot 90% conﬁdence intervals around the point esti-
mates. In the Northern countries the extent of displacement of net worth is the
highest (91%), and crowd-out is least in the South (11%), although the conﬁdence
intervals are wide. The pattern is similar when looking at ﬁnancial wealth, al-
though the offset is the lowest in the Eastern countries. More generous welfare
systems (including social security) in the Northern countries could reduce the need
to save for other reasons than retirement, such as precautionary savings. Also,
more developed capital markets are likely to relax liquidity constraints. For these
reasons, the displacement effect could be higher in the Northern countries com-
pared to the Southern or Eastern European countries.
Another explanation of these ﬁndings can be found in the cross-country stud-
ies on Financial Literacy around the World23 (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). These
“FLat World” studies investigate responses to three comparable ﬁnancial literacy
questions in country-speciﬁc socio-economic surveys, focusing on the concepts of
interest rates, inﬂation and risk diversiﬁcation. The results show that the Nether-
22 The sample sizes are too small to consider country-speciﬁc analysis.
23 See the special issue of the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Volume 10, Issue 4 (2011).
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lands (Alessie et al., 2011b) and Sweden (Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh, 2011)
score relatively well with 46.2% and 26.7% of respondents aged 25-65 answering
all three questions correctly24. In Germany 56.8% of the sample provides three
correct answers (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011). In Italy, 28.3% answers all cor-
rectly (Fornero and Monticone, 2011), while in Russia25 only 3.4% answers all cor-
rectly (Klapper and Panos, 2011). Jappelli (2010) conducts a panel data study using
data from the International Institute for Management Development’s World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook (IMD-WCY). Jappelli ﬁnds a positive relationship between a
country’s GDP per capita and its economic literacy26 using ﬁxed-effects regressions,
as well as the highest literacy scores in Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Sweden and the lowest scores in Poland, Italy and Spain. The evidence presented
is certainly not exhaustive, but still seems to suggest more literate households in
the Northern or Western countries, and less literacy in the Southern or Eastern
countries, consistent with our results given the strong correlation between ﬁnancial
literacy and planning for retirement found in these same studies. Still, our cross-
country results should be treated with caution, as the conﬁdence intervals are wide,
and, in fact, the group-speciﬁc estimates are never signiﬁcantly different from the
pooled displacement effect.
Overall, our results show that there is heterogeneity in the estimated offset
across different groups of the population. However, the displacement effect is al-
most always signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating some degree of crowding
out of private savings by pensions.
24 The interest rate question in Sweden was considerably more difﬁcult compared to the other countries;
the percentage of no question correct is around 10% as in the Netherlands and Germany.
25 We should be cautious with comparing the Russian results. First, the Czech Republic and Poland
might well score differently compared to Russia. Second, the question on inﬂation literacy in Russia
is framed differently from the other studies but is contentwise similar, while the risk diversiﬁcation
question asks Russians to rate the risks of different portfolio, and the remaining countries to give a
true/false answer, which may bias the results against the Russians. Also, the answer category “Refuse
to answer” was missing in all Russian questions.
26 The literacy scores in the IMD-WCY are obtained by asking business leaders’s and country experts’s
opinions on economic literacy in the population, instead of using household surveys as done in the
“FLat World” studies.
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5.4.1 The endogeneity of pension wealth
Although we have suggested an approach to limit the effect of measurement error,
our results might still be biased due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
For example, taste for saving is likely to inﬂuence both pension wealth and private
savings. Since both the dependent and the endogenous right-hand-side variable
are positively affected by the unobserved taste for saving, the estimates of the dis-
placement effect that we have obtained so far are likely to be attenuated. Therefore,
we can still conclude that there is crowding out but its magnitude might be under-
estimated.
We try to overcome this endogeneity problem by using an instrumental vari-
able identiﬁcation strategy, which at the same time should reduce the impact of
measurement error. We construct an instrument in the same spirit of that of Engel-
hardt and Kumar (2011), exploiting institutional differences across countries and
groups of individuals. First, we compute median27 pension beneﬁts by country
and employment sector (employee, civil servant and self-employed), relying on the
information from the second wave of SHARE. Second, for each individual we cal-
culate a “potential” pension wealth variable, using the relevant median beneﬁt and
the statutory retirement age that was in place at the time of retirement. Therefore,
there are three sources of variation in our instrument: the country of residence, the
sector of employment and the legal retirement age in place when leaving employ-
ment. For the validity of the instrument, we need to assume that, conditional on
demographic characteristics, education, wealth and the country of residence, work-
ers do not sort across employment sectors based on the taste for saving which is in-
cluded in the error term. This assumption is similar to that made by Attanasio and
Brugiavini (2003) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011). Note that the instrument does
not depend on any other individual characteristics which could be correlated with
unobserved heterogeneity. We report results for our instrumental variables estima-
tion in Table 5.5 (see Table 5.A.4 for the detailed results). There are two cautionary
notes to bear in mind. First, we only present the results of IV quantile regression
because the theory for IV robust regression is non–standard and we have not yet
27 Using average pension income by country and employment sector gives similar results, available
upon request.
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Table 5.5. IV Median regression estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Full sample Retired sample Old sample
Pension Wealth -1.232 -0.622 -0.955
(0.876) (0.863) (0.813)
p-value β2 = −1 0.804 0.684 0.960
F-statistic ﬁrst stage 41.895 31.232 38.567
Observations 3590 2487 2415
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications. Table shows the
coefﬁcient for pension wealth from an Instrumental Variable median regression,
instrumenting pension wealth. See the text for details on the instrument.
found a way to apply it to our context. Second, we employ the identiﬁcation strat-
egy of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), which provides consistent but imprecise
estimates, a fact that has been noted by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) and En-
gelhardt and Kumar (2011) as well. Therefore, although we focus only on the point
estimates and not on the conﬁdence intervals, the point estimates should be inter-
preted with caution.
As expected, the estimated displacement effect is higher when correcting for the
attenuation biases from endogeneity and measurement error, both if we focus on
the full sample and if we consider only the retirees or the old sample. The partial F-
statistic of the ﬁrst stage (OLS) regression exceeds the “weak” instrument threshold
of 10. The point estimates suggest full displacement, although the large standard
errors yield insigniﬁcant results for pension wealth.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use SHARE data to come up with new estimates of the displace-
ment effect of pensions on household wealth. The third wave of this survey, known
as SHARELIFE, collects retrospective data on lifetime earnings, which can be linked
to data on household wealth and subjective data on the expected replacement rate
and retirement age collected in previous waves. Consequently, we are able to ap-
proximate in a convincing way the main variables needed to estimate the extent of
crowding out between pension wealth and private wealth. In particular, we can
compute both the present value of past and future income and pension wealth.
According to our robust (median) regression results, each euro of pension wealth
is associated with a 47 (61) cent decline in non–pension wealth. However, these
results should be interpreted with caution: although we suggest an approach to
limit the effects of correlated measurement errors in lifetime earnings and pension
wealth, our estimates could still be biased and the direction of the bias is unclear. As
Gale (1998, p. 720) stated, “pension wealth data are of generally poor quality; all methods
of calculating pension wealth in deﬁned beneﬁt plans are likely to create measurement er-
ror”. For this reason, we estimate our model also on a sample of retirees and older
households, for whom the information on lifetime earnings and pension wealth
comes from two different sources. For this group measurement error, although
present, is likely to be uncorrelated and the direction of the bias in our preferred
speciﬁcation is thus clear: parameter estimates are attenuated and, therefore, they
can provide lower bounds to the true offset. We ﬁnd that the lower bounds for the
crowd–out are signiﬁcantly different from zero and they range between 17% and
30%, depending on the estimation method.
We also ﬁnd that the extent of the crowding out effect differs across education
groups: for the low educated, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of displacement whereas
for the high educated pension wealth completely crowds out private wealth. More-
over, the level of displacement is limited in the Mediterranean and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. The IV estimates, instrumenting pension wealth to account for
omitted variable bias, suggest full displacement although estimated with less pre-
cision.
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Our results shed light on the impact of recent and future pension reforms in Eu-
rope. The main results suggest that European households will react to reductions
in pensions by increasing private savings, although not strong enough to smooth
consumption over the life–cycle. Government policy should focus especially on
the less-educated and perhaps ﬁnancially illiterate households, for which we have
shown limited displacement.
Although we have suggested strategies to address the issues of measurement
error and unobserved heterogeneity, more work needs to be done. Most notably,
future waves of SHARE can be used to construct a panel data set, with which un-
observable household characteristics as well as the choice of retirement date can be
addressed.
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5.A Detailed estimation results
Table 5.A.1. Full table estimation results
Robust regression Median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Retired Old Full Retired Old
sample sample sample sample sample sample
Pension wealth -0.471*** -0.205** -0.173* -0.609*** -0.296 -0.306*
(0.0878) (0.0936) (0.0965) (0.151) (0.180) (0.177)
Age 55-60 -1.406*** -0.538** -1.409*** -0.359
(0.155) (0.207) (0.173) (0.226)
Age 70-75 1.797*** 1.483*** 1.674*** 1.614*** 1.347*** 1.505***
(0.172) (0.161) (0.167) (0.177) (0.175) (0.187)
Second earner 0.128 0.230 0.206 0.175 0.189 0.270
(0.151) (0.159) (0.171) (0.167) (0.191) (0.188)
Married 0.403* 0.148 0.173 0.332 -0.0066 -0.070
(0.233) (0.247) (0.267) (0.275) (0.292) (0.304)
No children 0.355 0.170 0.503 0.469* 0.0579 0.564
(0.254) (0.262) (0.289) (0.282) (0.274) (0.293)
High educated 0.0854 0.229 0.100 -0.0755 0.177 0.133
(0.175) (0.200) (0.202) (0.197) (0.233) (0.234)
Medium educated 0.255 0.229 0.362 0.139 0.233 0.340
(0.163) (0.186) (0.195) (0.175) (0.205) (0.211)
Bad health 0.120 0.0175 0.179 0.0712 0.0674 0.167
(0.149) (0.152) (0.170) (0.143) (0.165) (0.163)
Gaps in career -0.824*** -0.109 -0.236 -0.756*** -0.174 -0.275
(0.146) (0.180) (0.183) (0.164) (0.208) (0.211)
Sweden -0.820*** -0.882** -0.880*** -0.992** -1.104** -1.382***
(0.287) (0.341) (0.328) (0.412) (0.495) (0.459)
Denmark -0.311 -0.743** -0.716** -0.457 -0.831* -1.020**
(0.286) (0.321) (0.330) (0.369) (0.458) (0.428)
Netherlands 0.528* 0.467 0.590* 0.521 0.365 0.481
(0.285) (0.322) (0.333) (0.336) (0.356) (0.346)
Belgium 1.397*** 1.172*** 1.446*** 1.522*** 1.244*** 1.590***
(0.279) (0.300) (0.316) (0.356) (0.408) (0.377)
France 0.755** 0.295 0.413 0.337 -0.270 -0.267
(0.312) (0.340) (0.389) (0.463) (0.510) (0.629)
Switzerland -5.575*** -4.633*** -4.734*** -5.595*** -4.275*** -5.045***
(0.324) (0.389) (0.370) (0.589) (0.741) (0.628)
Austria 0.628 0.362 0.245 0.743 0.213 0.197
(0.389) (0.409) (0.442) (0.477) (0.507) (0.549)
Spain 1.649*** 1.825*** 1.763*** 1.314** 1.544** 1.504**
(0.371) (0.397) (0.437) (0.506) (0.599) (0.585)
Italy 2.477*** 2.237*** 2.563*** 2.325*** 2.171*** 2.431***
(0.274) (0.293) (0.315) (0.302) (0.350) (0.352)
Greece 2.053*** 1.802*** 2.100*** 1.950*** 1.401* 1.345*
(0.400) (0.465) (0.490) (0.742) (0.747) (0.745)
Poland 3.027*** 2.563*** 2.608*** 2.985*** 2.355*** 2.469***
(0.377) (0.408) (0.472) (0.330) (0.340) (0.363)
Czech Republic 2.201*** 1.979*** 2.171*** 2.102*** 1.920*** 2.055***
(0.305) (0.322) (0.339) (0.286) (0.311) (0.294)
Constant -4.786*** -4.664*** -5.128*** -4.385*** -4.244*** -4.559***
(0.329) (0.358) (0.372) (0.374) (0.427) (0.418)
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Bootstrapped standard errors for median regression, 1000 replications
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Table 5.A.2. Full estimation results robustness checks, robust regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Pension wealth -0.778*** -0.614*** -0.532*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.215* -0.833*** -0.380***
(0.0738) (0.0734) (0.0779) (0.0877) (0.0876) (0.122) (0.153) (0.121)
Age 55-60 -1.508*** -0.653*** -1.421*** -1.424*** -1.340*** -1.537*** -1.397***
(0.127) (0.159) (0.154) (0.155) (0.178) (0.293) (0.204)
Age 70-75 1.898*** 1.579*** 1.784*** 1.820*** 1.812*** 1.733*** 1.862*** 1.390***
(0.144) (0.125) (0.135) (0.171) (0.172) (0.206) (0.341) (0.240)
Second earner -0.142 -0.0818 -0.0961 0.0777 -0.117 0.183 0.151 0.215
(0.123) (0.123) (0.137) (0.149) (0.168) (0.175) (0.280) (0.203)
Married 0.0023 -0.117 -0.153 0.412* 0.255 0.276 0.558 0.143
(0.190) (0.191) (0.211) (0.230) (0.242) (0.271) (0.427) (0.331)
No children 0.355* 0.239 0.394* 0.331 0.377 0.346 0.0912 0.268
(0.204) (0.205) (0.233) (0.251) (0.252) (0.290) (0.489) (0.345)
High educated -0.677*** -0.397*** -0.557*** -0.0405 -0.0662 0.108
(0.142) (0.146) (0.162) (0.174) (0.183) (0.243)
Medium educated 0.0527 0.0511 0.134 0.201 0.159 0.152
(0.136) (0.137) (0.156) (0.161) (0.165) (0.221)
Bad health 0.279** 0.180 0.292** 0.197 0.153 0.148 0.0378 0.287
(0.123) (0.116) (0.133) (0.148) (0.150) (0.169) (0.327) (0.194)
Gaps in career -0.810*** 0.0087 -0.234 -0.826*** -0.835*** -0.654*** -1.109*** -0.865***
(0.123) (0.138) (0.149) (0.145) (0.145) (0.174) (0.270) (0.204)
Sweden -0.637*** -0.451* -0.749*** -0.824*** -0.787*** -1.356*** -0.0327
(0.237) (0.257) (0.260) (0.290) (0.289) (0.364) (0.522)
Denmark -0.243 -0.646** -0.725*** -0.254 -0.320 -0.395 -0.206
(0.237) (0.249) (0.263) (0.284) (0.286) (0.364) (0.455)
Netherlands 0.520** 0.396 0.431 0.600** 0.604** 0.217 0.819*
(0.239) (0.259) (0.275) (0.282) (0.288) (0.363) (0.473)
Belgium 0.868*** 0.817*** 0.871*** 1.430*** 1.431*** 1.148*** 1.626***
(0.229) (0.230) (0.253) (0.274) (0.279) (0.348) (0.435)
France -0.223 -0.720*** -0.461 0.830*** 0.818*** 0.829** 0.0730
(0.259) (0.266) (0.318) (0.307) (0.312) (0.381) (0.552)
Switzerland -5.555*** -4.195*** -4.753*** -5.695*** -5.517*** -6.236*** -4.760*** -6.393***
(0.274) (0.309) (0.313) (0.326) (0.324) (0.406) (0.518) (0.356)
Austria 0.767** 0.771** 0.560 0.786** 0.720* 0.156 1.537** -0.0631
(0.318) (0.318) (0.353) (0.383) (0.388) (0.487) (0.648) (0.398)
Spain 0.257 0.340 0.211 1.807*** 1.739*** 1.219*** 3.225*** 0.940**
(0.295) (0.299) (0.327) (0.366) (0.369) (0.415) (0.955) (0.375)
Italy 1.557*** 1.397*** 1.572*** 2.565*** 2.551*** 2.165*** 3.039*** 1.765***
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.270) (0.276) (0.316) (0.698) (0.291)
Greece 1.707*** 1.447*** 1.639*** 1.987*** 2.018*** 1.637*** 2.482*** 1.343***
(0.328) (0.358) (0.392) (0.396) (0.401) (0.486) (0.703) (0.398)
Poland 3.735*** 3.107*** 3.087*** 3.185*** 3.044*** 3.000*** 2.922*** 2.299***
(0.312) (0.318) (0.380) (0.373) (0.377) (0.457) (0.712) (0.401)
Czech Republic 2.459*** 2.161*** 2.267*** 2.296*** 2.240*** 2.021*** 2.249*** 1.470***
(0.248) (0.249) (0.271) (0.300) (0.305) (0.367) (0.585) (0.336)
Constant -5.233*** -5.083*** -5.364*** -4.964*** -4.518*** -4.679*** -4.420*** -3.890***
(0.274) (0.279) (0.297) (0.328) (0.372) (0.396) (0.514) (0.436)












Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
p-value β2 = −1 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.277 0.000
p-value Country 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
effects
See Table 5.4. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
In column (8), France is used as the baseline country.
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Table 5.A.3. Full estimation results robustness checks, median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Pension wealth -0.870*** -0.692*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.660*** -0.275 -1.099*** -0.740***
(0.114) (0.121) (0.118) (0.163) (0.162) (0.192) (0.286) (0.226)
Age 55-60 -1.477*** -0.433*** -1.399*** -1.483*** -1.238*** -1.943*** -1.390***
(0.154) (0.163) (0.170) (0.184) (0.196) (0.404) (0.217)
Age 70-75 1.948*** 1.776*** 1.891*** 1.674*** 1.629*** 1.550*** 1.652*** 1.207***
(0.143) (0.132) (0.138) (0.177) (0.186) (0.209) (0.437) (0.216)
Second earner -0.143 -0.144 -0.0901 0.119 -0.102 0.165 0.258 0.423**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.162) (0.167) (0.184) (0.185) (0.406) (0.211)
Married -0.128 -0.110 -0.194 0.348 0.190 0.182 0.524 -0.178
(0.203) (0.196) (0.215) (0.253) (0.281) (0.286) (0.673) (0.378)
No children 0.226 0.216 0.267 0.290 0.522* 0.407 0.179 0.180
(0.222) (0.197) (0.197) (0.249) (0.290) (0.277) (0.617) (0.347)
High educated -0.818*** -0.604*** -0.717*** -0.182 -0.267 0.0925
(0.171) (0.174) (0.198) (0.206) (0.204) (0.263)
Medium educated -0.0997 -0.0322 0.0255 0.131 0.0844 0.0550
(0.141) (0.136) (0.150) (0.168) (0.177) (0.214)
Bad health 0.206 0.167 0.231 0.134 0.102 0.140 -0.262 0.163
(0.126) (0.119) (0.140) (0.136) (0.145) (0.169) (0.391) (0.180)
Gaps in career -0.796*** -0.0446 -0.237 -0.796*** -0.780*** -0.617*** -0.982** -0.742***
(0.143) (0.136) (0.162) (0.168) (0.175) (0.185) (0.384) (0.210)
Sweden -1.376*** -1.255*** -1.596*** -0.947** -1.077** -1.700*** -0.326
(0.299) (0.385) (0.352) (0.396) (0.413) (0.472) (0.683)
Denmark -0.476* -0.722** -0.945*** -0.352 -0.490 -0.429 -0.646
(0.254) (0.341) (0.326) (0.357) (0.370) (0.433) (0.626)
Netherlands 0.531** 0.373 0.412 0.693** 0.592* 0.349 0.904
(0.230) (0.280) (0.256) (0.314) (0.320) (0.373) (0.577)
Belgium 0.815*** 0.788*** 0.843*** 1.537*** 1.543*** 1.576*** 1.174*
(0.234) (0.269) (0.272) (0.374) (0.395) (0.407) (0.619)
France -0.991** -1.484*** -1.453*** 0.399 0.462 0.515 -0.240
(0.416) (0.511) (0.613) (0.408) (0.456) (0.438) (1.000)
Switzerland -6.319*** -4.428*** -5.137*** -5.800*** -5.586*** -6.190*** -5.061*** -5.889***
(0.537) (0.455) (0.648) (0.595) (0.603) (0.766) (1.012) (0.650)
Austria 0.593 0.303 0.0036 0.944** 0.790 0.519 1.455 0.367
(0.492) (0.526) (0.495) (0.418) (0.480) (0.527) (0.938) (0.581)
Spain -0.215 -0.0919 -0.127 1.587*** 1.430** 1.065* 2.303 1.093*
(0.400) (0.406) (0.413) (0.514) (0.581) (0.596) (1.522) (0.586)
Italy 1.677*** 1.501*** 1.698*** 2.487*** 2.406*** 2.122*** 2.754*** 2.062***
(0.227) (0.222) (0.228) (0.297) (0.328) (0.341) (0.803) (0.401)
Greece 0.935* 0.858* 0.886* 1.503** 1.864** 1.343* 2.703* 1.354*
(0.506) (0.486) (0.475) (0.726) (0.772) (0.804) (1.578) (0.692)
Poland 3.615*** 2.954*** 3.083*** 3.188*** 2.949*** 2.973*** 2.711*** 2.480***
(0.260) (0.248) (0.288) (0.333) (0.342) (0.363) (0.696) (0.435)
Czech Republic 2.284*** 2.163*** 2.201*** 2.291*** 2.096*** 2.141*** 1.728*** 1.667***
(0.217) (0.213) (0.217) (0.293) (0.296) (0.335) (0.619) (0.520)
Constant -4.669*** -4.797*** -4.945*** -4.691*** -3.992*** -4.507*** -3.681*** -3.528***
(0.286) (0.309) (0.283) (0.383) (0.432) (0.442) (0.860) (0.586)












Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
p-value β2 = −1 0.253 0.0130 0.001 0.0210 0.0420 0.000 0.729 0.253
p-value Country 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
effects
See Table 5.4. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 1000 replications; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
In column (8), France is used as the baseline country.
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Table 5.A.4. IV Quantile regression estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Full Retired Old
sample sample sample
Pension Wealth -1.232 -0.622 -0.955
(0.876) (0.863) (0.813)
Age 55-60 -0.144*** -0.044
(0.022) (0.027)
Age 70-75 0.179*** 0.136*** 0.172***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
Second earner 0.012 0.017 0.026
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Married 0.037 0.006 0.003
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035)
No children 0.050* -0.001 0.054*
(0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
High educated 0.014 0.031 0.029
(0.040) (0.045) (0.043)
Medium educated 0.030 0.029 0.045
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Bad Health 0.005 0.001 0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Gaps in career -0.082*** -0.021 -0.036
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Civil servant 0.038 0.031 0.024
(0.033) (0.030) (0.035)
Employee -0.022 -0.016 -0.037
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032)
Sweden -0.099** -0.115** -0.111**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.045)
Netherlands 0.049 0.029 0.067*
(0.032) (0.038) (0.036)
Austria 0.075 0.016 0.019
(0.051) (0.054) (0.058)
Switzerland -0.521*** -0.425*** -0.435***
(0.094) (0.114) (0.099)
Spain 0.141*** 0.151** 0.156***
(0.051) (0.059) (0.058)
Italy 0.225*** 0.207*** 0.239***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
France 0.037 -0.020 -0.001
(0.050) (0.063) (0.072)
Denmark -0.077 -0.109* -0.124**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.053)
Belgium 0.149*** 0.130*** 0.182***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.042)
Greece 0.173*** 0.125* 0.135*
(0.066) (0.072) (0.073)
Czech Republic 0.161** 0.162** 0.156**
(0.079) (0.073) (0.071)
Poland 0.226*** 0.187** 0.198***
(0.084) (0.076) (0.076)
Constant -0.366*** -0.381*** -0.382***
(0.110) (0.100) (0.097)
Observations 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.804 0.684 0.960
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-statistic ﬁrst stage 41.895 31.232 38.567
p-value ﬁrst stage 0.000 0.000 0.000
See Table 5.5. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses;
1000 replications. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Dependent and endogenous RHS variable divided by 10
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5.B Advantages of retrospective information
In this appendix, we discuss the advantage of retrospective earnings information
compared to the traditional approach, used by, amongst others, Gale (1998). Our
main interest is in estimating the parameter β2, the displacement effect, in the re-
gression equation
A = z1β1 + z2β2 + x′γ+ ε
where A denotes private wealth, z1 permanent income, z2 pension wealth and x′ a
vector of controls. Using retrospective earnings data from SHARELIFE, z1 is a one-
dimensional measure of lifetime income, measured with error. Using the approach
of Gale (1998), z1β1 is replaced by g′1δ1, where g
′
1 is a vector of variables proxying
lifetime income, consisting of education, age, current income, marital status and the
expected age of retirement. Hence, g′1 is a multi-dimensional measure of lifetime
income, again measured with error. The economic model presented in Section 2
provides a value for β1 = 1, which we can use to estimate a restricted model,
such that we can sign the direction of the bias in the estimated displacement effect.
Instead, economic theory does not provide any intuition regarding the magnitude
of the elements in δ1, and hence a restricted estimator is not feasible.
The SHARE survey contains enough information to estimate Gale’s model on
the sample of non-retirees.28 An important impedient to this approach is that
SHARE asks individuals to report an expected replacement rate of pension ben-
eﬁts. Expected pension beneﬁts can then simply be computed by multiplying this
replacement rate by current income. In contrast, the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) used by Gale asks respondents to provide an expected money amount of
pension beneﬁts.29 This difference in survey questions has important consequences
for estimating Gale (1998)’s model: using SHARE data, pension wealth is a linear
28 Note that the approach of Gale (1998) is not suitable for the sample of retirees, as current labour
income is not observed for this sample, except for the case where individuals are followed repeatedly
over time and retire in the period surveyed. Gale indeed estimates his model for the sample of non-
retirees.
29 Given the different institutions between countries in Europe, we believe that the replacement rate is
indeed the appropriate pension income measure to elicit in a multi-country survey. The money amount
may be more appropriate in a single-country survey, although in, for instance, The Netherlands and
Italy, the replacement rate is the construct alluded to in political and popular debate.
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function of current income, and hence the measurement error in pension wealth
correlates with the measurement error in g1. Using the SCF, one may reasonably
argue that the measurement errors in g1 and z2 are uncorrelated. The derivation of
Section 2.1 clearly shows that this correlation biases the coefﬁcients further away
from the true values.
Table 5.B.1 shows the results of estimating Gale (1998)’s model using SHARE
data, without using any retrospective earnings information, for the sample of non-
retirees. In column (I), we proxy permanent income with Age, monthly real income
(in e000’s), education, marital status, a dummy for a second earner in the house-
hold, and the expected age of retirement. In column (II), we additionally include
interactions between age and income as well as education and income.
Table 5.B.1 shows that the estimated displacement effect is positive and not sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero using Gale (1998)’s approach with SHARE data. The
bias towards zero, compared to the model’s prediction, is most likely driven by
correlated measurement errors between pension wealth and current income, as pre-
dicted in Section 2.1 (see equation 14). In column (II), the marginal effect of income
for a 60-year old, high educated respondent equals 0.43, signiﬁcantly different from
zero (p=0.004), which is comparable to the effect of income in column (I). We con-
clude that one cannot use SHARE data to estimate the displacement effect, due to
the presence of measurement errors. The approach we suggest in this paper, com-
bining economic theory with retrospective earnings information, does allow for the
identiﬁcation of the displacement effect.
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Table 5.B.1. Gale’s regression
(1) (2)
Variables Gale’s model Gale’s model
with interactions
Pension wealth 0.150 0.135
(0.132) (0.133)




High educated 0.836*** 0.503
(0.196) (0.368)
Medium educated 0.389** -0.251
(0.169) (0.363)
Age x Income 0.0143
(0.0240)
High educated x Income 0.224
(0.156)




No children 0.0251 -0.00680
(0.275) (0.258)
Bad health -0.211 -0.202
(0.179) (0.178)
Second earner -0.101 -0.0874
(0.177) (0.172)





























p-value g1 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.002
Robust regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Inkomsten uit pensioenen beslaan een groot deel van de totale inkomsten die
een gemiddeld persoon over zijn of haar levensduur genereert. Voor het meren-
deel van de bevolking zijn verwachte pensioeninkomens het grootste vermogens-
bestanddeel. Dit verklaart voor een groot deel de hoeveelheid literatuur die over
dit onderwerp is verschenen. Immers, zonder inkomsten uit pensioenen zouden
we ofwel langer, tot het einde van ons leven doorwerken, ofwel meer sparen om op
een gegeven moment te kunnen stoppen met werken. In dit proefschrift ga ik in op
dit laatste effect, en bestudeer de spaarreactie van huishoudens op pensioeninkom-
sten. De hoofdvraag die ik probeer beantwoorden is dan ook: Is er een spaarreactie
van huishoudens op pensioenen?
Economische theorie is relatief eenduidig over het antwoord op deze vraag: Uit-
eraard gedragen huishoudens zich anders in een scenario zonder pensioenen als
in een scenario met pensioenen. Hieraan ligt ten grondslag dat mensen vooruit
denken: gegeven dat ik een pensioen ontvang als ik stop met werken hoef ik
nu minder te sparen om rond te kunnen komen. Recente (en minder recente)
ontwikkelingen maken dit gegeven echter minder waarschijnlijk. De vergrijzing
zorgt voor een toename van het aantal gepensioneerden ten opzichte van het aantal
werknemers, en zal ofwel leiden tot een toename van de premiedruk voor jongeren
of een verlaging van de AOW-uitkering voor ouderen, of een combinatie hiervan.
Met de kennis van nu is de keuze voor een omslagstelsel voor de AOW bij de intro-
ductie hiervan in de jaren ’50 een slechte geweest. Zolang ouderen mogen stemmen
op kortzichtige politici zal hieraan echter weinig veranderen, met uitzondering van
de traditionele kaasschaaf. Een andere ontwikkeling is de dekkingsgraad van pen-
sioenfondsen. De ﬁnanciële crisis toont aan dat het rendement van de tweede pijler
van ons pensioenstelsel, geﬁnancierd door werkgevers en werknemers, onderhe-
vig is aan resultaten behaald op de beurs. De omzetting van het huidige systeem,
gebaseerd op uitkomsten, naar een systeem wat gebaseerd is op bijdrages, zal de
risico’s nog meer expliciet maken dan ze nu al zijn.
Het voorgaande pleit voor een aanpak waar de verwachtingen ten aanzien van
toekomstig pensioeninkomen centraal staan. Consumptiegedrag onder onzeker-
heid is gebaseerd op de verwachtingen van huishoudens: als ik verwacht meer pen-
sioen te krijgen, hoef ik nu minder geld opzij te leggen voor later, om mijn con-
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sumptie op peil te houden. Onzekerheid leidt typisch echter ook tot een voor-
zorgsmotief: ik weet niet zeker hoeveel pensioen ik later zal ontvangen. Hoe
onzekerder ik ben over de hoogte van mijn pensioenuitkering, des te meer leg ik nu
geld opzij om mogelijke tegenvallers te compenseren. Hoewel deze twee hypothe-
sen plausibel zijn, en theoretisch goed gefundeerd, blijken ze in de praktijk lastig
te toetsen. Tot voor kort was informatie met betrekking tot verwachtingen niet
beschikbaar; in plaats daarvan veronderstellen economen rationele verwachtin-
gen. In dit proefschrift maak ik gebruik van recent verzamelde verwachtingsdata:
huishoudens worden gevraagd hun verwachtingen kenbaar te maken. In combi-
natie met data over spaargedrag kunnen we bovenstaande hypothesen toetsen.
In hoofdstuk 2, geschreven met Rob Alessie en Adriaan Kalwij, bestudeer ik de
kwaliteit van de antwoorden op verwachtingsvragen. Het type vraag dat gesteld
wordt is niet in de vorm: “Vertelt u eens hoeveel pensioeninkomen u verwacht?” In
plaats daarvan wordt de methodologie van Dominitz en Manski gebruikt, toegepast
op de vervangingsratio (de ratio van pensioeninkomen ten opzichte van huidig
inkomen): “Wat is volgens u de kans dat uw vervangingsratio lager is dan 100%?”
Dezelfde vraag wordt herhaald voor de kansen op een vervangingsratio lager dan
90%, 80%, 70%, 60% en 50%, alsook de kans op een vervangingsratio van meer
dan 100%. Samen genomen geven de antwoorden op deze vragen een goed beeld
van de kansverdeling van toekomstig pensioeninkomen. Deze kansverdeling stelt
ons in staat om, voor elk huishouden apart, het gemiddelde en de standaardde-
viatie uit te rekenen, als maatstaven voor de verwachting van en de onzekerheid
over de hoogte van het toekomstig pensioeninkomen. De Nederlandse werknemer
verwacht gemiddeld een pensioen van 75-80% van zijn huidig inkomen te ontvan-
gen, met een standaarddeviatie van 15%. Oudere werknemers verwachten meer
pensioeninkomen en zijn minder onzeker. Hoogopgeleiden verwachten een lager
percentage van hun huidige inkomen te ontvangen, en tonen aan onzekerder te
zijn. Sinds 2007 zijn huishoudens minder pensioeninkomen gaan verwachten, en
zijn ze onzekerder geworden. Gegeven de situatie op de beurs zijn deze resul-
taten niet verassend, en dragen ze bij aan het vertrouwen wat onderzoekers mogen
hebben in de verwachtingsdata.
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Een belangrijke bevinding is echter dat niet alle huishoudens in staat zijn deze
vragen te beantwoorden. Kansen zijn een ingewikkeld concept voor een groot
deel van de respondenten. De serie antwoorden moet voldoen aan twee statistis-
che eisen: monotoniciteit van de (cumulatieve) kansverdelingfunctie, en kansen
moeten optellen tot maximaal 100%. Voor een derde deel van onze steekproef
wordt niet aan beide eisen voldaan. Het berekenen van een gemiddelde en stan-
daarddeviatie is voor deze groep lastig, zoniet onmogelijk. Niet verassend speelt
genoten onderwijs een belangrijke rol: laagopgeleiden geven vaker statistisch in-
consistente antwoorden dan hoogopgeleiden. Als gevolg daarvan bestaat de uitein-
delijke dataset uit voornamelijk hoogopgeleiden, oftewel een selectieve steekproef.
Gegeven bovenstaande bevindingen zorgt dit selectieproces voor een te hoge mate
van pessimisme en teveel onzekerheid ten aanzien van pensioeninkomen, waar-
voor onderzoekers een correctiemethode zullen moeten toepassen om uitspraken
te kunnen doen over de hele populatie.
In hoofdstuk 3 toets ik de hypotheses dat een hoger verwacht pensioen leidt
tot lagere besparingen, en dat meer onzekerheid leidt tot meer besparingen. Ik
schat hiervoor een spaarvergelijking, afgeleid uit een theoretisch model, waar con-
sumptie afhangt van inkomen, vermogen, levensverwachting en de verwachtingen
ten aanzien van pensioeninkomen. Besparingen worden gemeten door voor elk
huishouden te berekenen hoeveel het ﬁnanciële vermogen toe- of afneemt tussen
twee opeenvolgende jaren. Ik probeer zoveel mogelijk te corrigeren voor het feit
dat de verwachtingsvragen leiden tot een aselecte steekproef, zoals aangetoond
in hoofdstuk 2. Bovendien beantwoordt niet elk huishouden de (hele) vragenlijst
twee jaar achter elkaar, waardoor we geen besparingen kunnen meten voor deze
groep. Ook dit kan leiden tot een selectieve steekproef, waarvoor ik probeer te
corrigeren. Ik gebruik een kwantielregressiemodel, waarin de spaarreactie afhangt
van de positie van een huishouden ten opzichte van andere huishoudens in de
verdeling van besparingen. Simpel gezegd vermoed ik dat huishoudens die weinig
sparen zich anders gedragen dan huishoudens die veel geld opzij zetten. De moti-
vatie volgt uit het feit dat banken niet toestaan dat het ﬁnanciële vermogen van
een huishouden (te sterk) negatief wordt. Uit het theoretische model volgt dat
huishoudens met een lage spaarvoet minder sterk reageren op veranderingen in
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hun pensioeninkomen dan huishoudens met een hogere spaarvoet, typische de
rijke, vermogende huishoudens. Meer in het algemeen geldt dat een deel van de
bevolking weinig vooruitziend is, en zich dus anders gedraagt dan veronderstelt
in het theoretische model.
Ik vind dat alleen de huishoudens in de bovenste helft van de verdeling zich
gedragen volgens het model: zij sparen meer als gevolg van lagere verwachte pen-
sioeninkomsten en als gevolg van meer onzekerheid. Ook geldt dat deze groep
meer spaargeld opzij zet als gevolg van een hogere levensverwachting. Dit in
tegenstelling tot de minder vermogende huishoudens, die geen spaarreactie tonen
ten aanzien van pensioeninkomen of levensverwachting. Deze resultaten zijn con-
sistent met het theoretische model met een ondergrens aan ﬁnancieel vermogen.
Tot dusver is dit een van de eerste empirische studies naar het voorzorgsmotief
voor spaargedrag. De unieke data ten aanzien van verwachtingen maken deze,
zeker vandaag de dag relevante studie mogelijk.
In hoofdstuk 4, in samenwerking met Rob Alessie en Adriaan Kalwij, kijk ik
naar andere vormen van private pensioenaanvullingen. In plaats van naar totale
besparingen te kijken, zoals in hoofdstuk 3, focus ik hier op speciﬁeke producten:
lijfrentes, koopsompolissen en kapitaalverzekeringen. Het aanschaffen van een li-
jfrenteverzekering of koopsompolis resulteert in een extra aanvulling op het pen-
sioen. Een kapitaalverzekering daarentegen keert typisch een bedrag ineens uit,
en kan dus meer gezien worden als het deﬁnitief opzij zetten van een deel van het
vermogen voor consumptie na uitkering. Onder voorwaarden zijn deze producten
belastingtechnisch gezien aantrekkelijk.
Zowel lijfrenteverzekeringen als koopsompolissen zijn economisch zeer aantrekke-
lijke producten. Ze garanderen een periodieke aanvulling op het inkomen zolang
de bezitter leeft. In een belangrijke studie heeft Yaari in 1965 aangetoond dat dit
type producten theoretisch optimaal zijn. Sterker nog, iedereen zou al zijn geld
in deze producten moeten steken. In de praktijk blijkt dit echter niet het geval,
en deze observatie wordt typisch aangeduid met de ’Annuity puzzle’. Oorzaken
voor dit contrast tussen theorie en realiteit zijn uitgebreid onderzocht, en wijzen op
niet-realistische veronderstellingen in de studie van Yaari, de verzekeringen zijn te
duur (denk aan woekerpolissen) of verschillen in de praktijk van hoe ze theoretisch
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vormgegeven zijn, altruïsme ten aanzien van het nageslacht, grote zorguitgaven in
de laatste jaren van het leven en meer. In dit hoofdstuk proberen we in kaart te
brengen wie deze producten wel kopen. De resultaten tonen aan dat de rijkere,
vermogende en hoogopgeleide huishoudens met name dit type producten kopen.
Een zelfde sociaaleconomische splitsing tussen bezitters en niet-bezitters geldt voor
de kapitaalverzekeringen. Kortom, de ’Annuity puzzle’, voor zover die al bestaat,
vind zijn oorsprong voornamelijk in de lagere sociaaleconomische klassen van de
Nederlandse bevolking.
Ons econometrische model staat ons echter toe een andere oorzaak aan te dra-
gen: meetfouten. In elk databestand zitten meetfouten; in vragenlijsten, via de com-
puter ingevuld door leden van het huishouden, zullen deze relatief vaak voorkomen.
De meetfout die wij onderzoeken beslaat het bezit van de diverse producten. Naast
de mogelijkheid dat een persoon de waarheid invult (hij/zij heeft wel een polis,
en vult in dat hij/zij deze inderdaad bezit; idem voor niet-bezitters) zijn er twee
mogelijke meetfouten: een persoon heeft een polis, maar stelt in het antwoord geen
polis te bezitten, en omgekeerd. Waarom de persoon een antwoord geeft dat afwijkt
van de waarheid is niet duidelijk, en zullen we in nader onderzoek proberen toe te
lichten. Mogelijke spelen veranderingen in de samenstelling van het huishouden
(zoals echtscheiding), vergeetachtigheid of verveling tijdens het invullen van de
vragenlijst een rol. In elk geval vinden wij een grote rol voor meetfouten: wij schat-
ten dat 32% van de bezitters invult geen lijfrenteverzekering of koopsompolis te
bezitten. Voor 12% geldt het omgekeerde: zij geven aan wel een lijfrenteverzek-
ering of koopsompolis te bezitten, terwijl wij inschatten dat ze in de groep niet-
bezitters horen. Deze forse afwijkingen zijn onderhevig aan statistische onzeker-
heid, maar letterlijk genomen zou het percentage bezitters hiermee stijgen van 32%
naar 56%. Meetfouten kunnen dus een belangrijke oorzaak van de ’Annuity puzzle’
zijn.
In hoofdstuk 5, geschreven met Rob Alessie en Viola Angelini, keer ik terug
naar de vraag wat de effecten zijn van pensioenen op spaargedrag. Wij nemen
een Europees perspectief, en maken gebruik van recent verzamelde gegevens over
huishoudens in 13 Europese landen. Deze data zijn uniek, in dat ze, naast de
typische vragen over inkomen, vermogen en samenstelling van het huishouden,
Samenvatting 157
vragen stellen over wat zich in het verleden heeft afgespeeld. De respondenten
zijn 50 jaar of ouder, waardoor we doorgaans niets weten over gebeurtenissen in
het verleden die een belangrijke rol kunnen spelen in hedendaags vermogen of
gedrag. Iemand die 10 jaar lang werkloos is geweest zal een andere pensioenop-
bouw kennen dan iemand die altijd fulltime heeft gewerkt. Met deze pan-Europese
vragenlijst kunnen we deze informatie wel achterhalen, en kunnen we inschatten
hoeveel het huishouden in het verleden in totaal aan arbeidsinkomen heeft verdi-
end. We tonen aan dat deze informatie uitermate nuttig is in het schatten hoeveel
meer of minder huishoudens sparen door veranderingen in hun pensioeninkomen.
Onze resultaten suggereren dat een gemiddeld Europees huishouden 47-61 euro-
cent meer spaart als het pensioenvermogen met 1 euro afneemt. Dit stijgt tot 78-
87% als we alleen kijken naar liquide besparingen. Deze percentages suggereren
dat een hervorming van het pensioensysteem, met lagere pensioenuitkeringen als
gevolg, zal leiden tot een toename van private besparingen, en dus een toename
van het vermogen van huishoudens. Hierdoor worden de negatieve gevolgen van
de hervorming deels teniet gedaan, echter in onvoldoende mate om dezelfde lev-
ensstandaard te garanderen. Ook vinden we dat er belangrijke verschillen zijn qua
opleiding: laagopgeleiden zullen hun gedrag nauwelijks aanpassen, en lopen dus
grote risico’s er ﬂink op achteruit te gaan als het pensioensysteem op de schop
gaat. Dit in tegenstelling tot hoogopgeleiden, die hun gedrag wel aanpassen aan
de veranderde omstandigheden. Tot slot vinden we dat pensioenhervormingen
in Griekenland, Italië en Spanje de meest desastreuze effecten zullen hebben, als
gevolg van het uitblijven van genoemde spaarreactie.
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